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H. Rai a. The Art and Science of Negotiation. Harvard University Press, 1982.

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Automated Negotiation and Bundling of Information Goods - Somefun, Gerding, Bohte, .. (2003)   (5 citations)  (Correct)

....search strategy combined with a concession strategy. Moreover, this choice results in (a close approximation of a) Pareto e#cient solution. Rather than via direct negotiation, another way to find (Pareto) e#cient solutions for multi issue problems is through a mediator, see for instance [5, 11, 13]. Both parties need to reveal their preferences to the mediator. With a mediator, however, trust becomes an important issue. Furthermore, additional costs are often involved. Related to our work, in [6] a heuristic approach to finding win win trade o#s between issues is introduced. Contracts ....

H. Rai#a. The Art and Science of Negotiation. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1982.


Towards Automating Negotiation for M-Services - Paurobally, Turner, Jennings (2003)   (Correct)

....task such as delivering parcels [6] Although we could say the trading of an m service is a joint task of exchanging the service, the competition is not in accessing the service but in its profitable purchase and sale. Therefore, we adopt the intuitive service oriented approach and notation in [9] and [2] which embodies the concept of electronic transactions. We consider a negotiation between two agents a and b over a changeable set of issues J . An issue j, j J) can take values between [min j ,max j ] which define the domain, D j , of a quantitative issue and are e#ectively the ....

....for each strategy. 4. 2 Evaluation Functions In a negotiation, participants exchange sets of issues (for example a sends (x b#a ) to b at time t) Each agent has a j : D j [0, 1] that gives the score agent a assigns to a value of issue j in the range of its acceptable values [2] [9]. A weight # j is associated by agent a to issue j to indicate its relative importance, where the sum of weights of all issues is 1. An agent can change the importance attached to an issue by changing the weights associated to that issue. The evaluation of (x b#a ) involves summing the ....

H. Rai#a. The art and science of negotiation.Harvard University Press, 1982.


A Fuzzy Constraint Based Model for Bilateral.. - Luo, Jennings..   (Correct)

.... Negotiation is a process by which a group of entities try and come to a mutually acceptable agreement on some matter [44] Because of its ubiquity in everyday encounters, it is a subject that has been extensively discussed in the game theoretic, economic, and management science literatures [45,46,69]. Recently, however, there has been a surge of interest in automated negotiation systems that are populated with arti cial agents [20] This is due to both a technology push and an application pull [50] The technology push is mainly from a growing standardised communication infrastructure (e.g. ....

....its payo from the deal. Moreover, when an agent does have to make a concession it should make the smallest one possible. Thirdly, it is important that the agents minimise the amount of information they reveal about their preferences since any such revelation can weaken their bargaining position [45,46]. Finally, in many real retail markets, sellers often use gifts to raise a products acceptability for the customers [4] This gift may make a previously unacceptable o er acceptable. Our model employs the notion of prioritised fuzzy constraints [6 8,32,34] at its core (in particular, to ....

[Article contains additional citation context not shown here]

H. Rai a. The Art and Science of Negotiation. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, USA, 1982.


eMediator: A Next Generation Electronic Commerce Server - Sandholm (2002)   (31 citations)  (Correct)

....after some future events have occurred. Similarly, a contract may have too low expected payo# ex ante, but in some realizations of the future events, it may be desirable. Contingency contracts have been suggested for utilizing the potential provided by future events among self interested agents [22]. The contract obligations are made contingent on future events. In some games this increases the expected payo# to both parties compared to any full commitment contract. However, contingency contracts are often impractical because the space of combinations of future events may be large and ....

H. Rai#a. The Art and Science of Negotiation. Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1982.


Surplus Equivalence of Leveled Commitment Contracts - Sandholm, Zhou (2000)   (5 citations)  (Correct)

....without a monetary compensation. Similarly, the role of decommitment among cooperative agents has been studied in meeting scheduling using a contracting approach [23] Contingency contracts have been suggested for utilizing the potential provided by future events among self interested agents [14]. The contract obligations are made contingent on future events. In some games this increases the expected payo# to both parties compared to any full commitment contract. However, contingency contracts are often impractical, especially as a negotiation instrument among software agents, for several ....

H. Rai#a. The Art and Science of Negotiation. Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1982.


Is Defeasible Logic Applicable? - Governatori, Hofstede, Oaks (2001)   (Correct)

....preferences, constraints, and negotiation structures (auctions in this case) Antoniou et al. 4] have shown that defeasible theories are at least as expressive as CLP s. Faratin, Jennings and Sierra et al. [32, 11, 12, 17] use Value functions, a version of Multi Attribute Utility Theory (MAUT) [30] to generate and evaluate o#ers in multi attribute negotiations. While value functions are e#ective for analyzing the acceptability of o#ers, we know people have problems with identifying and defining utility functions [18, 8] In this respect defeasible reasoning provides a more natural way of ....

Howard Rai#a. The Art and Science of Negotiation. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1982.


A Service-Oriented Negotiation Model between Autonomous.. - Sierra, Faratin, Jennings (1997)   (31 citations)  (Correct)

.... must be in place (this occurs mainly when multiple services need to be combined or closely coordinated) 3 The Negotiation Model The negotiation model for autonomous agents proposed in this Section is based on a variation of the two parties, many issues value scoring system presented in [8]. That is, a model for bilateral negotiations about a set of quantitative variables. Our variation transforms that model into a many parties, many issues model (that is, multilateral negotiations about a set of variables) Multilateral negotiations are central to the application domains we are ....

....tactics over time. Thus strategies combine tactics depending on the history of negotiations and the mental state of agents, and negotiation threads influence one another by means of strategies (see Section 6) Before presenting our model, we introduce Rai#a s basic model for bilateral negotiation [8]. 3.1 The bilateral negotiation model Let i (i b ) represent the negotiating agents and j (j # 1, n ) the issues under negotiation. Let x j [min j , max j ] be a value for issue j. Here we consider issues for which negotiation amounts to determining a value between a delimited ....

[Article contains additional citation context not shown here]

H. Rai#a. The Art and Science of Negotiation. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, USA, 1982.


Decentralized Coordination for Open Distributed Systems - Rasmusson   (Correct)

....(either contractor or contractee) breaks its contract and it has no notion of obligation for the agents. This means that sel sh agents could simply give up working on one contract if a better one was found. One suggested extension of the protocol was to allow for contingency dependent contracts [Rai82]. Such contracts only have to be ful lled if certain other criteria are ful lled. When such contracts are added to a contract net, the agents are able to accommodate their behaviour better for future events and uncertainties. A contractor knows for example that another agent will break the ....

H. Rai a. The Art and Science of Negotiation. Harvard Univ. Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1982.


Reasoning about Commitments and Penalties for.. - Cora.. (2001)   (Correct)

....of trust on which agents perform their part of the social activity. However the imposition of unbreakable commitments can lead to irrational and inecient behaviour. For this reason, a number of models have been developed that allow commitments to be dropped if speci ed contingencies arise (e.g. [4, 7, 9]) While this certainly represents an improvement, the drawback is that the speci c conditions under which commitments can be broken must be enumerated in advance. In dynamic and unpredictable environments this can be extremely dicult (and sometimes impossible) To provide yet greater exibility, ....

H. Rai a. The art and science of negotiation. Harvard University Press, 1997.


Exploring auction-based leveled-commitment contracting - Part.. - Brandt, Weiß (2000)   (Correct)

....even in scenarios in which the agents possess only very little domain or task speci c knowledge. Two standard types of task assignment contracts are unbreakable contracts (e.g. 7, 12, 13] and breakable contracts, where common forms of breakable contracts are contingency contracts (e.g. [10]) and leveled commitment contracts (e.g. 1, 5, 14, 15] Compared to unbreakable contracts, breakable contracts o er a signi cant advantage: they allow agents acting in dynamic environments to exibly react upon future environmental changes that make existing contracts unfavorable. Figure 1 ....

H. Rai a. The Art and Science of Negotiation. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1982.


Task Assignment in Multiagent Systems based on.. - Brandt, Brauer, Weiß (2000)   (4 citations)  (Correct)

....even in scenarios in which the agents possess only very little domain or task speci c knowledge. Two standard types of task assignment contracts are unbreakable contracts (e.g. 11, 16, 17] and breakable contracts, where common forms of breakable contracts are contingency contracts (e.g. [14]) and leveled commitment contracts (e.g. 1, 6, 19, 20] Compared to unbreakable contracts, breakable contracts o er a signi cant advantage: they allow agents acting in dynamic environments to exibly react upon future environmental changes that make existing contracts unfavorable. Figure 1 ....

H. Rai a. The Art and Science of Negotiation. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1982.


Exploring auction-based leveled-commitment contracting - Part.. - Brandt, Weiß (2000)   (Correct)

....even in scenarios in which the agents possess only very little domain or task speci c knowledge. Two standard types of task assignment contracts are unbreakable contracts (e.g. 10, 15, 16] and breakable contracts, where common forms of breakable contracts are contingency contracts (e.g. [13]) and leveled commitment contracts (e.g. 1, 6, 18, 19] Compared to unbreakable contracts, breakable contracts offer a signi cant advantage: they allow agents acting in dynamic environments to exibly react upon future environmental changes that make existing contracts unfavorable. Figure 1 ....

H. Rai a. The Art and Science of Negotiation. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1982.


Revenue Equivalence of Leveled Commitment Contracts - Tracking Number   (Correct)

....losing part of its e ort without a monetary compensation. Similarly, the role of decommitment among cooperative agents has been studied in meeting scheduling (Sen 1993) Contingency contracts have been suggested for utilizing the potential provided by future events among self interested agents (Rai a 1982). The contract obligations are made contingent on future events. In some games this increases the expected payo to both parties compared to any full commitment contract. However, contingency contracts are often impractical. The space of combinations of future events can be large and it is rare ....

Rai a, H. 1982. The Art and Science of Negotiation.


A Service-Oriented Negotiation Model between Autonomous.. - Sierra, Faratin, Jennings (1997)   (31 citations)  (Correct)

.... must be in place (this occurs mainly when multiple services need to be combined or closely coordinated) 3 The Negotiation Model The negotiation model for autonomous agents proposed in this Section is based on a variation of the two parties, many issues value scoring system presented in [8]. That is, a model for bilateral negotiations about a set of quantitative variables. Our variation transforms that model into a many parties, many issues model (that is, multilateral negotiations about a set of variables) Multilateral negotiations are central to the application domains we are ....

....tactics over time. Thus strategies combine tactics depending on the history of negotiations and the mental state of agents, and negotiation threads influence one another by means of strategies (see Section 6) Before presenting our model, we introduce Rai#a s basic model for bilateral negotiation [8]. 3.1 The bilateral negotiation model Let i (i # a, b ) represent the negotiating agents and j (j # 1, n ) the issues under negotiation. Let x j # [min j , max j ] be a value for issue j. Here we consider issues for which negotiation amounts to determining a value between a delimited ....

[Article contains additional citation context not shown here]

H. Rai#a. The Art and Science of Negotiation. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, USA, 1982.


Problem Solving With Multiple Interdependent Criteria - Carlsson, Fullér (1996)   (2 citations)  (Correct)

....as logical conclusions, or built as illustrations of complex decision problems in classical text books, there are real life situations which, if we ponder them systematically, reveal themselves to have interdependent objectives. A well known negotiation problem is the Buyer Seller dilemma [24], in which it is unclear for both parties at which price they are going to settle when they start the negotiation process (cf fig.1) Fig. 1 Buyer Seller negotiation problem. Their objectives are clearly conflicting: the Buyer wants the price to be as low as possible; the Seller tries to keep the ....

H.Rai#a, The Art and Science of Negotiation, Belknap/Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1982.


A Review of Research Literature on Bilateral - Negotiations Carnegie Mellon   (Correct)

No context found.

H. Rai a. The Art and Science of Negotiation. Harvard University Press, 1982.


Bilateral Negotiation Decisions with Uncertain Dynamic Outside - Options Cuihong Li   (Correct)

No context found.

H. Rai#a. The Art and Science of Negotiation. Harvard University Press, 1982.


Learning an Opponent's Preferences to Make Effective.. - Coehoorn, Jennings (2004)   (1 citation)  (Correct)

No context found.

H. Rai#a. The Art and Science of Negotiation. Harvard University press, Cambridgem USA, 1982.


Negotiation Support System for Resolution of Disputes over.. - Kronaveter, Shamir (2004)   (Correct)

No context found.

Rai#a, H. (1982): The Art and Science of Negotiation, Belknap Press of Harvard University Press


Bilateral Negotiation Decisions with Uncertain Dynamic.. - Li, Giampapa, Sycara (2004)   (Correct)

No context found.

H. Rai#a. The Art and Science of Negotiation. Harvard University Press, 1982.


Intelligent Enterprise Technologies Laboratory - Hp Laboratories Palo (2003)   (Correct)

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H. Rai#a, The Art and Science of Negotiation, Harvard University Press, 1982 11


The Ultimatum Conundrum - Karp, Chen, Wu (2004)   (Correct)

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H. Rai#a. The Art and Science of Negotiation. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1982.


Learning an Opponent's Preferences to Make Effective.. - Coehoorn, Jennings   (1 citation)  (Correct)

No context found.

H. Rai#a. The Art and Science of Negotiation. Harvard University press, Cambridgem USA, 1982.


Knowledge-Based Acquisition of Tradeoff Preferences for.. - Luo, Jennings, Shadbolt   (Correct)

No context found.

H. Rai a. The Art and Science of Negotiation. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, USA, 1982.


Deception in Electronic Auctions - Brandt (2003)   (Correct)

No context found.

H. Rai#a. The Art and Science of Negotiation. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1982.


A Review of Research Literature on Bilateral Negotiations - Li, Giampapa, Sycara (2003)   (Correct)

No context found.

H. Rai a. The Art and Science of Negotiation. Harvard University Press, 1982.


A Hybrid Model For Sharing Information Between Fuzzy.. - Luo, Zhang, Jennings (2002)   (Correct)

No context found.

H. Rai a, The Art and Science of Negotiation (Harvard University Press, 1982).


Dynamic Desires - Dastani, Huang, van der Torre (2002)   (Correct)

No context found.

H. Rai a. The art and science of negotiation. Harvard university press, Cambridge, Mass., 1982.


Dynamic Desires - Dastani, Huang, van der Torre   (Correct)

No context found.

H. Rai a. The art and science of negotiation. Harvard university press, Cambridge, Mass., 1982.

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