| CERT. Advisory CA-2001-02, Multiple Vulnerabilities in BIND. http://www.cert.org/advisories/ CA-2001-02.html, January 2001. |
....occurs at the application layer, the results returned become information that is critical to correct network operation at the network level. While we do not explicitly consider attacks against DNS server information below, the model we will construct can easily be expanded to show such attacks [13]. Each of the devices in the network has some resources available to perform their function. These resources might be speci c to a particular service layer, or they might be global across all layers within the same device. In this OSI Application Presentation Session Transport Network ....
CERT Advisory CA-98.05, \Multiple Vulnerabilities in BIND." http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-98.05.bind\_problems. html, April 1998.
....For instance, the additional section of a response may contain A RRs to provide the IP addresses for the NS RRs listed in the authority section. 4. 4 DNS Vulnerabilities Bellovin [4, 5] Gavron [25] Cheswick and Bellovin [12] Schuba and Spafford [60] Vixie [71] and CERT advisory 98:05 [10] have discussed several security problems with DNS. In the following, we summarize their findings: in particular, cache poisoning, failure to authenticate DNS responses, information leakage, masquerading as other name servers, and denial of service. 3 Query id s are used in both queries and ....
....and e.f.g.h. Thus, if an attacker creates a domain h.d, the traffic would be redirected to an unintended server. In the newer implementations, only the first and the last alternatives one that falls into the user s domain or one specified by the user will be tried by a resolver. CERT [10] published an advisory on several vulnerabilities in BIND that could lead to unauthorized transfers of root privileges and name server crashes. The first vulnerability concerned inadequate checks on the size of inverse queries. An inverse query looks for a domain name given a certain ....
CERT Coordination Center, "Multiple Vulnerabilities in BIND." CERT Advisory CA98: 05, April 8, 1998. 118
....the RRs in the other sections. For instance, the additional section of a response may contain A RRs to provide the IP addresses for the NS RRs listed in the authority section. 3. DNS Vulnerabilities Bellovin [3, 4] Gavron [10] Schuba and Spafford [15] Vixie [17] and CERT advisory CA 98.05 [5] discuss several security problems of DNS. In the following, we describe two well known problems of DNS that are relevant to this paper cache poisoning and failure to authenticate DNS responses. In the cache poisoning attack, an attacker can trick a name server S 1 to query another name server ....
CERT Coordination Center, "Multiple Vulnerabilities in BIND." CERT Advisory CA-98:05, April 8, 1998.
....and system libraries. It is interesting to note that this attack need not originate from an account on the system, in many cases daemons or utilities reading input from the network are vulnerable, and the attack can be successfully mounted from outside the system [10] 14] 12] 15] and [17]. 8.3.11 CpuHog (see 7.5.3) UNIX has had a similar problem, and most modern UNIX systems implement some kind of per user limits as to how many resources in terms of memory, CPU time, number of processes etc. Before these mechanisms were in place however, many simple availability attacks where ....
[CERT CA-98.05] Multiple Vulnerabilities in BIND, April 08, 1998, http:// www.cert.org.
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CERT. Advisory CA-2001-02, Multiple Vulnerabilities in BIND. http://www.cert.org/advisories/ CA-2001-02.html, January 2001.
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