(Enter summary)
Abstract: This paper examines the problem of safely integrating independent software
components, of different criticality levels, in a single system. We examine the
risks of interference between independent components which share common
hardware resources. We propose a definition of safe integration in which only
a limited form of interference is tolerated, namely a bounded performance
degradation. We show how the definition can be applied to systems modeled
as input-output automata, and we compare our... (Update)
Context of citations to this paper: More
...concepts to model the integrity of embedded control systems. Dutertre and Stavridou developed an elegant noninterference model [5] having some similarities to our own. Their model adopts a higher level of granularity, taking task execution as the basic entity. This...
.... ensures containment if there is no unsafe interference between components on di#erent safety levels (this is called noninterference in [DS99] Intuitively, providing containment means that an output should in no way depend on inputs of a lower level. For this we assume an...
Cited by: More
Componentware for Critical Systems - Jürjens (2002)
(Correct)
Developing Safety-Critical Systems with UML - Jürjens (2003)
(Correct)
Partitioning in Avionics Architectures: Requirements, Mechanisms, .. - Rushby (2000)
(Correct)
Active bibliography (related documents): More All
0.8: The Priority Ceiling Protocol: Formalization and Analysis Using PVS - Dutertre (1999)
(Correct)
0.3: Practical Techniques for Damage Confinement in Software - Taylor (1998)
(Correct)
0.3: From Security to Safety and Back - Stavridou, Dutertre
(Correct)
Similar documents based on text: More All
0.4: A Model of Cooperative Noninterference for Integrated Modular.. - Di (1999)
(Correct)
0.4: Approximate Non-Interference - Di Pierro, Hankin, Wiklicky (2002)
(Correct)
0.2: Intrusion-Tolerant Group Management in Enclaves - Dutertre, Saïdi, Stavridou (2001)
(Correct)
Related documents from co-citation: More All
4: Security policies and security models (context) - Goguen, Meseguer - 1982
4: Invariant Performance: A Statement of Task Isolation Useful for Embedded Applica..
- Wilding, Hardin et al. - 1999
3: Computer Science Laboratory (context) - Owre, Shankar et al. - 1997
BibTeX entry: (Update)
B. Dutertre and V. Stavridou. A Model of Noninterference for Integrating Mixed-Criticality Software Components. In DCCA-7, Dependable Computing for Critical Applications, San Jose, CA, January 1999. http://citeseer.ist.psu.edu/dutertre99model.html More
@inproceedings{ dutertremodel,
author = "Bruno Dutertre and Victoria Stavridou",
title = "A Model of Noninterference for Integrating Mixed-Criticality Software Components",
pages = "301--318",
url = "citeseer.ist.psu.edu/dutertre99model.html" }
Citations (may not include all citations):
270
Formal Verification for Fault-Tolerant Architectures: Proleg..
- Owre, Rushby et al. - 1995
170
Security Policies and Security Models (context) - Goguen, Meseguer - 1982
120
Integrity Considerations for Secure Computer Systems (context) - Biba - 1977
77
Unwinding and Inference Control (context) - Goguen, Meseguer - 1984
32
A Distributed Secure System
- Rushby, Randell - 1983
25
Design and Verification of Secure Systems
- Rushby - 1981
12
Partitioning in Avionics Architectures: Requirements
- Rushby - 1998
8
COTS Software Integration: State of the Art (context) - Vigder, Gentleman et al. - 1996
7
Invariant Performance: A Statement of Task Isolation Useful ..
- Wilding, Hardin et al. - 1999
6
A Model of Cooperative Noninterference for Integrated Modula..
- Di Vito - 1999
5
Supporting Multiple Levels of Criticality (context) - Totel, Blanquart et al. - 1998
5
Integrated Modular Avionics for Next-Generation Commercial A.. (context) - Morgan - 1991
4
Advanced system concepts for future civil aircraft - an over.. (context) - Nadesakumar, Crowder et al. - 1995
1
ARINC Specification (context) - Software, Interface - 1997
The graph only includes citing articles where the year of publication is known.
Documents on the same site (http://www.csl.sri.com/dsa/publis.html): More
Provably Dependable Software Architectures - Stavridou, Riemenschneider (1998)
(Correct)
Complete Proof Systems for First Order Interval Temporal Logic - Dutertre (1995)
(Correct)
Correctness and Composition of Software Architectures - Moriconi, Qian (1994)
(Correct)
Online articles have much greater impact More about CiteSeer.IST Add search form to your site Submit documents Feedback
CiteSeer.IST - Copyright Penn State and NEC