Karmilo-Smith, A., Beyond modularity: A Developmental Perspective, MIT Press, Cambridge, 1992.  Home/Search   Document Not in Database   Summary   Related Articles   Check

....implies that knowing that can be explained and shared with other thinking subjects, but neither necessarily reduced to rules nor explicited. The notions of procedural and declarative knowledge have been brought into contact with the implicit explicit distinction by several authors. For instance, [16, 17] characterized implicit knowledge as a procedural knowledge whose accessibility for the other parts of the system is limited. Accessibility has also been emphasized as the central issue in the distinction between procedural and declarative knowledge in [19] Squire [33] characterized the knowledge ....

Karmiloff-Smith A. (1992) Beyond modularity: A developmental perspective on cognitive science, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.

....knowing that can be explained and shared with other thinking subjects, but neither necessarily reduced to rules nor explicited. The notions of procedural and declarative knowledge have been brought into contact with the implicit explicit distinction by several authors. For instance Karmiloff Smith [30, 31] characterized implicit knowledge as a procedural knowledge whose accessibility for the other parts of the system is limited. Accessibility has also been emphasized as the central issue in the distinction between procedural and declarative knowledge in [32] Squire [33] characterized the knowledge ....

Karmiloff-Smith A. (1992) Beyond modularity: A developmental perspective on cognitive science, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.

....This suggests that what happens over the course of learning a skill is that additional novel ways of inhibiting or otherwise modulating the effects of these very strong representations are found through processes of learning. Consider what happens when you learn to play the piano, for instance. As Karmiloff Smith (1992) points out, one goes from effortful programming of every movement to a stage where entire sequences of movements can be executed all at once, and then to a later stage where genuine flexibility is achieved. Our suggestion here is that subjective experience at each stage simply reflects the ....

.... Implicit learning: A graded, dynamic perspective 37 Finally, with respect to the development of explicit, conscious representations in cognitive systems, our framework can also be linked in interesting ways with the processes of representational redescription envisioned by Karmiloff Smith (Karmiloff Smith, 1992) as the main process of change during development. A crucial claim embodied in the assumptions that underpin the notion of representational redescription is that learning is success driven, that is, behavioral mastery of a particular skill does not constitute a signal for learning to stop but ....

Karmiloff-Smith, A. (1992). Beyond modularity : A developmental perspective on cognitive science. Cambridge: MIT Press.

....choose from at all. Put simply, connectionist networks require additional units that explicitly encode relational knowledge. This claim converges with Clark and Thornton s (1997) arguments that solving type 2 (i.e. relational) problems requires some form of input representational redescription (Karmiloff Smith, 1992). They tentatively suggested incremental learning (Elman, 1993) the idea of incrementally increasing the number of training patterns, or retainable weights. But, the approach I have been critiquing here shares common roots with this idea. Consequently, redescription cannot just be recoding ....

....the most promising way forward for connectionism is by integration of context sensitive (e.g. feedforward) networks and context insensitive (e.g. tensor) networks. The critical question then becomes how. It is perhaps ironic that advocates of explicit representations in cognitive development (Karmiloff Smith, 1992) should consider the sorts of connectionist models that rely on, as shown here, implicit representations (Elman, Bates, Johnson, Karmiloff Smith, Parisi, Plunkett, 1996) But, just as Karmiloff Smith has argued for explicit representation in cognitive development, I have been arguing for ....

Karmiloff-Smith, A. (1992). Beyond Modularity: A developmental perspective on cognitive science. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press/Bradford Books.

.... organisation as either an implicit or explicit consequence of goal directed or cognitive theories of behaviour (Bruner 1982) Staged theories of development and learning are also hierarchical when they described complex skills being composed of simpler, previously developed ones (Piaget 1954, Karmiloff Smith 1992, Greenfield 1991) CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 3 1.2.2 Dynamic Theories and the Thesis Problem The competing theory, that responsive animal intelligence cannot possibly be governed by hierarchical control, has emerged from some of the practitioners of the dynamic hypothesis of cognition (van Gelder ....

....situation. The innovation of behaviour based AI has been to move away from such global systems of intelligence to modular, specialised, and distributed ones. Such approaches have also been under investigation recently in psychology and philosophy of mind (Fodor 1983, Dennett Kinsbourne 1992, Karmiloff Smith 1992, Cosmides Tooby 1994, Mithen 1996, Elman et al. 1996) 2.2.3 Behaviour Expression and Emergence The fact that agent based AI uses the word behaviour both to describe a program element and an explicit act would lead to ambiguity even if each software behaviour, when executed successfully, ....

[Article contains additional citation context not shown here]

Karmiloff-Smith, A. (1992), Beyond Modularity: A Developmental Perspective on Cognitive Change, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.

.... organization as either an implicit or explicit consequence of goal directed or cognitive theories of behavior (Bruner, 1982) Staged theories of development and learning are also hierarchical when they described complex skills being composed of simpler, previously developed ones (Piaget, 1954; Karmiloff Smith, 1992; Greenfield, 1991) Nevertheless, the problem of how this apparently hierarchically ordered behavior emerges from a brain or machine has been an ongoing issue, in psychology as well as AI. The well known defenses of Lashley and Dawkins are still being revisited (Houghton and Hartley, 1995; ....

....For a hybrid system, emergent behavior is useless (Malcolm, 1997) This is because an emergent behavior definitionally has no name or handle within the system, consequently the planning layer cannot use it. In humans at least, acquired skills can be recognized and deliberately redeployed (Karmiloff Smith, 1992). Hexmoor (1995) attempts to model both the development of a skill (an element of the middle layer) from actions performed deliberately (planned by the top layer) and the acquisition of deliberate control of skills. His hypothesis of requiring both these forms of learning are probably valid, but ....

Karmiloff-Smith, A. (1992). Beyond Modularity: A Developmental Perspective on Cognitive Change. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.

....neo constructivism says that it is the very stability of the environment, and low level cognitive architecture that allows the emergence of higher order phenomena regularly during development. Such neo constructivist development is likely to be adaptive and therefore selected for. Karmiloff Smith [11] terms this approach as emergent modularisation, arguing that specific computational mechanisms for specific tasks will emerge as a part of this process, but that they are not in built. The brain functionally organises itself as a response to the activity it is involved in during development. The ....

Karmiloff-Smith, A. (1992) Beyond Modularity: A Developmental Perspective on Cognitive Science. London: MIT Press.

....years Piaget s anti nativist stance has been challenged by the findings of many developmental psychological findings. It is believed now that the child has many domain specific inheritances. However, despite this, the Piagetian principles may still be reconciled with a weak form of nativism (see (KarmiloffSmith, 1992) for a review) 17 therefore necessary to distinguish between the stated of adaption and the process of adaption. In the state, nothing is clear. In following the process, things are cleared up. There is adaption when the organism is transformed by the environment and when this variation results ....

Karmiloff-Smith, A. (1992). Beyond modularity: a developmental perspective on cognitive science. MIT press, Cambridge, MA.

....human knowledge reuse in terms applicable to artificial systems has been extensively studied in the field of cognitive science. For example, it has been observed that reuse of knowledge occurs in children s learning and possible explanations based on artificial connectionist models (e.g. [44]) and symbolic machine learning (e.g. 57] have been described. Also, there has been some discussion of the related topic of structured learning in a connectionist framework [19] Flexibility Human flexibility in knowledge reuse is an important property to consider. Humans learn how to make a ....

Annette Karmiloff-Smith. Beyond Modularity: A Developmental Perspective on Cognitive Science. MIT Press, 1992.

....rigor, e.g. 10] but see Lourenco and Machado s 1996 paper [28] for a recent review and defense. Another, perhaps more important criticism, is that Piaget s rejection of the notion of specific innate abilities turned out to run counter to more recent findings (but see Karmiloff Smith s 1992 book [23] for a review of the criticisms and a discussion of how Piagetian theory can be salvaged) For earlier criticisms of Piaget s theory of Egocentricity see [17] DRAFT PAPER FOR COMMENTS 7 from French) A pasteboard model, one metre square and from twelve to thirty centimetres high, was made to ....

A. Karmiloff-Smith. Beyond modularity: a developmental perspective on cognitive science. MIT press, Cambridge, MA, 1992.

....two year old. Piaget al.so underestimates the degree to which a child s intelligence is domain specific. He believed that intelligence is grounded in a developmental sequence of domain general structures, implying a number of distinct stages to development. However a number of experiments[2] have shown this not to be the case. One example is children suffering from Williams syndrome, who have good linguistic skills even though their general intelligence is severely deficient. If language were constructed from the same intellectual structures that underlie reasoning, then such a ....

Karmiloff-Smith, A. (1992) Beyond Modularity: A Developmental Perspective on Cognitive Science, MIT Press.

....humans, we learn behaviours by interacting with our socio cultural linguistic environment, biased by our innate architectures. But how do we get the most from our knowledge How can we take our learned skills and articulate them to ourselves as ideas, or to others through language Karmiloff Smith [KS92] proposes a process that allows us to get the most from our knowledge: Representational Redescription. Through this process we take our implicit behavioural knowledge, and abstract from it progressively more explicit representations of our behaviour representations that we can manipulate and ....

....neural network, and how the network will develop its own method for accessing the parts of the sequence. 2 Representational Redescription In seeking to describe how humans gain knowledge and how we make the most flexible use of this knowledge, Annette Karmiloff Smith (hereafter KS) in [KS92] describes an endogenous process which acts on our internal representations of knowledge to effectively give us new knowledge. This is through a process of internal representational change, termed Representational Redescription (hereafter RR) which acts on our innately specified (genetic) ....

[Article contains additional citation context not shown here]

A. Karmiloff-Smith. Beyond Modularity: A Developmental Perspective on Cognitive Science. MIT Press/Bradford Books, Cambridge, MA., first edition, 1992.

....for such an adaptive architecture. To explain this focusses us on the very difficult question of the nature of the non symbolic symbolic interface. Our understanding of the dynamic nature of this relationship is inspired by recent work in cognitive development theory by Karmiloff Smith 92 [4]. It must be stressed however that the ideas we will sketch here represent only a small section of this highly developed theoretical work in developmental psychology and neuroscience, which we regard as a rich source of ideas for future research in robotics. 3 The Development of Symbolic ....

A. Karmiloff-Smith. Beyond Modularity: A Developmental Perspective on Cognitive Science. MIT Press, 1992.

.... organisms represent an important issue debated in many different disciplines such as evolutionary and developmental biology (e.g. Wagner, 1996; Raff, 1996; Wagner, 1995; Fontana and Buss, 1994; Needham, 1993; Bonner, 1988; Gould, 1977) the neurosciences, and cognitive science (e.g. Bates, 1994; Karmiloff Smith, 1992; Fodor, 1983; Chomsky, 1957) Many researchers tend to assume that human cognitive processes are accomplished by means of specialized modules (see e.g. Moscovitch and Umilt , 1990) and, in fact, the modularity of mind is one of the most fundamental assumption of cognitivism (Fodor, 1983) The ....

Karmiloff-Smith, A. (1992). Beyond modularity: A developmental perspective on cognitive science. MIT Press, Cambridge.

....1995; Yamada, 1990) On Modularity and Innateness Even though data from adult savants cannot be used to rule out cognitive prerequisites to language, they can still be used to argue for a modular architecture, one that emerges over time after certain key cognitive infrastructures are in place. Karmiloff Smith (1992) has referred to this hypothetical process as modularization , where modules are the end product of learning rather than its cause. Bates et al. 1988) make a similar argument, suggesting that Modules are made, not born. The emergence of such a modular architecture must be constrained by innate ....

.... as though they were accepted by all qualified authorities in the fields of linguistics and psycholinguistics, but the fact is that all these claims are highly controversial (for reviews, see Bates, Bretherton, Snyder, 1988; Bates Elman, 1996; Bates et al. in press; Elman et al. 1996; Karmiloff Smith, 1992). First, the existence of language universals does not provide compelling evidence for the innateness of language, because such universals could arise for a variety of reasons that are not specific to language itself (e.g. universal properties of cognition, memory, perception and attention) To ....

Karmiloff-Smith, A. (1992). Beyond modularity: A developmental perspective on cognitive science. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

No context found.

Neil Smith & Ianthi-Maria Tsimpli 18 Karmiloff-Smith, A. (1992) Beyond Modularity: A Developmental Perspective on Cognitive Science. MIT Press.

No context found.

Karmilo-Smith, A., Beyond modularity: A Developmental Perspective, MIT Press, Cambridge, 1992.

No context found.

Karmiloff-Smith, A. (1992). Beyond Modularity: A Developmental Perspective on Cognitive Science. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press/Bradford Books.

No context found.

Karmiloff-Smith, A. (1992) Beyond Modularity: A Developmental Perspective on Cognitive Science, MIT Press Review Atkinson et al. -- Consciousness mapping

No context found.

A. Karmilo-Smith, (1992). Beyond Modularity: A Developmental Perspective on Cognitive Science. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.

No context found.

A. Karmilo-Smith, (1992). Beyond Modularity: A Developmental Perspective on Cognitive Science. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.

No context found.

Karmiloff-Smith, A. Beyond Modularity: A Developmental Perspective on Cognitive Science. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992a.

No context found.

Karmiloff-Smith, A. (1992). Beyond modularity: a developmental perspective on Cognitive Science. Cambridge,Ma.: MIT Press/Bradford books.

No context found.

Karmiloff-Smith, A. (1992a). Beyond Modularity: a developmental perspective on cognitive science, MIT/Bradford, Cambridge, Mass.

No context found.

Karmiloff-Smith, A. (1992). Beyond modularity: a developmental perspective on Cognitive Science. Cambridge,Ma.: MIT Press/Bradford books.

First 50 documents

Online articles have much greater impact   More about CiteSeer.IST   Add search form to your site   Submit documents   Feedback  

CiteSeer.IST - Copyright Penn State and NEC