| Marvin Minsky, 1988. The Society of Mind. Simon and Schuster. |
....the work in AI without having to agree on any of the above issues. Briefly (for a fuller discussion see [24] 1. Researchers will never agree on how to divide up the work, so we need models in which this is not a problem, i.e. models of multiple overlapping, conflicting and duplicated minds [28, 29], and conflict resolution mechanisms to generate winning actions from such a collection [21] 2. Researchers do not re use each others work for the same reasons that software re use in general [20] has not been as easy as promised complex installation, and incompatibility of libraries, ....
Minsky, M. (1986), The Society of Mind.
....in terms of the numbers of nodes and links required to store even a single relation. Another possibility is to make a copy of the entire schema structure for each new instance but this seems to lack neurophysiologica] plausibility. A more appealing direction is suggested both by Minsky [18] 17] and Feldman and Shastri [5] 32] a very large number of nodes are randomly connected to each other such that nodes that have never been used before form a kind of pool of potential binding units for novel combinations of schemas and role fillers. When a new instance is encountered, all the ....
Minsky, M.L., The Society of Mind, Simon & Schuster, 1986 (to appear).
.... of control is covered in more depth, discussing various architectures including deliberative, reactive, hybrid and behaviorbased [8, 1, 6, 22] Learning is also discussed [21, 13, 35] Other topics presented include artificial life [10, 3] edutainment [14, 32] cognitive science and psychology [24, 7] and science fiction [2] The course is taught over a 14 week semester. There is one 75 minute lecture and one 75 minute lab per week. There are two exams, and students submit written lab reports documenting their software and hardware developments. They are encouraged to record results of tests ....
M. Minsky. Society of Mind. Picador, 1987.
....entities that embed partial and specific submodels [6] of a phenomenon. Abstractly, in both approaches the agents are conceived as autonomous heterogeneous entities that take independent decisions. In particular, our approach can be traced back to the work of Marvin Minsky on the society of mind [7]. This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we characterize the distributed nature of both physiological processes and their regulation systems and we motivate the need for simulation. In Section 3, we describe the anthropic agency paradigm to control physiological processes; this ....
Minsky, M.: The Society of Mind. Simon & Schuster, New York, USA (1985)
....of this chapter presents an improvement to three layer architectures, called Behavior Oriented Design. 2. 1 Behavior Based Artificial Intelligence (BBAI) BBAI was first developed by Brooks [6] at a time when there were several prominent modular theories of natural intelligence being discussed [13, 17, 29]. In BBAI, intelligence is composed of a large number of modular elements that are relatively simple to design. Each element operates only in a particular context, which the module itself recognizes. In Brooks original proposal, these modules are finite state machines organized into interacting ....
Minsky, M. (1985). The Society of Mind. Simon and Schuster Inc., New York, NY.
....you recognize the particular way things went wrong, you can use that as a clue for deciding what you should do next. Knowing how each method is likely to fail can be used at a higher, reflective level, for example, by a B brain that can use such knowledge I proposed a theory of how we do this in [6], and I ll extend that theory in [9] to control a mental activity. This could be where we exploit the sort of debugging knowledge described in [11] Achieving my first goal interfered with achieving my second goal; I ll reverse their order and try again. Knowledge retrieval. Retrieving ....
....of that knowledge, and find commonsense ways to reason with it. Consider two examples from [1] Mary was invited to Jack s party. She wondered if he would like a kite. What leads the reader to understand Mary was thinking about a kite when there was no mention of birthday or present In [6], I suggest how a suitable representation of invited to party could help one infer she is wondering whether a kite would be a suitable gift for Jack. Jack needed some money, so he went and shook his piggy bank. He was disappointed when it made no sound. Why was Jack disappointed Clearly ....
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Minsky. M. The Society of Mind. Simon & Schuster, New York, 1986.
....then produces action. Fodor himself cites Chomsky [16] and Gall [24] the originator of phrenology, as his main inspirations. See also Dawkins [20] and Hume [30] for highly relevant discussions. 3. 2 Modules as Agents Another modular theory immediately precursing BBAI was the Society of Mind [21, 36]. Minsky s proposal is more substantially vertical than Fodor s, although it still has some horizontal elements. An individual s actions are determined by simpler individual agencies, which are effectively specialists in particular domains. Minsky s agencies exploit hierarchy for organization, so ....
Minsky, M. (1985). The Society of Mind. Simon and Schuster Inc., New York, NY.
.... It is sometimes urged that this gap is intrinsic to the topic: intelligence is not a unitary thing for which there will be a unifying theory, but rather a society of subintelligences whose overall behavior cannot be reduced to useful characterizing and predictive principles (e.g. Minsky [ Minsky, 1986 ] Here we describe a formal architecture known as active logic that is more closely tied to implementational constraints than is usual for formalisms, and which has been used to solve a number of commonsense problems in a unified manner. In particular, we address the issue of formal, ....
Marvin Minsky. The Society of Mind. Simon & Schuster, 1986.
....more detail. The remainder of this paper presents an improvement to three layer architectures, called Behavior Oriented Design. 2. 1 Behavior Based Artificial Intelligence (BBAI) BBAI was first developed by Brooks [5] at a time when there were several prominent modular theories of intelligence [12, 17, 28]. In BBAI, intelligence is composed of a large number of modular elements that are relatively simple to design. Each element operates only in a particular context, which it itself recognizes. In Brooks original proposal, these modules are finite state machines organized into interacting layers, ....
Minsky, M. (1985). The Society of Mind. Simon and Schuster Inc., New York, NY.
....called agency [1] The adoption of the wording agency emphasizes our conception of a multiagent system as a unitary machine, even if the composing agents have very complex natures. The concept of agency has been firstly introduced by Marvin Minsky under the metaphor of The Society of Mind [5] to set up a rich and precise description of the human intelligence. We consider an agency as a machine made up of intelligent agents interacting each other in order to offer or receive collaboration for achieving a global goal. By intelligent agents we mean that each component of the agency has ....
Minsky, M.: The Society of Mind. Simon & Schuster, New York, USA, 1985.
.... INTRODUCTION In the field of distributed computer science, in general, and of distributed artificial intelligence, in particular, the role of complex multiagent systems composed of several simple entities, called agents, is assuming a growing importance. We denote, following Minsky s proposal [9], multiagent systems as agencies in order to evidence the unitary nature of the machine that results from the composition of several cooperating inferential agents. Agencies have been applied for addressing various applications in many different fields. On the other hand, little work has been ....
....between the formal descriptions of decomposition and composition. Finally, Section 7 concludes the paper. 2 AGENCIES IN DISTRIBUTED ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE In this section, we shortly present the notion of agency, conceived as a machine of distributed artificial intelligence. Minsky [9] firstly introduced the concept of agency in order to provide a description of the complex nature and performances of the human mind. According to Minsky, the human intellectual activities are of such complexity that a single model is not adequate to fully describe every one of them. Therefore, ....
M. Minsky. "The Society of Mind". Simon & Schuster. New York, USA. 1985.
....of an agency by means of ER Petri nets. Section 7 is a review of the main results obtained taking advantage of descriptions given in Sections 4, 5 and 6. Finally, Section 8 summarizes the content of the paper. 2. DAI SYSTEMS The terms agent and agency were first used by Marvin Minsky in [28] in order to explain the human mind. In fact, Minsky conceives the mind as the result of the cooperation among agents organized in an hierarchy of agencies (set of agents) each one specialized to work out a particular task. Minsky argues that the phenomena of the mind performances are of such ....
M. L. Minsky, "The Society of Mind", Simon & Schuster, New York, 1985
.... di Milano Artificial Intelligence and Robotics Project; Dipartimento di Elettronica e Informazione; Politecnico di Milano; Piazza Leonardo da Vinci, 32; I 20133 Milano; Italy 1 Introduction Recent advantages of multi agent systems (Bond et al. 1988) have taken on the challenge, proposed by Minsky (Minsky, 1985), of tackling with a multi paradigmatic approach, embedded by a multi agent society, namely the agency, the difficult problem of modelling the very complex phenomenology of human intelligence. From the Minsky viewpoint, the relevance of agency studies in informatics and robotics has further ....
M. L. Minsky, "The Society of Mind", Simon & Schuster, New York, 1985
....which arises in the construction of an agency and we introduce dynamic agencies which overcome the critical problem. Finally, some applications of dynamic agencies are described. 3. 1 Agencies The concept of agency has been introduced by Marvin Minsky under the metaphor of The Society of Mind [19]. The main issue addressed by Minsky is the deep understanding of the various phenomena of human intelligence which present a complex nature and provide a difficult task in their satisfactory representations within given models. To overcome this situation, Minsky proposes the concept of agent as ....
....which the properties of a formal framework conserve their validity in a more general formal framework. For example, the properties of the sum of natural numbers remain valid in the extension to integer numbers. An example of invention of alternative paradigms is the explanation, given by Minsky [19], of the complexity of human mind. For Minsky there is not any global model of the mind, but there are several alternative partial models which coexist competing together. The third property of our approach is the fact that the paradigm of creative dynamic agency is a new approach that, from one ....
[Article contains additional citation context not shown here]
M. Minsky. "The Society of Mind". Simon & Schuster. New York, USA. 1985.
.... non e ancora sostenuto da un adeguato impianto metodologico e formale che ne consenta la specifica e l analisi di proprieta [78] Per affrontare la definizione di una metodologia per il progetto e lo sviluppo di sistemi a molti agenti e interessante concepire, seguendo l approccio di Minsky [99], un sistema a molti agenti come una agenzia per evidenziare la natura unitaria della macchina che, pur composta da diversi agenti complessi, opera come una unica entita per il raggiungimento di un unico obiettivo. Lo scopo della tesi e di illustrare l approccio denominato agenzia dinamica che ....
....of a multiagent system. It is interesting, for focusing some significant and important problems of design and construction of a multiagent system, to conceive a multiagent system as a unitary machine, that we call agency. More precisely, we denote, following the wording introduced by Minsky [99], a multiagent system as agency in order to stress the uniqueness of the machine that results from the composition of complex cooperating entities called agents. 1.2 Motivations and Summary of Contents A lot of specific multiagent systems have been developed for addressing several different ....
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M. Minsky. The Society of Mind. Simon & Schuster, New York, USA, 1985.
....of autonomous creatures all sensing and reacting to each other and the world. But more importantly, the architecture needed to facilitate the construction and control of synthetic creatures. Intelligence is often seen as the confluent effect of many individually unintelligent components (as in [Minsky 1985]) and the architecture needed not only to support those components individually but also to allow them to coexist and communicate coherently within one brain. Therefore the primary goal was to build a system that facilitated: Reactive behavior: it should be easy to design and implement the kind ....
....and probabilistic choice of action. Our representation of action sits between that typically used in reactive systems and that used in planning systems. As such it borrows from the work of Maes and Firby [Maes 1990, Firby 1992] and in its emphasis on choosing a few good representations, from Minsky [Minsky 1985]. However, by focusing on the 5 big questions (when, to whom, what, for how long, and how much is it worth) the ActionTuple goes beyond these previous representations in providing a surprisingly powerful and intuitive representation for action. Our system also is novel in showing how learning may ....
Minsky, M., Society of Mind, Simon & Schuster, New York 1985.
....automatically. 1.1 Terminology Terminology in this area is a problem. And one I m not necessarily going to solve here. These are the crucial terms I use and their explanation: agent the mind or part of the mind. A piece of semi autonomous software. The usage is from Minsky s Society of Mind [Minsky, 1986], in which multiple agents may inhabit the same body. Agents have more autonomy than traditional modules or procedures. They are autonomous actors in their own right, not waiting on some higher level to call them. They are not necessarily structured in any hierarchy and are not even necessarily ....
....where goals are inactive (don t compete) start up at random (are activated) compete until they are fulfilled, and then fall inactive again. In this work, goals are implicitly activated and deactivated by suitable accompanying internal and external senses. 15.1. 3 Dithering and Persistence Minsky [Minsky, 1986] warns that too simple forms of state based switching will be unable to engage in opportunistic behavior. His example is of a hungry and thirsty animal. Food is only found in the North, water in the South. The animal treks north, eats, and as soon as its hunger is only partially satisfied, thirst ....
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Minsky, Marvin (1986), The Society of Mind, Simon and Schuster, New York.
....speak about intelligence because we find it virtually impossible to understand how this is done from watching only what the child does . Perhaps our educational research should be less concerned with teaching children to acquire particular skills and more concerned with how we learn to learn. [Minsky 1986, p. 229, his stress] And Selfridge has stressed the requirement for the proper nature of purpose structures, the higher level parts of which provide motivation The actual result of the self improvement depends on what the learner perceives to be an improvement, for that is why the learner learns ....
....on two mistakes. One is to talk about intelligence as though a person s quality of mind were like a quantity one could pour into a cup. The other mistake is to assume that there is a clear distinction between what we learn and how we learn as though experience had no effect on how we learn. [Minsky 1986, p. 309] So how do new purposes arise This is [our] way of putting a question that has been much treated in the field of genetic programming. On the other side of the question, since each control needs controls for itself, how do we control the infinite possibilities of recursion We can start ....
Minsky, M. (1986). The Society of Mind, Simon and Schuster, NY.
....physical and mental discourses without having been learned, or are just experienced without outer reference, see e.g. 3] 1.2.2 Signifiers Signified Symbolic signs themselves are put together of signifiers, and signified. This structure might be compared to the societal agency agent paradigm [4], including two major differences signalling a semiotic approach: historioicity of the structure, and diverse and dynamic points of view: Form and content of a structure change over time, depending on who generates, and who receives form and structure. 1.2.3 Upper Level Signifiers Signified ....
Minsky, Marvin (1988), The Society of Mind, Touchstone, New York et al.
....the agent to change its goals and actions in response to unanticipated changes in the environment. The problem of deciding what to do next has also been addressed in decision theory [Kanazawa and Dean, 1989] Maes dynamics of action selection [Maes, 1990] and Minsky s mental proto specialists [Minsky, 1986]. Decision theoretic tools are limited in their ability to handle continuous variables and perform sophisticated spatial reasoning. The dynamics of action selection performed poorly in simulations [Tyrrell, 1993] in part due to a reliance of the model on predicate inputs. Minsky s arguments ....
....selecting actions or goals in a timely manner. A central feature of reactive deliberation is that the deliberator is composed of concurrently active modules called behaviours that represent the goals of the robot. The notion of a behaviour is used in the sense of Minsky s mental proto specialists [Minsky, 1986] with some important distinctions. In reactive deliberation, each behaviour computes an action and generates a bid reflecting how suitable it is in the current situation. The most appropriate behaviour, and hence action, is determined in a distributed manner through inter behaviour bidding. Some ....
Marvin Minsky. The Society of Mind. Simon & Schuster Inc., 1986.
....College of Science, Technology and Medicine, UK p.charlton k.kamyab ic.ac. uk Compaq Computers, Ballybrit Business Park, Galway, Ireland Pat.Fehin digital.com Introduction A question arising out of the late 80 s about computation systems was could machines be intelligent without emotions ([Minsky 1988]) It seems that the machines of today are not only inhuman but also behave stupidly. Studies by psychologists have shown that humans who lack the emotional features usually used by many aspects of human reasoning do not behave intelligently [Damasio 1994] This theory of requiring emotional ....
Minsky, M; "The Society of Mind", Chapter 16, Picard 1988
....assistance to cognition has been increasingly acknowledged. For example, Toda (1994) argues that emotions are the ultimate source of intelligence and might provide robots with the autonomy they need. Doubts have even been posed on whether machines can exhibit intelligent behaviour without emotions (Minsky, 1986; Charland, 1995) In robotics, emotions are often used to modulate activity (Ca namero, 1997; Bates et al. 1992a) The social role of emotions has been particularly explored. The external demonstration of emotions has been used as a sort of communication mechanism that allows the robot to ....
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Minsky, Marvin. The Society of Mind. Simon & Schuster, Inc, New York, 1985.
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