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Abstract: Combinatorial auctions where agents can bid on bundles of items are desirable because they allow the agents to express complementarity and substitutability between the items. However, expressing one's preferences can require bidding on all bundles. (Update)
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BibTeX entry: (Update)
@misc{ sandholm-generalizing,
author = "Tuomas Sandholm",
title = "Generalizing Preference Elicitation in Combinatorial Auctions",
url = "citeseer.ist.psu.edu/sandholm03generalizing.html" }
Citations (may not include all citations):214 Incentives in teams (context) - Groves - 1973
184 Algorithm for optimal winner determination in combinatorial .. - Sandholm - 1999 ACM DBLP
147 Taming the computational complexity of combinatorial auction.. (context) - Fujishima, Leyton-Brown et al. - 1999 DBLP
128 Bidding and allocation in combinatorial auctions - Nisan - 2000 ACM DBLP
69 Iterative combinatorial auctions: Theory and practice - Parkes, Ungar - 2000 DBLP
51 eMediator: A next generation electronic commerce server - Sandholm - 1999 DBLP
40 Preference elicitation in combinatorial auctions: Extended a.. - Conen, Sandholm - 2001
37 Optimal auction design for agents with hard valuation proble.. - Parkes - 1999 DBLP
34 Partialrevelation VCG mechanism for combinatorial auctions - Conen, Sandholm - 2002
32 anonymous-price combinatorial auction (context) - Wurman, Wellman et al. - 2000
29 Bidding languages for combinatorial auctions - Hoos, Boutilier - 2001 DBLP
27 Towards a universal test suite for combinatorial auction alg.. - Leyton-Brown, Pearson et al. - 2000 ACM DBLP
27 Why are Vickrey auctions rare (context) - Rothkopf, Teisberg et al. - 1990
24 Costly valuation computation in auctions - Larson, Sandholm - 2001 ACM
22 Issues in computational Vickrey auctions (context) - Sandholm - 2000
17 The communication complexity of efficient allocation problem.. - Nisan, Segal - 2002
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