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Abstract: We consider auction design in a setting with costly preference elicitation. Well designed auctions can help to avoid unnecessary elicitation while determining efficient allocations. Careful design can also lead to more efficient outcomes when elicitation is too costly to permit perfect allocative efficiency. An incremental revelation principle is developed and used to motivate the role of proxied and indirect auction designs. Proxy agents, situated between bidders and an auction, can be used to ... (Update)
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BibTeX entry: (Update)
David C. Parkes. Auction design with costly preference elicitation. Annals of Mathematics and AI, 2003. to appear. http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/parkes03auction.html More
@misc{ parkes03auction,
author = "D. Parkes",
title = "Auction design with costly preference elicitation",
text = "David C. Parkes. Auction design with costly preference elicitation. Annals
of Mathematics and AI, 2003. to appear.",
year = "2003",
url = "citeseer.ist.psu.edu/parkes03auction.html" }
Citations (may not include all citations):177 An implementation of the Contract Net Protocol based on marg.. - Sandholm - 1993
99 A theory of auctions and competitive bidding (context) - Milgrom, Weber - 1982
95 Principles of metareasoning - Russell, Wefald - 1991
89 Limitations of the Vickrey Auction in Computational Multiage.. - Sandholm - 1996
74 Analyzing the airwaves auction - McAfee, McMillan - 1996
69 Iterative Combinatorial Auctions: Theory and Practice - Parkes, Ungar - 2000
64 Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed tenders (context) - Vickrey - 1961
55 Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A general result (context) - Gibbard - 1973
51 Shopbots and Pricebots - Greenwald, Kephart - 1999
44 Truthful mechanisms for one-parameter agents - Archer, Tardos - 2001
43 Characterization of satisfactory mechanisms for the revelati.. (context) - Green - 1977
40 Preference Elicitation in Combinatorial Auctions - Conen, Sandholm - 2001
35 Truth Revelation in Approximately Efficient Combinatorial Au.. - Lehmann, O'Callaghan et al. - 2002
35 Microeconomic Theory (context) - Mas-Colell, Whinston et al. - 1995
31 Iterative Combinatorial Auctions: Achieving Economic and Com.. (context) - Parkes - 2001
27 Preventing Strategic Manipulation in Iterative Auctions: Pro.. - Parkes, Ungar - 2000
24 Costly Valuation Computation in Auctions - Larson, Sandholm - 2001
23 Mechanism theory - Jackson - 2000
19 Bargaining with limited computation: Deliberation equilibriu.. - Larson, Sandholm - 2001
15 Auctions with severely bounded communication - Blumrosen, Nisan - 2002
12 Computational Criticisms of the Revelation Principle - Conitzer, Sandholm - 2003
11 Preference Elicitation and Query Learning - Blum, Jackson et al. - 2004
11 Equilibrium in Auctions with Entry (context) - Levin, Smith - 1994
10 Bundling Equilibrium in Combinatorial Auctions - Holzman, Kfir-Dahav et al. - 2004
9 Price-Based Information Certificates for Minimal-Revelation .. - Parkes - 2002
8 Iterative Multiattribute Vickrey Auctions - Parkes, Kalagnanam - 2004
8 Applying Learning Algorithms to Preference Elicitation - Lahaie, Parkes - 2004
7 Multi-Player and Multi-Round Auctions with Severely Bounded .. - Blumrosen, Nisan et al. - 2003
7 Automated Negotiation (context) - Sandholm - 1999
7 Sequential Selling Mechanisms (context) - Ehrman, Peters - 1994
7 The Design of Coordination Mechanisms and Organizational Com.. (context) - Ledyard - 1993
6 The Communication Requirements of Efficient Allocations and .. - Nisan, Segal - 2003
6 the virtues of the ascending price auction: New insights in .. (context) - Compte, Jehiel - 2000
6 Preference Elicitation in Proxied Multiattribute Auctions - Sunderam, Parkes - 2003
6 Auctions and Information Acquisition: Sealed-bid or Dynamic .. (context) - Compte, Jehiel - 2002
5 Mechanism design with incomplete languages - Ronen - 2001
5 Ascending Price Vickrey Auctions using Primal-Dual Algorithm.. - Mishra, Parkes - 2004
5 Competitive bidding with entry costs (context) - Samuelson - 1985
4 Competition and information acquisition in first price aucti.. (context) - Lee - 1985
4 Mid-Auction Information Acquisition (context) - Rezende - 2001
3 Information and the divergence between willingness-to-accept.. - Kolstad, Guzman - 1999
3 Combinatorial Auctions (context) - Cramton, Shoham et al. - 2004
3 Participation Costs and Efficient Auctions (context) - Stegeman - 1996
3 Bidding Languages for Combinatorial Auctions (context) - Nisan - 2004
3 On Ascending Vickrey Auctions for Heterogeneous Objects (context) - de Vries, Schummer et al. - 2003
2 Computing Equilibrium Strategies in Infinite Games of Incomp.. (context) - Reeves, Wellman - 2003
2 Effectiveness of Query Types and Policies for Preference Eli.. - Hudson, Sandholm - 2004
1 The Winner Determination Problem (context) - Lehmann, Muller et al. - 2004
1 Combinatorial Auctions for Truckload Transportation (context) - Caplice, Sheffi - 2004
1 Experiments on deliberation equilibria in auctions - Larson, Sandholm - 2004
1 Multi-stage Information Acquisition in Auction Design - Fong - 2003
1 Auctioning Bus Routes (context) - Cantillon, Pesendorfer - 2004
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