Eli Biham, Adi Shamir, Differential Cryptanalysis of Snefru, Khafre, REDOC-II, LOKI and Lucifer (extended abstract), Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Advances in Cryptology, proceedings of CRYPTO'91, pp. 156--171, 1991.  Home/Search   Document Not in Database   Summary   Related Articles   Check

....Madryga, RC5, DES, Lucifer, ciphertext only attack, differential cryptanalysis, differential linear attack. 1 Introduction Differential cryptanalysis [1, 15] is a very powerful technique for the analysis of block ciphers. It has been used with success against many block ciphers, e.g. [1, 2, 3, 4, 21]. One weakness of differential cryptanalysis is that it finds chosen plaintext attacks; these are much less practical than known plaintext and certainly than ciphertext only attacks. Ciphertext only attacks are the most useful attacks on cryptosystems, since they require only passive eavesdropping ....

E. Biham, A. Shamir, Differential Cryptanalysis of Snefru, Khafre, REDOC-II, LOKI and Lucifer, Lecture Notes in Computer Science 576, Advances in Cryptology -- CRYPTO'91, pp.156--171, Springer-Verlag, 1992.

....of 63 and 2556 . 1 Introduction Traditional ciphers are based on fixed internal structures managed by fixed or variable length keys [1, 18] The knowledge of the cipher s internal structure facilitates the development of attacks attempting to guess its contents or the key controlling them [4, 5, 6, 3, 15, 14, 20]. This problem can be reduced if ciphers support some degrees of freedom regarding their operational parameters, besides the size of the key, like the block cipher RC5 [17, 16] In this paper we present a new efficient stream cipher allowing to dynamically choose the structure and evolution of ....

E. Biham and A. Shamir. Differential Cryptanalysis of Snefru, Khafre, REDOCII, LOKI, and Lucifer. In Advances in Cryptology -- CRYPTO '91 Proceedings, pages 156--171. Springer-Verlag, 1992.

....then since the outputs are equal (x is an irreducible polynomial) we have: p 31 (mod x) q 31 (mod x) p = q: since gcd(31,255) 1. A contradiction. 2 There exists many iterative characteristics where two neighbouring S boxes 7 have different inputs. The best one has a probability of [BS91] 118 2 20 2 Gamma13;12 No iterative characteristic where more than two S boxes have different inputs is better than the abovementioned. However we can find 3 round iterative characteristics, which are better. Definition 1. A F fixpoint is an inputxor x, for which F(x) x, with some ....

....a zero round. If the rounds (i Gamma1) and (i 1) are zero rounds, round i is of type A. If the rounds (i Gamma1) and (i 2) are zero rounds, round i and round (i 1) are of type B. A round of type A must have the form OE i 00 00 00 00 x . The best probability of such a round is 2 Gamma13:12 [BS91]. The two rounds of type B must have the following form: 12 oe F oe Phi hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh ( oe F oe Phi hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh ( oe F oe Phi hhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhhh ( oe F oe Phi 0x 0x 0x 0x OE OE By consulting ....

Eli Biham, Adi Shamir. Differential Cryptanalysis of Snefru, Khafre, REDOC-II, LOKI and Lucifer. Presented at CRYPTO '91.

....block ciphers, Madryga, RC5, DES, ciphertext only attack, differential cryptanalysis, differential linear attack. 1 Introduction Differential cryptanalysis [1, 12] is a very powerful technique for the analysis of block ciphers. It has been used with success against many block ciphers, e.g. [1, 2, 3, 18, 4]. One weakness of differential cryptanalysis is that it finds chosen plaintext attacks; these are much less practical than known plaintext and certainly than ciphertext only attacks. Ciphertext only attacks are the most useful attacks on cryptosystems, since they require only passive ....

E. Biham, A. Shamir, Differential Cryptanalysis of Snefru, Khafre, REDOC-II, LOKI and Lucifer, Lecture Notes in Computer Science 576, Advances in Cryptology -- CRYPTO'91, pp.156--171, Springer-Verlag, 1992.

.... history of differential cryptanalysis, the first public appearance of differential type techniques came when Murphy published a chosen ciphertext attack on FEAL requiring 20 chosen plaintexts [102] These techniques were extended by Biham and Shamir with increasing effect on various cryptosystems [15, 16] culminating in attacks on DES [14, 18] Differential cryptanalysis succeeds in obtaining information about the key from individual rounds of the iterated cipher. Recall that the main design philosophy behind an iterated cipher was that a weak round function, with several desirable attributes, is ....

....are also significant differences which make a look at Lucifer interesting in its own right. There appear to be two variants of Lucifer in the open literature [52, 141] Biham and Ben Aroya describe the version outlined by Sorkin [141] as the final variant of the Lucifer project. Biham and Shamir [17, 16] have claimed that this variant is in fact weaker, with respect to differential cryptanalysis, than the one described by Feistel [52] We note, however, that some assumptions to fill the gaps left by Feistel s description were made during this analysis. There is no doubt that Lucifer is a block ....

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E. Biham and A. Shamir. Differential cryptanalysis of Snefru, Khafre, REDOC-II, LOKI and Lucifer. In J. Feigenbaum, editor, Advances in Cryptology --- Crypto '91, volume 576 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 156--171, New York, 1992. Springer-Verlag.

.... Permutations Luke O Connor Distributed Systems Technology Center Brisbane, Australia email: oconnor fitmail.fit.qut.edu.au Abstract Differential cryptanalysis is a method of attacking iterated mappings which has been applied with varying success to a number of product ciphers and hash functions [1, 2]. Let ae : Z c 2 Theta Z m 2 Z m 2 be a mapping that consists of c control bits and m data bits. The mapping ae mapping contains 2 c m bit permutations i : Z m 2 Z m 2 ; 0 i 2 c Gamma 1, one of which is selected (multiplexed) by the control bits, and a substitution is ....

....which leads to approximations for the largest entry in the XOR table and the density of zero entries. Keywords: Differential cryptanalysis, iterated mapping, product cipher. 1 Introduction and Results Differential cryptanalysis is a statistical attack popularized by Biham and Shamir [1, 2] that has been applied to a wide range of iterated mappings including LUCIFER, DES, FEAL, REDOC, Kahfre [3, 4, 7, 8, 11, 12] As explained below, the attack is based on a quantity Omega called a characteristic, which has some probability p Omega of giving information about the secret key used in ....

E. Biham and A. Shamir. Differential cryptanalysis of Snefru, Khafre, REDOCII, LOKI and LUCIFER. Advances in Cryptology, CRYPTO 91, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 576, J. Feigenbaum ed., Springer-Verlag, pages 156--171, 1992.

....Technology Center, Brisbane, Australia. Correspondence should be sent to ISRC, QUT Gardens Point, 2 George Street, GPO Box 2434, Brisbane Q 4001, Australia; Email oconnor sleet.fit.qut.edu.au. 1 Introduction Differential cryptanalysis is a statistical attack popularized by Biham and Shamir [3, 5] that has been applied to a wide range of cryptosystems including LUCIFER, DES, FEAL, REDOC, Kahfre [7, 8, 10, 17, 18, 25] The attack is universal in that it can be used against any cryptographic mapping which is constructed from iterating a fixed round function (compare this to the universality ....

....The main shortcoming of differential cryptanalysis is that large amounts of chosen ciphertext may be required to determine the key, which will not possible in most practical circumstances. Nevertheless, differential cryptanalysis has caused the revision and redesign of several iterated mappings [1, 5, 6, 20] and is the only known attack which can theoretically recover DES keys in time less than the expected cost of exhaustive search [4] Importantly, the method has shown that the security of DES is not significantly increased if independent subkeys are used. We will give a brief description of ....

[Article contains additional citation context not shown here]

E. Biham and A. Shamir. Differential cryptanalysis of Snefru, Khafre, REDOCII, LOKI and LUCIFER. Advances in Cryptology, CRYPTO 91, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 576, J. Feigenbaum ed., Springer-Verlag, pages 156--171, 1992.

....probability. Since finding all r Gamma 1 round characteristics is impractical for even fairly small values of r, instead we search for a relatively short iterative characteristic which can be repeated to obtain a long characteristic. For more information on differential cryptanalysis see e.g. [25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30]. 5.2 MacGuffin characteristics I wrote several small programs to search for short iterative characteristics using mathematically plausible heuristics. The best characteristics found are listed in Table 11. These characteristics may not be optimal, but they suffice to provide an upper bound on ....

Eli Biham and Adi Shamir. Differential cryptanalysis of Snefru, Khafre, REDOC-II, LOKI, and Lucifer. In Advances in Cryptology: EUROCRYPT '91, pages 156--171. Springer-Verlag, 1992.

....:B i [6] B i [2] Delta B i [5] 1) Delta =boolean and, boolean or, boolean not. There are three minterms in the example and it is generally believed that the number of minterms in a minimal expression is one measure the complexity of the s box. The recent papers by Biham and Shamir [BS91] and others , show that there are additional ones that are more important. Meyer and Matyas note that there are 52 and 53 minterms in the description of each of the 8 s boxes. These minterm descriptions of the s boxes can be directly converted into operations for the Coherent Processor . Each ....

Eli Biham and Adi Shamir. Differential cryptanalysis of Snefru, Khafre, REDOC-II, LOKI, and lucifer. In Crypto 91, Santa Barbara, California, 1991.

....when they are used as the round function of a hashing algorithm. The major weaknesses of the encryption algorithms are Key Collisions, Complementation Property, Weak Keys, and Fixed Points [63] Details on these weaknesses are beyond the scope of this paper, and the reader is referred to [1, 16, 21, 20, 42, 48, 49, 50, 51, 58, 60, 66, 67] for more information. 3.2.5 Differential Cryptanalysis The idea of this attack was first given by Biham and Shamir in [14] In Differential Cryptanalysis, the correlation between the difference in input and output is studied. In other words, the intruder searches for a particular difference in ....

....a particular difference in input that cause a specific difference in output. This attack is applied to almost all cryptosystems, including most dedicated hash functions. In the case of hash functions, the difference in output should be zero to result in collisions. Examples of this attacks are in [9, 11, 14, 15, 16, 17, 51]. 3.2.6 Linear Cryptanalysis Linear Cryptanalysis was proposed by Matsui [54] in early 1993. Although it is inspired by Differential Cryptanalysis, better results are gained compared with Differential Cryptanalysis (specially on block ciphers such as DES) 12, 13, 26, 43, 54] For the time ....

E. Biham and A. Shamir. Differential Cryptanalysis of Snefru, Khafre, REDOC-II, LOKI and Lucifer. In Advances in Cryptology, Proceedings of CRYPTO '91, pages 156--171, 1992.

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Eli Biham, Adi Shamir, Differential Cryptanalysis of Snefru, Khafre, REDOC-II, LOKI and Lucifer (extended abstract), Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Advances in Cryptology, proceedings of CRYPTO'91, pp. 156--171, 1991.

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E. Biham and A. Shamir. Differential Cryptanalysis of Snefru, Khafre, REDOCII, LOKI and Lucifer. In Advances in Cryptology, Proceedings of CRYPTO '91, pages 156--171, 1992.

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