Copeland, A.H. 1951, A reasonable social welfare function. Mimeo, University of Michigan.  Home/Search   Document Not in Database   Summary   Related Articles   Check

....minimum feedback edge sets. 2 Such approximations in themselves are not difficult to find, since in the case of k full lists, K is a metric and hence one of the s is a 2(1 Gamma 1=k) approximation to the L1 minimum (we thank Jon Kleinberg for pointing this out) 10 Copeland s method [12] is an attractive method for full lists: sort the candidates by the number of pairwise majority wins minus pairwise majority losses. This amounts to sorting the nodes in the majority graph by outdegree minus indegree. Copeland s method satisfies the extended Condorcet condition, can be computed in ....

A. H. Copeland. A reasonable social welfare function. Mimeo, University of Michigan, 1951.

....Q uniformly from the union of all pages ranked by the search engines. If (Q) P ) for a majority of the lists that ranked both P and Q, then go to Q, else stayinP . This chain generalizes Copeland s suggestion of sorting the candidates by the number of pairwise majoritycontests they havewon [10]. There are examples that differentiate the behavior of these chains. One can also show that the Markov ordering implied by these chains need not satisfy the extended Condorcet principle. 5. APPLICATIONS Weenvisage several applications of our rank aggregation methods in the context of searching ....

A. H. Copeland. A reasonable social welfare function. Mimeo,UniversityofMichigan, 1951.

....# # 8 # # 10 define profiles where had the KR depended on the Euclidean distance, it would reverse the rankings of the first, rather than the second set. 2.5. BC and CM geometry. Two other well known procedures based on pairwise votes are the Borda Count (Borda [2] and Copeland Method (Copeland [4]) For transitive preferences, it is well known that the BC tally is equivalent to summing each candidate s pairwise tallies. With the Eq. 2.1 profile, the a 1 ,a 2 ,a 3 respective BC tallies are 11 9 = 20, 8 14 = 22, 10 5 = 15 defining the BC ranking of a 2 # a 1 # a 3 . Similarly, the BC ....

A.H. Copeland, A reasonable social welfare function. Mimeo, University of Michigan, 1951.

....positional and statistical methods have provided new results for nonparametric statistics (Haunsperger [8] Positional outcomes also are used with choice procedures. A runo#, for instance, is held among the top ranked candidates from a first election. An agenda, a tournament, the Copeland Method ([6, 31, 14]) and Kemeny s rule ( 10, 11, 32] are among the many procedures using pairwise voting outcomes. Other methods, such as the controversial approval voting and the enigmatic rules of figure skating, use positional outcomes in complicated ways. 1.1. Complexity of analysis. Positional procedures have ....

....component where the BC winner (or winners as there there may be a tie) ranked above the BC loser (or losers) The rest of the proof follows from Fig. 5 which starts with any Basic rankings and finds all corresponding pairwise rankings. 5.3. Copeland Method. The Copeland Method (CM) see Copeland [6], Saari and Merlin [31] Merlin and Saari [14] often is used to rank sports teams. This is where the winning team receives one point, the losing team 1 and, if there is a tie, both receive zero points. A team s ranking is determined by the sum of received points. For a geometric description of ....

Copeland, A. H., A reasonable social welfare function. Mimeo, University of Michigan, 1951.

No context found.

Copeland, A.H. 1951, A reasonable social welfare function. Mimeo, University of Michigan.

No context found.

A.H. Copeland, A reasonable social welfare function. Mimeo, University of Michigan, 1951.

Online articles have much greater impact   More about CiteSeer.IST   Add search form to your site   Submit documents   Feedback  

CiteSeer.IST - Copyright Penn State and NEC