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@ARTICLE{Sabelfeld03language-basedinformation-flow,
    author = {Andrei Sabelfeld and Andrew C. Myers},
    title = {Language-based information-flow security},
    journal = {IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications},
    year = {2003},
    volume = {21},
    pages = {2003}
}

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Abstract:

Abstract--- Current standard security practices do not provide substantial assurance that the end-to-end behavior of a computing system satisfies important security policies such as confidentiality. An end-to-end confidentiality policy might assert that secret input data cannot be inferred by an attacker through the attacker's observations of system output; this policy regulates information flow. Conventional security mechanisms such as access control and encryption do not directly address the enforcement of information-flow policies. Recently, a promising new approach has been developed: the use of programming-language techniques for specifying and enforcing information-flow policies. In this article we survey the past three decades of research on information-flow security, particularly focusing on work that uses static program analysis to enforce information-flow policies. We give a structured view of recent work in the area and identify some important open challenges. Index Terms--- Computer security, confidentiality, information flow, noninterference, security-type systems, covert channels,

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