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Abstract: This paper introduces Correlated-Q (CE-Q)
learning, a multiagent Q-learning algorithm
based on the correlated equilibrium (CE) solution
concept. CE-Q generalizes both Nash-
Q and Friend-and-Foe-Q: in general-sum
games, the set of correlated equilibria contains
the set of Nash equilibria; in constantsum
games, the set of correlated equilibria
contains the set of minimax equilibria. This
paper describes experiments with four variants
of CE-Q, demonstrating empirical convergence
to... (Update)
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BibTeX entry: (Update)
@misc{ amy-correlatedq,
author = "Amy Greenwald Amy",
title = "Correlated-Q Learning",
url = "citeseer.ist.psu.edu/753783.html" }
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