Abraham Neyman. Bounded complexity justifies cooperation in finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma. Economic Letters, pages 227--229, 1985. Home/Search Document Not in Database Context Related Articles Check |
This paper is cited by the following papers:
Complexity Results about Nash Equilibria - Conitzer, Sandholm (2002) (24 citations) (Correct)
On Bounded Rationality And Computational Complexity - Papadimitriou, Yannakakis (Correct)
Learn Your Opponent's Strategy (in Polynomial Time)!.. - Mor, Goldman.. (Correct)
Lattice Games with Strategic Takeover - Feldman, Nagel (1993) (Correct)
Algorithms and Complexity in Combinatorial Optimization Games - Deng, Ibaraki, Nagamochi (1997) (6 citations) (Correct)
Learn Your Opponent's Strategy (in Polynomial Time)! - Mor, Goldman, Rosenschein (Correct)
Algorithmic Knowledge - Halpern, Moses, Vardi (1994) (13 citations) (Correct)
Provably Bounded-Optimal Agents - Russell, Subramanian (1995) (67 citations) (Correct)
Efficient Algorithms for Learning to Play Repeated .. - Freund, Kearns.. (1996) (9 citations) (Correct)
Efficient Algorithms for Learning to Play Repeated Games Against.. - al. (1995) (9 citations) (Correct)
Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning: a critical survey - Shoham, Powers, Grenager (2003) (11 citations) (Correct)
Journal of Economic Theory 83, 308317 (1998) - Notes Comments And (Correct)
Evolved Perception and Behaviour - In Oligopolies Robert (Correct)
Online articles have much greater impact More about CiteSeer.IST Add search form to your site Submit documents Feedback
CiteSeer.IST - Copyright Penn State and NEC