Stephen Rassenti, Vernon L. Smith, and Robert L. Bulfin. A Combinatorial Auction Mechanism for Airport Time Slot Allocation. Bell Journal of Economics, 12(2):402--417, 1982.  Home/Search   Document Not in Database   Summary   Related Articles   Check

....and formalizes several bidding languages. Andersson [1] also proposes an integer programming method showing that the integer programming enables the management of very general problems by the use of standard algorithms and commercially available software such as CPLEX. In the works of Rassenti [13] and Fujishima [6] the winner determination in combinatorial auctions is attempted via approximation algorithms. However, Sandholm [15] shows that no polynomial time algorithm can be constructed to obtain a solution which is guaranteed to find a solution that is within any chosen ratio k of the ....

S. J. Rassenti, V. L. Smith, and R. L. Bulfin. A combinatorial auction mechanism for airport time slot allocation. Bell Journal of Economics, 13:402--417, 1982.

....the uncertainty of others, a bidder may obtain combinations of items that he or she does not want an inefficient solution. Many auctions involve the selling of a large number of items where bidders have preference over bundles. The FCC spectrum auction [6, 15] auctions for airport time slots [16], railroad segments [14] and carrier of last resort responsibilities for universal services [3] are some of the many examples. Due to complementary effects (likewise substitution effects) between different items, a bidder may have a preference for more than one item. Moreover, the bidder may have ....

S.J. Rassenti, V.L. Smith and R.L. Buffin. "A Combinatorial Auction Mechanism for Airport Time Slot Allocation". Bell Journal of Economics, 1982.

.... market, less inventory, reduced transaction costs, global expansion, and ecient pricing [126] We classify the commonly used auctions into three kinds: buy side auctions (one buyer and multiple sellers) sell side auctions (one seller and multiple buyers) and combinatorial auctions [42] 72] [113] (where bidders bid for a combination of related items) An agent can be either a buyer who submits bids or a seller who provides some products or services in these auctions. The sell side auction is similar to the auctions discussed in the B2C context; the buy side auction is the opposite of the ....

....spectrum auction 21, bidders placed bids on different combinations of spectrum licences. Between 1994 and January 2002, 38,829 licenses have been auctioned and 21,849 of them have been won through such combinatorial mechanisms. Other examples of combinatorial auctions are for airport time slots [113], railroad segments [18] and delivery routes [20] These auctions are especially prevalent in a B2B context because companies often want to trade in a variety of inter related assets. Moreover as different companies value the items or bundles of items differently, allowing them to bid on ....

S. Rassenti, V. Smith, and R. Bulfin. A combinatorial auction mechanism for airport time slot allocation. Bell J. of Economics, 13(2):402 417, 1982.

....sum of the individual items valuations it can be more or less. This is often the case for example in electricity markets, equities trading, bandwidth auctions [14,15] transportation exchanges [21,22] pollution right auctions, auctions for airport landing slots [18], and auctions for carrier of last resort responsibilities for universal services [10] In a traditional auction format where the items are auctioned separately (sequentially or in parallel) to decide what to bid on an item, an agent needs to estimate which other items it will receive in the ....

....residual uncertainty would remain due to incomplete information about the other bidders. This leads to inefficient allocations where bidders do not get the combinations that they want and get combinations that they do not [2,22] Combinatorial auctions can be used to overcome these deficiencies [3,15,18,21]. In a combinatorial auction, bidders may submit bids on combinations of items. This allows the bidders to express complementarities between items instead of having to speculate into an item s valuation the impact of possibly getting other, complementary items. 2. Winner determination problem ....

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S.J. Rassenti, V.L. Smith, R.L. Bulfin, A combinatorial auction mechanism for airport time slot allocation, Bell J. Economics 13 (1982) 402--417.

....recent work has stressed the agent aspect, i.e. that the trading parties are locally optimizing entities [Faratin00] Combinatorial markets, i.e. trading of bundles of distinct resources is yet a relatively new area. Somewhat related to combinatorial markets is the area of combinatorial auctions [Rassenti82] [Rothkopf98] Sandholm99] Derivatives have to our knowledge only been used for network admission control by [Lazar98] Previous bandwidth market models usually only include a primary market, in which end users can buy and sell capacity only from the router owner. In the presented model end users ....

S. J. Rassenti, V. L. Smith, and R. L. Bun, A Combinatorial Auction Mechanism for Airport Time Slot Allocation, The Bell Journal of Economics, (13) pp. 402-417,1982.

....combination of items is not the sum of the individual items valuations it can be more or less. This is often the case for example in electricity markets, equities trading, bandwidth auctions [11, 10] transportation exchanges [16, 18] pollution right auctions, auctions for airport landing slots [13], and auctions for carrier of last resort responsibilities for universal services [7] In a traditional auction format where the items are auctioned separately (sequentially or in parallel) to decide what to bid on an item, an agent needs to estimate which other items it will receive in the ....

....residual uncertainty would remain due to incomplete information about the other bidders. This leads to inecient allocations where bidders do not get the combinations that they want and get combinations that they do not [18, 1] Combinatorial auctions can be used to overcome these de ciencies [13, 16, 11, 2]. In a combinatorial auction, bidders may submit bids on combinations of items. This allows the bidders to express complementarities between items instead of having to speculate into an item s valuation the impact of possibly getting other, complementary items. 2 Winner determination problem The ....

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S J Rassenti, V L Smith, and R L Bul n. A combinatorial auction mechanism for airport time slot allocation. Bell J. of Economics, 13:402{ 417, 1982.

....and the need for lookahead is not as drastic as in a sequential auction. However, the same problems prevail as in sequential auctions, albeit in a mitigated form. Combinatorial auctions can be used to overcome the need for lookahead and the ine#ciencies that stem from the related uncertainties [17, 24, 26, 27]. In a combinatorial auction bidders may place bids on combinations of items. This allows the bidders to express complementarities between items instead of having to speculate into an item s valuation the impact of possibly getting other, complementary items. This capability is particularly ....

....input language. To this end, we introduced the A recent paper shows that if each bidder is interested in only one bundle, then incentive compatibility can be guaranteed even under approximate winner determination [12] One idea toward this direction was presented early on by Rassenti et al. [24]. They allowed each bidder to place combinatorial bids and to state the maximal number of bids that could be accepted from that bidder. Our XOR bidding language could be viewed as a special case of this where that number is one. OR of XORs bidding language. Each bidder can submit multiple XOR ....

S. J. Rassenti, V. L. Smith, and R. L. Bulfin. A combinatorial auction mechanism for airport time slot allocation. Bell J. of Economics, 13:402--417, 1982. 18

....of items need not equal the sum of his valuations of the individual items in the bundle. This is often the case, for example, in electricity markets, equities trading, bandwidth auctions [34,35] markets for trucking services [43,44,48] pollution right auctions, auctions for airport landing slots [40], and auctions for carrier of last resort responsibilities for universal services [27] There are several types of auction mechanisms that could be used in this setting, as the following subsections will discuss. 1.1. Sequential auction mechanisms In a sequential auction, the items are auctioned ....

....in the auction itself so no fixing would be necessary. Combinatorial auctions hold significant promise toward this goal. 1.4. Combinatorial auction mechanisms Combinatorial auctions can be used to overcome the need for lookahead and the inefficiencies that stem from the related uncertainties [14,35,40,43,44]. In a combinatorial auction, there is one seller (or several sellers acting in concert) and multiple bidders. The bidders may place bids on combinations of items. This allows a bidder to express complementarities between items so she does not have to speculate into an item s valuation the ....

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S.J. Rassenti, V.L. Smith, R.L. Bulfin, A combinatorial auction mechanism for airport time slot allocation, Bell J. Econom. 13 (1982) 402--417.

.... whether simple selling mechanisms can lead to efficient outcomes [1, 22] Two methods for dealing with complementarities have been studied in some depth in the literature: simultaneous auctions for multiple goods [1, 18] and combinatorial auctions in which agents submit bids for resource bundles [17, 19, 22]. Neither of these models is suitable in the setting we consider, when resources are made available at different points in time or are offered by different sellers. Even in settings where the requirements of combinatorial or simultaneous auctions are met or could be enforced a sequential ....

S. J. Rassenti, V. L. Smith, and R. L. Bulfin. A combinatorial auction mechanism for airport time slot allocation. Bell J. Econ., 13:402--417, 1982.

....example, a customer may want to buy both a cellular phone and a battery but does not need only a cellular phone without a battery or a battery without a cellular phone. In combinatorial auctions bidders can express the complementarity of items explicitly by placing bids on combinations of items [25]. In the example above, the customer can place a bid including both the cellular phone and the battery with a reservation cost, which is equal to the utility of both of them to the customer. It is common in real markets that price discounts and complementarity among items exist simultaneously. In ....

....bids without coalition. But when both of the mechanisms are applied, then both b 1 and b 2 can win their bids and furthermore have 10 profit together. Although economists have provided much insight into the stability analysis of coalitions [2, 4] and mechanism design of combinatorial auctions [40, 41, 25], both the determination 1 of optimal coalition structure and stable payoff division in coalition formation problems, and winner determination in combinatorial auction problems are computationally intractable. There is some research discussing the computational problems by computer scientists in ....

Rassenti, V. Smith, and R. Bulfin. A Combinatorial Auction Mechanism for Airport Time Slot Allocation. The RAND Journal of Economics, 13(2): 402-417, 1982. 42

....with each other. This happens if say both A and B are needed to create a lucrative golf course while A and B separately can only be used for less profitable purposes. The opposite may be true in some cases too. The cases that are often mentioned with regards to both are airport landing slots [9], bandwidth auctions, real estate auctions, and transportation exchanges [11] In such cases participating in parallel or sequential auctions for each items in a bundle desired by a bidder is risky as the bidder may not win all items in the bundle. Moreover it would be difficult for him to ....

S. Rassenti, V. Smith, and R. Bulfin. A combinatorial auction mechanism for airport time slot allocation. Bell J. of Economics, 13:402--417, 1982.

....the items [Sandholm, 1999; Fujishima et al. 1999; Sandholm, 2000; Nisan, 2000] This expressiveness can lead to more economical allocations of the items because bidders do not get stuck with partial bundles of low value. This has been demonstrated, for example, in airport landing slot allocation [Rassenti et al. 1982] , and in transportation exchanges [Sandholm, 1993] However, determining the winners in a combinatorial auctions is computationally complex. There has recently been a surge of research into addressing that [Rothkopf et al. 1998; Sandholm, 1999; Fujishima et al. 1999; Lehmann et al. 1999; ....

S J Rassenti, V L Smith, and R L Bulfin. A combinatorial auction mechanism for airport time slot allocation. Bell J. of Economics, 13:402--417.

....for winner determination for auctions that use this bidding language. 1 Introduction Combinatorialauctions (CAs) have been proposed as a means of dealing with the allocation of goods to buyers whose preferences exhibit complex structure with respect to complementarity and substitutability [Rassenti et al. 1982; Rothkopf et al. 1998; Wellman et al. 2001] Instead of selling items individually, the seller allows bids on bundles of items, allowing bidders to deal with the entities of direct interest and avoid the risk of obtaining incomplete bundles. Given a set of combinatorial bids, the seller then ....

S. J. Rassenti, V. L. Smith, and R. L. Bulfin. A combinatorial auction mechanism for airport time slot allocation. Bell Journal of Economics, 13:402-- 417, 1982.

....values to each is difficult. Furthermore, bidding for them individually (e.g. in sequence [3, 6, 8] or in parallel [2, 15] exposes the agent to certain risks (e.g. obtaining one item without the other) Combinatorial auctions (CAs) have been proposed as a means of dealing with such problems [14, 16, 18]. Instead of selling items individually, the seller allows bids on bundles of items, allowing bidders to deal with the entities of direct interest and avoid the risk of obtaining incomplete bundles. Given Copyright c fl2000, American Association for Artificial Intelligence (www.aaai.org) All ....

S. Rassenti, V. Smith, and R. Bulfin. A combinatorial auction mechanism for airport time slot allocation. Bell J. Econ., 13:402--417, 1982.

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S. J. Rassenti, V. L. Smith, and R. L. Buln. A combinatorial auction mechanism for airport time slot allocation, 1982.

No context found.

Stephen Rassenti, Vernon L. Smith, and Robert L. Bulfin. A Combinatorial Auction Mechanism for Airport Time Slot Allocation. Bell Journal of Economics, 12(2):402--417, 1982.

No context found.

S. J. Rassenti, V. L. Smith, and R. L. Bulfin. A combinatorial auction mechanism for airport time slot allocation. Bell Journal of Economics, 13:402--417, 1982.

No context found.

S J Rassenti, V L Smith, and R L Bulfin. A combinatorial auction mechanism for airport time slot allocation. Bell J. of Economics, 13:402--417, 1982.

No context found.

S. J. Rassenti, V. L. Smith, and R. L. Bulfin. A combinatorial auction mechanism for airport time slot allocation. Bell Journal of Economics, 13:402--417, 1982.

No context found.

S. J. Rassenti, V. L. Smith, and R. L. Bulfin. A combinatorial auction mechanism for airport time slot allocation. Bell Journal of Economics, 13:402--417, 1982.

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S.J. Rassenti, V.L. Smith and R.L. Bul n, A combinatorial auction mechanism for airport time slot allocation, Bell J. Economics, Vol.13, 402-417, 1982.

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V. L. Smith, S. J. Rassenti and R. L. Bulfin. A combinatorial auction mechanism for airport time slot allocation. Bell J. Econ., 13:402--417, 1982.

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S.J. Rassenti, V.L. Smith, R.L. Bul n, A combinatorial auction mechanism for airport time slot allocation, Bell Journal of Economics, 13, no. 2 (1982), 402-417. 19

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S. J. Rassenti, V. L. Smith, and R. L. Bulfin. A combinatorial auction mechanism for airport time slot allocation. Bell Journal of Economics, 13:402--417, 1982.

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Rassenti, S. J., Smith, V. L., and Bulfin, R. L. (1982), "A combinatorial auction mechanism for airport time slot allocation," Bell Journal of Economics, vol. 13, 402--417.

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