(Enter summary)
Abstract: this paper, we focus on the communication burden
of algorithms for implementing the MC and SH cost-sharing mechanisms. We
prove a lower bound suggesting that any cost-sharing algorithm implementing the
Shapley-value mechanism must send a linear number of messages over each of a
linear number of links, a quadratic number of messages overall (Update)
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BibTeX entry: (Update)
Joan Feigenbaum, Christos Papadimitriou, and Scott Shenker. Sharing the cost of multicast transmissions. In Thirty-Second Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC00), May 2000. http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/feigenbaum00sharing.html More
@article{ feigenbaum01sharing,
author = "Joan Feigenbaum and Christos H. Papadimitriou and Scott Shenker",
title = "Sharing the Cost of Multicast Transmissions",
journal = "Journal of Computer and System Sciences",
volume = "63",
number = "1",
pages = "21-41",
year = "2001",
url = "citeseer.ist.psu.edu/feigenbaum00sharing.html" }
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