Rao, A. S. and Foo, N. Y. (1989). Formal theories of belief revision. In KR89 (1st Int Conf on Principles of KR and Reasoning), pages 369--380, CA. Kaufmann. 9  Home/Search   Document Not in Database   Summary   Related Articles   Check

.... best way to correct a KB. The issue of how to guide this search (or even regarding it as a search problem in the first place) was not a focus of Murray s research. Other work in truth maintenance and belief revision directly addresses these issues (e.g. de Kleer, 1986, Forbus and de Kleer, 1988, Rao and Foo, 1989] 4 Additional Learning Mechanisms Murray also suggests three other learning mechanisms which, although the details were not worked out completely, are given here for completeness. 4.1 Justifying Facts in the KB We can sometimes justify facts in the KB from other facts which are known. ....

Rao, A. S. and Foo, N. Y. (1989). Formal theories of belief revision. In KR89 (1st Int Conf on Principles of KR and Reasoning), pages 369--380, CA. Kaufmann. 9

....or explicitly (more often implicitly, unfortunately) It is hence not surprising that we too need to adopt this view for concept construction. 4 3.3 Coherence and Belief Revision Our notion of coherence in Section 2. 2 is similar, but not quite the same, as coherence theories of belief revision [Rao and Foo, 1989a] Rao and Foo define maximizing coherence as retaining as many consistent beliefs as possible during a state change [Rao and Foo, 1989b] similarly, we are attempting to minimize the (weighted) number of axioms which are not applied to a concept description. However, two differences are also ....

Rao, A. S. and Foo, N. Y. (1989a). Formal theories of belief revision. In KR89 (1st Int Conf on Principles of KR and Reasoning), pages 369--380, CA. Kaufmann.

....strategies and is based on the actions the opponents are supposed to take according to these strategies. 9 Belief revision has more recently been treated by philosophers (e.g. 49, 42, 60, 24, 22] theoretical computer scientists (e.g. 20] and artificial intelligence researchers (e.g. [14, 64, 50, 27, 15]) These groups view an agent s beliefs as a set of assertions (without probabilities) and revising beliefs involves deciding how that set of assertions should change when new information arrives. 10 3 The Negotiation Protocol Our strategic model of negotiation is a modification of Rubinstein ....

A. S. Rao and N. Y. Foo. Formal theories of belief revision. In Proceedings of the First International Conference on Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning, pages 369--380. Morgan Kaufmann, May 1989.

....P 2 P red is a k ary predicate, x 1 ; x n are terms, and t 2 TC [ TV , then [t; P (x 1 ; x n ) is a wff (read as: P (x 1 ; x n ) is true at time t) 5 The new information may be inconsistent with the agent s current beliefs. We leave this for future discussion. See for example, [6,26,53,96,166,103,125,22,66,27]. 6 Our intention model is closer to Shoham [138] s Dec and Thomas et al. 152] s Comit than to Cohen s and Levesque [16] s Intend . 7 We have extended [152] to deal with the FOL case. We prefer this approach, where time can be expressed explicitly, over others where time periods cannot be ....

A. Rao and N. Y. Foo. Formal theories of belief revision. In Proceedings of the First International Conference on Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning, pages 369--380. Morgan Kaufmann, May 1989.

....a knowledge base while preserving consistency. Recently, belief revision has received a lot of attention in AI, 1 which led to a number of different proposals for different applications (Ginsberg 1986; Ginsberg, Smith 1987; Dalal 1988; Gardenfors, Makinson 1988; Winslett 1988; Myers, Smith 1988; Rao, Foo 1989; Nebel 1989; Winslett 1989; Katsuno, Mendelzon 1989; Katsuno, Mendelzon 1990; Doyle 1990) Most of this research has been considerably influenced by approaches in philosophical logic, in particular by Gardenfors and his colleagues (Alchourr on, Gardenfors, Makinson 1985; Gardenfors 1988) who ....

Rao, A. S., Foo, N. Y. (1989): Formal Theories of Belief Revision, in: Brachman, R. J., Levesque, H. J., Reiter, R. (eds.): Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning: Proceedings of the 1st International Conference, Toronto, Ont., 369--380.

.... iff it does not exist a subbase B=B 1 . B n such that: in, where B i A i and for j i we have B j = A j where A is the cardinality of A. From now on, we denote by Incl( and Lex( the set of inclusion preferred subbases and Lex preferred subbases of . Inclusion preferred subbases have been proposed by (Brewka, 1989) under the name preferred sub theories and have also been independently introduced by (Dubois et al. 1992a) in the setting of possibilistic logic under the name of strongly maximal consistent subbases. Baral et al. 1992) have also used a similar approach to combine belief bases. The definition ....

A.S. Rao, N.Y. Foo (1989) Formal theories of belief revision.

....If this is the case, the agent must make changes in its knowledge base in order to make the new data compatible with existing knowledge. The process of selecting a part of the knowledge to retract in order to maintain consistency with the new data is known as belief revision [G ardenfors, 1988; Rao and Foo, 1989] Abduction and belief revision are closely related tasks. As we will show in the next section, when multiple explanations are possible, abduction can be viewed as a search in a space of explanations. Sometimes, explanations that look preferable early on may look less preferable later, or worse ....

....1 . The various theories and systems that have been studied differ in the principles used in deciding what to retract. One dimension along which we can classify belief revision theories is in terms of what other beliefs are discarded when a particular belief is retracted. This dimension [Rao and Foo, 1989] distinguishes between systems following a Coherence Theory of Belief Revision and a Foundational Theory of Belief Revision. Systems following a coherence theory [G ardenfors, 1988; Katsuno and Mendelzon, 1991] eliminate just enough from the original belief set to consistently accomodate the new ....

A. S. Rao and N. Y. Foo. Formal theories of belief revision. In First International Conference on Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning, pages 369--380, Toronto, Ont., 1989.

.... phrasing the problem as one of revision of probability assessments, with Bayes s rule the central method (see, for example, 39, 21] Recently these studies have been complemented by detailed studies by philosophers (e.g. 36, 28, 42, 20, 14] and artificial intelligence researchers (e.g. [9, 17, 44, 6, 29, 32, 37]) of belief revision in a nonprobabilistic setting, in which one views the beliefs of an agent as a set of propositions and seeks to describe how a rational agent should change its set of believed propositions. Numerous practical systems for belief revision called reason maintenance or truth ....

A. S. Rao and N. Y. Foo. Formal theories of belief revision. In R. J. Brachman, H. J. Levesque, and R. Reiter, editors, Proceedings of the First International Conference on Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning (KR'89), pages 369-- 380, San Mateo, CA, May 1989. Morgan Kaufmann.

....while preserving consistency. Recently, belief revision has received a lot of attention in AI, 1 which led to a number of different proposals for different applications [ Ginsberg, 1986; Ginsberg and Smith, 1987; Dalal, 1988; Gardenfors and Makinson, 1988; Winslett, 1988; Myers and Smith, 1988; Rao and Foo, 1989; Nebel, 1989; Winslett, 1989; Katsuno and Mendelzon, 1989; Katsuno and Mendelzon, 1990; Doyle, 1990 ] Most of this research has been considerably influenced by approaches in philosophical logic, in particular by Gardenfors and his colleagues [ Alchourr on et al. 1985; Gardenfors, 1988 ] who ....

Anand S. Rao and Norman Y. Foo. Formal theories of belief revision. In R. J. Brachman, H. J. Levesque, and R. Reiter, editors, Proceedings of the 1st International Conference on Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning, pages 369--380, Toronto, Ont., May 1989.

....true in general. Katsuno and Mendelzon have analyzed belief revision in terms of orderings on models [8] but have provided no explicit construction of a belief revision operator. Also, in real life, orderings are specified by people on the syntactic form of beliefs, and not on models. Rao and Foo [13] have analyzed both the foundational and coherentist approaches to belief revision, but their approach assumes a modal logic with auto epistemic operators. 8 Appendix Note : For the puropose of brevity in the proofs that follow, we shall use the term p closure to denote partial closure . ....

Anand S. Rao and Norman Y. Foo. Formal theories of belief revision. In Proc. of the First International Conference on Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning, 1989.

....not antisymmetric, that is, it does not follow from the fact that x and y stand in the same # relation with every z that x and y are identical. 5 Or in the move from H to V H; compare Nebel (1989) and del Val (1997) 6 Also compare Martins and Shapiro s (1988) disbelief propagation , and Rao and Foo s (1989) foundational equation , according to which foundationalism is coherentism plus disbelief propagation. This is quite a complex requirement. In the present paper, we are going to study only a much simpler version of the Filtering condition, which we call the condition of Simple Filtering . SF) ....

Rao, Anand S., and Norman Y. Foo (1989): `Formal Theories of Belief Revision', in R.

....unneeded justifications and permits some latitude in choosing a revision, since in general there is no unique minimal change. Various sets of selection criteria have been defined by means of axioms or postulates that a belief revision operator must satisfy (Dalal 1988; Gardenfors 1988; Nebel 1989; Rao and Foo 1989). Nonmonotonic formalisms such as circumscription (Winslett 1989) and probabilistic logic (Neufeld 1989) have also been used to specify minimal revisions. Chapter 9 Conclusion 9.1 Goals and achievements In human dialogues, both the producer and the recipient of an utterance have a say in ....

Rao, Anand S. and Foo, Norman Y. (1989). Formal theories of belief revision. In Proceedings of the First Annual Conference on Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning. pages 369--380.

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