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Abstract: One of the major achievements of mechanism design theory is the family of truthful (incentive compatible) mechanisms often called VCG (named after Vickrey, Clarke and Groves). When applying VCG mechanisms to complex mechanism design problems such as combinatorial auctions a problem emerges: even finding optimal outcomes is computationally intractable. A striking observation is that if the optimal outcome is replaced by the results of computationally tractable approximation algorithms or... (Update)
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BibTeX entry: (Update)
Nisan, N., and Ronen, A. 2000. Computationally feasible vcg mechanisms. To appear. http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/nisan00computationally.html More
@inproceedings{ nisan00computationally,
author = "Noam Nisan and Amir Ronen",
title = "Computationally feasible {VCG} mechanisms",
booktitle = "{ACM} Conference on Electronic Commerce",
pages = "242-252",
year = "2000",
url = "citeseer.ist.psu.edu/nisan00computationally.html" }
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243 Rules of Encounter: Designing Conventions for Automated Nego.. (context) - rey, Rosenschein et al. - 1994
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4 Extended abstract appeared in STOC (context) - Nisan, Ronen et al. - 2001
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