by Tetsu Iwata, Kaoru Kurosawa
Pre-proceedings of Fast Software Encryption, FSE 2003
http://eprint.iacr.org/2002/180.ps.gz
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Abstract:
In this paper, we present One-key CBC MAC (OMAC) and prove its security for arbitrary length messages. OMAC takes only one key, K (k bits) of a block cipher E. Previously, XCBC requires three keys, (k + 2n) bits in total, and TMAC requires two keys, (k + n) bits in total, where n denotes the block length of E. The saving of the key length makes the security proof of OMAC much harder than those of XCBC and TMAC substantially.
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