W. E. Walsh , P. Wellman, P. R.Wurman, and J. K.MacKie-.Mason, Some economics of market-based distributed scheduling, In International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems, 612--621, 1998.  Home/Search   Document Details and Download   Summary   Related Articles   Check

....is determined solely by cost. Our setting is more general. Our agents have to cover all the tasks, ensure feasibility of the bids they accept, and reduce scheduling risk. Walsh has proposed using combinatorial auction mechanisms for supply chain formation [18] and for decentralized scheduling [19]. Nei ther of these proposals requires the allocation solver to deal with temporal feasibility, which is the principal problem dealt with in this work. One of the algorithms we used is based on simulated annealing [13] and as such combines the advantages of heuristically guided search with some ....

W.E. WALSH, M.P. WELLMAN, P. R. WURMAN, AND J. K. MACKIE-MASON, Some economics of market-based distributed scheduling, in Proc. of the Eighteenth Int'l Conf. on Distributed Computing Systems, 1998, pp. 612-621.

....ed in market systems. These systems conserve a currency in its internal trades. The money an agent earns is the same amount another agent has to spend. Examples of market based systems in manufacturing control are found in [ Baker, 1996 ] Lin and Solberg, 1992 ] Upton et al. 1991 ] Walsh et al. 1998 ] Odell and Greenstein, 1999 ] or [ Parunak et al. 1997 ] In unbalanced numerical interactions, the messages are independent of the agents. As a consequence the communicated information may be read by more than one agent since the message itself is not erased when it is received. Force ....

W.E. Walsh, M.P. Wellman, P.R. Wurman, and J.R. MacKie-Mason. Some economics of market-based distributed scheduling. In Proceedings of 18th International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems, 1998.

....about the tardiness of jobs into their reward function. Miyashita [15] applies genetic programming to the problem, defining the fitness of a dispatch policy in terms of its global performance. There have been a number of agent based approaches that take a decentralized view of shop floor control [10, 12, 13, 15, 17, 19, 20, 23]. Through various forms of agent coordination these approaches attempt to attain coherent global performance by means of local decision making. A few popular agent based negotiation paradigms used by decentralized approaches to scheduling include the contract net protocol [10, 17, 20] auction ....

....various forms of agent coordination these approaches attempt to attain coherent global performance by means of local decision making. A few popular agent based negotiation paradigms used by decentralized approaches to scheduling include the contract net protocol [10, 17, 20] auction protocols [23] and other market based approaches [12, 13] There is evidence that market based approaches can produce globally optimal or near optimal solutions. Wellman et al. [23] show that for discrete resource allocation problems an equilibrium solution is an optimal solution. The problem is that equilibrium ....

[Article contains additional citation context not shown here]

W. E. Walsh, M. P. Wellman, P. R. Wurman, and J. K. MacKie-Mason. Some economics of market-based distributed scheduling. In Proceedings of the Eighteenth International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems, pages 612--621, May 1998.

....AG, and Sydkraft. 3 2 Applying Market Oriented Programming to Load Management Market oriented programming has been successfully applied to a number of applications [Wellman, 1993, Wellman, 1994, Wellman, 1996, Yamaki et al. 1996, Ygge and Akkermans, 1997, Kurose and Simha, 1989, Walsh et al. 1997] In this section we describe how market oriented programming can be applied to the application direct load management, and what the most important design steps are. 2.1 Basic Market Design The first important issue is getting setting up the commodities properly. In our research we started with ....

W. E. Walsh, M. P. Wellman, P. R. Wurman, and J. K. MacKieMason. Some economics of market-based distributed scheduling. Submitted. (Available from http://ai.eecs.umich.edu/people/wellman/Publications.html), 1997.

....is to maximize expected revenues. Moreover, our algorithms for matching buyers and sellers are fundamentally based on flow algorithms as encountered in combinatorial optimization and network theory [22] Finally, MARI builds on work done in the area of market oriented allocation mechanisms [23, 24, 26]. We build upon game theory to formulate our problem in economics terminology [25, 15] with optimization heuristics, such as maximization of aggregate surplus, that derive directly from economics theory. Future Work As of now, we have precisely defined MARI s design framework and functional ....

Walsh, W., M. Wellman, P. Wurman, J. MacKieMason. "Some Economics of Market-Based Distributed Scheduling." In Proceedings of the Eighteenth International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems, p.612-621. 1998.

....other servers utility. In addition, if all the servers learn more, the servers average utility increases, but if there was incomplete information, excess learning could reduce the average utility. 2. Related Work Auctions are suggested for a wide range of resource allocation problems in DAI [2, 19], since they lead to a fair, simple and efficient solution, with no need for a central authority. Vickrey auction [18] is widely used in DAI [9, 16] for the case of one to many auctions. This protocol is incentive compatible, whichmeans that each bidder has incentives to bid truthfully and this is ....

....protocol for the case of multiple buyers and multiple sellers of the same item. In AuctionBot, buyers and sellers can bid on a certain item according to a multilateral competitive negotiation protocol. Auctions can fail when applied to hard resource allocation problems, such as scheduling, [19] since there are dependencies between the resources. For such problems Clarke s mechanism can be used [7] Its disadvantage is the requirement that the agents have to pay taxes, and this means that utility is transferred out of the system thus reducing the efficiency of the overall mechanism. In ....

W. E. Walsh, M. P. Wellman, P. R. Wurman, and J. K. M. Mason. Some economics of market-based distributed scheduling. In Proc. of ICDCS-98, Amsterdam, 1998.

....ERDoS [24] accounts for only two specific security parameters (confidentiality and integrity) whereas the security component of the performance measure in this research can describe an arbitrarily complex set of security features. The FISC ratio is similar to the utility function described in [31] in that both measure the system value. The utility function in [31] calculates the system value by summing the value of resources allocated and resources reserved depending on the duration of a job, the deadline of a job, and the price of allocated time slots. The FISC ratio uses a conceptually ....

....and integrity) whereas the security component of the performance measure in this research can describe an arbitrarily complex set of security features. The FISC ratio is similar to the utility function described in [31] in that both measure the system value. The utility function in [31] calculates the system value by summing the value of resources allocated and resources reserved depending on the duration of a job, the deadline of a job, and the price of allocated time slots. The FISC ratio uses a conceptually similar calculation, but formulates it differently and includes ....

W.E. Walsh, M. P. Wellman, P. R. Wurman, and J. K. Mackie-Mason, "Some economics of market-based distributed scheduling," 18th Int'l Conf. on Distributed Computer Systems, May 1998, PP. 612-621.

....To illustrate this idea let s consider a distributed task scheduling scenario where a set of agents must agree on a schedule to work together towards performing some certain global task. There are several mechanisms by which this can be achieved [ Parunak, 1998 ] such as auction based mechanisms [ Walsh et al. 1998 ] where agents advertise (1) what they need in order to perform their individual task and (2) the result of this task once it is carried out. After some negotiation rounds the outcome is a global organization of the agents so that the overall task can be achieved. However, if agents are too ....

William Walsh, Michael Wellman, Peter Wurman, and Jeffrey MacKie-Mason. Some economics of market-based distributed scheduling. In Proc. 18 th International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems, pages 612--621, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, 1998.

....and provides an entropy leak to drain second law entropy gain from the macro to the micro level. One example of such a dissipative mechanism is the flow of currency in a market economy. AARIA institutes artificial markets among the various agents, extending the mechanisms explored in other work [2, 18, 37, 39, 40]. In addition to enabling self organization among agents, this economic model provides a natural way to measure and trade off the relative importance of conflicting demands at each decision point. It uses the same dynamics that natural markets do to measure the relative values of goods that would ....

....nature poses a challenge to Uniformity. Balanced Numerical. A market system is the prototypical example of a balanced numerical system, balanced because of the conservation of currency in trades among the participants. This approach, which has been explored in several projects (e.g. [2, 18, 37, 39, 40]) is developed extensively in AARIA as a primary means of achieving Uniformity. Market based trades are the foundation of interactions between companies, and using them as the main mechanism for agent integration within companies as well is a natural way to achieve enterprise integration. Some ....

W. E. Walsh, M. P. Wellman, P. R. Wurman, and J. R. MacKie-Mason. Some Economics of Market-based Distributed Scheduling. In Proceedings of 18th International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems, 1998. Available at http://wwwpersonal. engin.umich.edu/~wew/Papers/icdcs98.ps.Z.

.... market based approaches to resource allocation into a programming paradigm, which they have given the name marketoriented programming, e.g. Wellman, 1993; Mullen Wellman, 1995; Wellman, 1995, 1996; Yamaki, Wellman, Ishida, 1996; Hu Wellman, 1996; Cheng Wellman, 1998; Wellman Hu, 1998; Walsh, Wellman, Wurman, MacKie Mason, 1998). Particularly, the microeconomic framework of general equilibrium theory has been successfully used as a resource allocation mechanism. In such a market which we call an equilibrium market agents send demand functions telling how much they like to consume or produce at di#erent prices. The ....

Walsh, W. E., Wellman, M. P., Wurman, P. R., & MacKie-Mason, J. K. (1998). Some economics of market-based distributed scheduling. In Proceedings of the Eighteenth International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems, pp. 612--621.

....in one hour intervals, then the agent has complementary demand for any two adjacent slots. We have defined a market model for a simple version of scheduling, in which each agent s job requires a particular number of slots, and achieves variable value depending on how soon the job is completed [20]. For example, in the problem instance depicted in Figure 1, four agents each have one job to perform, with specified deadline and value. Since there is not enough factory time to complete all the jobs, the agents must compete through the market for the available slots. One natural way to run the ....

William E. Walsh, Michael P. Wellman, Peter R. Wurman, and Jeffrey K. MacKieMason. Some economics of market-based distributed scheduling. In Eighteenth International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems, pages 612-621, Am- sterdam, 1998.

....the previous quarter. The industry has rapidly spawned subindustries, such as newsletters, 6 auction sofware providers, 7 and specialized search engines. 8 In addition to their use in online retail, automated auctions are also found at the core of systems for market based resource allocation [2, 13, 16, 17, 18, 20]. To sup port our research on this topic, as well as electronic commerce, we have developed a general platform for price based negotiation the Michigan Internet AuctionBot. 9 The AuctionBot serves as infrastructure for our research efforts, and can be used by others exploring related ....

....research [16] We welcome efforts by researchers interested in setting up their own experiments on this platform. Our primary current use of the AuctionBot is as part of a comprehensive testbed in market mechanism design. We have used the system to prototype protocols for market based scheduling [17], and the simple web based demonstration we have deployed may be a good introduction for those interested in experimenting with the AuctionBot. 16 9 Conclusion The Michigan Internet AuctionBot is a versatile, robust online auction server that supports both human and software agents. It is ....

William E. Walsh, Michael P. Wellman, Peter R. Wurman, and Jeffrey K. MacKie-Mason. Some economics of market-based distributed scheduling. In 18th International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems, Amsterdam, 1998.

....for a particular use depends fundamentally on when it is employed (e.g. whether it enables the user to meet a deadline) We have some particular protocols for market based scheduling. The techniques work well for some problem classes, but others can be fundamentally difficult to decentralize (Walsh et al. 1998; Wellman et al. to appear) Second, in supply chain problems (Walsh and Wellman 1999b) dependencies are prerequisite relationships between elements in the chain. We have captured an interesting class of supply chain problems in our task dependency network model described below. In addition, we ....

....military scenario, where a commander wishes to execute an air attack. Air attacks require a bomber squad and a fighter squad, and these in turn require airfields. 3 Given a specification of the available resources and taskachievement options, we can formulate a task dependency network (Walsh and Wellman 1998) describing the possible configurations. A solution to the planning problem is a subnetwork specifying the assignment of tasks and subtasks so that the end objective is satisfied. When there is no resource contention, as in the network shown in Figure 3, deriving an allocation supporting the air ....

[Article contains additional citation context not shown here]

Walsh, William E., Michael P. Wellman, Peter R. Wurman, and Jeffrey K. MacKie-Mason. 1998. Some economics of market-based distributed scheduling. In Eighteenth International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems, May, Amsterdam.

....as much attention, although the proliferation of online auctions on the World Wide Web 1 is evidence that explicit price formation mechanisms will play an important role in electronic commerce. To support our research into negotiation protocols for electronic commerce and multiagent systems [20, 21], we have built the Michigan Internet AuctionBot [23] a con gurable auction server deployed over the World Wide Web (http: auction.eecs.umich.edu ) The AuctionBot has been operational since September 1996, allowing human agents to create auctions and submit bids via web forms, and (more ....

William E. Walsh, Michael P. Wellman, Peter R. Wurman, and Jeffrey K. MacKie-Mason. Some economics of market-based distributed scheduling. In 18th International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems, pages 612-621, Amsterdam, 1998.

....as much attention, although the proliferation of online auctions on the World Wide Web 1 is evidence that explicit price formation mechanisms will play an important role in electronic commerce. To support our researchinto negotiation protocols for electronic commerce and multiagent systems [20, 21], wehave built the Michigan Internet AuctionBot [23] a configurable auction server deployed over the World Wide Web (http: auction.eecs.umich.edu ) The AuctionBot has been operational since September 1996, allowing human agents to create auctions and submit bids via web forms, and (more ....

William E. Walsh, Michael P.Wellman, Peter R. Wurman, and Jeffrey K. MacKie-Mason. Some economics of market-based distributed scheduling. In 18th International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems, pages 612--621, Amsterdam, 1998.

No context found.

W. E. Walsh , P. Wellman, P. R.Wurman, and J. K.MacKie-.Mason, Some economics of market-based distributed scheduling, In International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems, 612--621, 1998.

No context found.

W. Walsh, M. Wellman, P. Wurman, and J. MacKieMason. Some economics of market-based distributed scheduling. In In Eighteenth International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems, pages 612--621, 1998.

No context found.

Walsh, W.; Wellman, M.; Wurman, P. and MacKie-Mason, J. (1998). Some Economics of Market-Based Distributed Scheduling, In: Eighteenth International Conference of Distributed Computing Systems, Michigan.

No context found.

Walsh, W. E., Wellman, M. P., Wurman, P. R. & MacKie-Mason, J. K. (1998), Some economics of market-based distributed scheduling, in `Proceedings of the Eighteenth International Conference of Distributed Computing Systems, Michigan', pp. 612--621.

No context found.

W.E.Walsh,M.P.Wellman,P.R.Wurman,andJ.K.MacKieMason. Some economics of market-based distributed scheduling. In International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems, pages 612--621, 1998.

No context found.

W. E. Walsh, M. P. Wellman, P. R. Wurman, and J. K. MacKieMason. Some economics of market-based distributed scheduling. In International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems, pages 612--621, 1998.

No context found.

W. Walsh, M. Wellman, P. Wurman, and J. MacKieMason. Some economics of market-based distributed scheduling. In In Eighteenth International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems, pages 612--621, 1998.

No context found.

W. E. Walsh, M. P. Wellman, P. R. Wurman, and J. K. Mackie-Mason, " Some economics of market-based distributed scheduling," 18th International Conference on Distributed Computer Systems, May 1998.

No context found.

W. E. Walsh, M. P. Wellman, P. R. Wurman, and J. K. Mackie-Mason, "Some economics of market-based distributed scheduling," 18th International Conference on Distributed Computer Systems, May 1998.

No context found.

Walsh, W., M. Wellman, P. Wurman, and J. MacKie-Mason "Some Economics of Market-Based Distributed Scheduling," In Proc. of the 8 th International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems (ICDCS-98), Amsterdam, the Netherlands, May 1998.

First 50 documents

Online articles have much greater impact   More about CiteSeer.IST   Add search form to your site   Submit documents   Feedback  

CiteSeer.IST - Copyright Penn State and NEC