by James Schummer, Rakesh V. Vohra
Journal of Economic Theory
http://www.kellogg.nwu.edu/faculty/schummer/ftp/research/circle.pdf
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Abstract:
We consider rules that choose a location on a graph (e.g. a road network) based on agents ’ single-peaked preferences. First, we characterize the class of strategy-proof, onto rules when the graph is a tree. Such a rule is based on a collection of generalized median voter rules (Moulin, 1980) satisfying a consistency condition. Second, we characterize such rules for graphs containing cycles. We show that while such a rule is not necessarily dictatorial, the existence of a cycle grants some agent an amount of decisive power, unlike the case of trees. Rules for this case can be described in terms of a subclass of such rules for trees. Journal of Economic Literature Classification
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