Y. Frankel, P. D. MacKenzie, and M. Yung. Adaptively-secure distributed public-key systems. In J. Nesetril, editor, European Symposium on Algorithms (ESA '99), volume 1643 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 4-27. Springer-Verlag, 1998.  Home/Search   Document Details and Download   Summary   Related Articles   Check

.... it is very likely that our methodology can be applied to showing security of other threshold discrete log based cryptosystems using the less expensive Pedersen s DKG used to construct in a generic fashion secure threshold versions of discrete log based schemes, was proposed by Frankel et al. in [FMY99] The DKG protocols proposed by Gennaro et al. and Frankel et al. are similar in spirit but the proposal of Gennaro et al. is more e#cient. protocol, if the security of the original centralized versions of these schemes can be reduced to the discrete logarithm assumption, the computational ....

....i.e. it outputs secret sharing of a private key x and a public Replacing computation on polynomial shares with computation on additive shares often seems necessary for the proof of security of a threshold protocol to go through. This technique was used before to handle an adaptive adversary in [FMY99, CGJ 99] or to handle the no erasure and concurrent adversary in [JL00] Threshold Signature Protocol TSch Inputs: Message m to be signed, plus the secret sharing of x generated by the initial Ped DKG protocol. In particular, each player P i holds an additive share x i of x while values y ....

Y. Frankel, P. D. MacKenzie, and M. Yung. Adaptively-secure distributed Public Key systems. In Algorithms -- ESA'99, 7th Annual European Symposium, Prague, pages 4--27, 1999. LNCS No. 1643

....number of parties it may corrupt. Constructing protocols that are provably secure against an adaptive adversary is a dicult task, because the adversary s corruption strategy is unknown and may depend upon public values as well as the internal states of the other corrupted parties. Frankel et al. [17] and Canetti et al. 7] have developed techniques for designing adaptively secure threshold cryptosystems, which were improved upon by Jarecki and Lysyanskaya [22] 9 This thesis will rst de ne the important notions and tools needed to develop secure protocols. It will then describe a simple ....

....than the static adversary model. We refrain from giving a precise formulation of the model in terms of multiparty computation because the de nitions are actually stricter than necessary for our threshold cryptographic protocols. However, the reader may see Canetti [6] for details. Frankel et al. [17] provide de nitions of the model and methodologies for proving adaptive security in many cryptographic settings (including ours) We summarize their results here. Recall that a t limited static adversary must choose at most t parties to corrupt before any protocols are executed. The adversary ....

Y. Frankel, M. Yung, and P. MacKenzie. Adaptively-secure distributed publickey systems. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 1643:4{??, 1999.

....to do this translation without recurring to erasures but at the expense of a significant added complexity. Other recent work on the adaptive adversary model includes [Can98, CDD 99] Also, independently from our work, adaptively secure distributed cryptosystems have been recently studied in [FMY] 2 2 Technical Overview: Road map to Adaptive Security This section provides an overview of some basic technical elements in our work. It is intended as a high level introduction to some of the issues that underly the protocol design and proofs presented in this paper (without getting into a ....

Y. Frankel, P. MacKenzie, and M. Yung. Adaptively-secure distributed public-key systems. Personal communication with M.Yung.

....due to space considerations. Corollary 1. There exists an adaptively secure proactive DL based optimal resilient (t; l) threshold public key system. Corollary 2. There exists an adaptively secure DL based optimal resilient (t; l) threshold key generation system. In a companion paper (also [26]) we extend this work to key generation and proactive maintenance of RSA based systems, which require additional techniques. 2 Model and Definitions Our system consists of l servers S = fS 1 ; S l g. A server is corrupted if it is controlled by the adversary. When a server is corrupted, ....

Y. Frankel, P. D. MacKenzie, and M. Yung. Adaptively-secure distributed publickey systems. Preliminary report of this work, Oct. 7, 1998 (STOC '99 submission), 1998.

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Y. Frankel, P. D. MacKenzie, and M. Yung. Adaptively-secure distributed public-key systems. In J. Nesetril, editor, European Symposium on Algorithms (ESA '99), volume 1643 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 4-27. Springer-Verlag, 1998.

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Y. Frankel, P. MacKenzie, M. Yung, Adaptively secure distributed public-key systems, Theoretical Computer Science, Vol. 287, No. 2, September 2002.

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Y. Frankel, P. MacKenzie and M. Yung, Adaptively-Secure Distributed Public-Key Systems, Algorithms { proceedings of European Symposium on Algorithms (ESA '99), Lecture Notes in Computer Science volume 1643, Springer-Verlag, pp. 4-27, 1999.

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Y. Frankel, P. MacKenzie and M. Yung, Adaptively-Secure Distributed Public-Key Systems. In European Symposium on Algorithms (ESA '99), Springer LNCS 1643, pp. 4--27, 1999.

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Y. Frankel, P. MacKenzie and M. Yung, Adaptively-Secure Distributed Public-Key Systems, Algorithms -- proceedings of European Symposium on Algorithms (ESA '99), Lecture Notes in Computer Science volume 1643, Springer-Verlag, pp. 4--27, 1999.

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