K. Konolige. What awareness isn't: A sentential view of implicit and explicit belief,. In J.Y. Halpern, editor, Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning about Knowledge, pages 241--250, 1986.  Home/Search   Document Not in Database   Summary   Related Articles   Check

....truth of that by some special deduction rules or approaches. In other words, non awareness of something can be interpreted as failure of computation of the truth. That may be because the agent s resources are limited or something else. From the computational point of view, as Konolige suggested in [15], there are two possible approaches that would fit into the awareness framework: 1. Awareness as filter Agents compute all logical consequences of their beliefs, throwing away those not in the awareness set, perhaps because limitation of memory, perhaps because of agents prejudices. 2. ....

....Intuitively, nonawareness means unknown . Moreover, in a multi agents environment, even though a super agent is one of those agents whose beliefs and knowledge are reasoned with, we should draw a distinctions between awareness of general agent and the awareness of super agent. 5 Negation In [15], Konolige points out that the problem of logical omniscience results from the introduction of possible worlds in analysis of beliefs. He suggests that the introduction of possible worlds should be rethought. However,the idea of possible worlds indeed has a certain intuitive appeal. A suitable ....

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Konolige, K., What Awareness Isn't: A Sentential View of Implicit and Explicit Belief, in: J. Y. Halpern (ed.) Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning about Knowledge: Proceedings of the 1986.

....of the logical consequences of the asserted beliefs. This seems to mean that people do not possess logical omniscience, and various attempts have been made toward formal theories of belief that do not demand that beliefs be closed under entailment (see (Levesque, 1984; Fagin and Halpern, 1985; Konolige, 1986)) Levesque (1984) introduced the term explicit belief to mean the beliefs to which an agent will assent, and the term implicit belief to mean the logical consequences of explicit belief. Thus ordinarily, the explicit beliefs of the agent will be incomplete. Secondly, the implicit beliefs of the ....

Konolige, K. 1986. What awareness isn't: a sentential view of implicit and explicit belief. In Halpern, J. Y., editor, Proceedings of the Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning about Knowledge, pp. 241--250.

....leads to what Hacking calls personal possibility, and to his preferred, sentential form of personal probability. This solves Savage s problem in one 1. Logical closure on beliefs is referred to as logical omniscience in the logic community (such as [Hintikka 75] according to Konolige [Konolige 86]. p q 109 sense, by making the theory weaker. Now that agents do not make all logical deductions, to restore some of the power of decision theory we would need to model what deductions they do make. But Hacking realized this still left a question unanswered: namely, how are we supposing the ....

Kurt Konolige. What awareness isn't: A sentential view of implicit and explicit belief. In Joseph Y. Halpern, editor, Proceedings of the Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning about Knowledge, pages 241-250, Los Altos, California, 1986. Morgan Kaufmann.

.... while the active beliefs are those facts and rules that have been derived or used at a certain point (acc) and the queries (prov) I E A Figure 1: Structure of an agent s beliefs Our view of the structure of an agent s beliefs (figure 1) differs from the ones found in the literature, like [Kon86] that does not distinguish active from explicit beliefs, FH88] that start from the set of implicit beliefs and eliminate things to get to the set of the explicit beliefs and [Har86] that considers that implicit beliefs can be derived from the explicit ones in a different way than by inference. We ....

Kurt Konolige. What awareness isn't: A sentential view of implicit and explicit knowledge. In Joseph Halpern, editor, Proceedings of the 1986 Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning About Knowledge (TARK), pages 241--250, San Mateo, CA, 1986. Morgan Kaufmann Publishers.

....time, actions and plans in Figure 1 is that the former are normally located at a logical level whereas the latter may be regarded as operational. This division seems to exist no matter Supported by CNPq Brazilian Research Council grant No. 200210 93 9 whether the approach used is sentential [5] or model theoretic [3] In both cases, the planning algorithm operates on a logical representation a set of sentences or snapshots of possibleworlds whose semantics is intrinsically influenced by the action operators. From a theoretic Belief Systems (KD45) Sentential Planner f: W W ....

Kurt Konolige. What awareness isn't: A sentential view of implicit and explicit belief. In Joseph Y. Halpern, ed., TARK'86, pages 241--250, Los Altos, 1986.

....alternative approach of making a distinction between awareness and possession, a clear understanding of how to formalize awareness is required. Some initial attempt in adding awareness to an algebraic model is reported in [16] General logical perspectives on formalizing awareness can be found in [9, 13, 15]. We have presented a semantic model for authentication protocols and a formalization of two basic types of correctness properties. We believe that these are necessary groundwork that must be in place before we can propose and study analysis techniques. In particular, given the semantic model and ....

K. Konolige. What awareness isn't: A sentential view of implicit and explicit belief. In Proceedings of the 1st Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning About Knowledge, pages 241--250, Monterey, Californiaa, March 19--22 1986.

....discussion above, that there are two problems to be addressed in developing a logical formalism for intentional notions: a syntactic one, and a semantic one. It follows that any formalism can be characterized in terms of two independent attributes: its language of formulation, and semantic model (Konolige, 1986a, p83) There are two fundamental approaches to the syntactic problem. The first is to use a modal language, which contains non truth functional modal operators, which are applied to formulae. An alternative approach involves the use of a meta language: a many sorted first order language ....

....approach. In this scheme, beliefs are viewed as symbolic formulae explicitly represented in a data structure associated with an agent. An agent then believes OE if OE is present in its belief data structure. Despite its simplicity, the sentential model works well under certain circumstances (Konolige, 1986a) 2 Note, however, that the sentence (5) is itself a proposition, in that its denotation is the value true or false. In the subsections that follow, we discuss various approaches in some more detail. We begin with a close look at the basic possible worlds model for logics of knowledge ....

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Konolige, K. (1986b). What awareness isn't: A sentential view of implicit and explicit belief (position paper). In Halpern, J. Y., editor, Proceedings of the 1986 Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning About Knowledge, pages 241--250. Morgan Kaufmann Publishers: San Mateo, CA.

....agent s reasoning capabilities. In an effort to recover from this last negative result, Fagin and Halpern have developed a logic of general awareness , based on a similar idea to Levesque s but with a very much simpler semantics [40] However, this proposal has itself been criticised by some [81]. Konolige the deduction model A more radical approach to modelling resource bounded believers was proposed by Konolige [80] His deduction model of belief is, in essence, a direct attempt to model the beliefs of symbolic AI systems. Konolige observed that a typical knowledge based system ....

K. Konolige. What awareness isn't: A sentential view of implicit and explicit belief (position paper). In J. Y. Halpern, editor, Proceedings of the 1986 Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning About Knowledge, pages 241--250. Morgan Kaufmann Publishers, Inc., 1986.

....logic 10 and does not allow nested beliefs 11 , so it is quite limited. 2.2. 3 Logic of general awareness Fagin and Halpern suggest in [FaHa85] different logics that try to solve the problems of this last approach (however, they keep explicit and implicit beliefs) Konolige comments in [Kono86b] one of them, the logic of general awareness. 9 Similar logics that deal with many agents were investigated by Halpern and Lakemeyer in [Halp93] Lake93] and [HaLe96] 10 Lakemeyer has extended this approach to first order logic, see [Lake91b] or [Lake94] 11 Some partially nested beliefs ....

....T. That is, the agent is aware of a certain class of formulas for which it is easy to make deductions (or to show that a certain deduction does not exist) Thus, the logic of general awareness models perfect reasoners over a restricted set of formulas. Konolige makes some remarks about this logic ([Kono86b]) ffl With this semantics, the connection between the properties of the accessibility relation and the axioms satisfied by knowledge is lost. For instance, assume that the agent explicitly believes ; then B , L and A are true. One can wonder whether BB is true or not. BB j (LB AB ) j ....

Konolige, K., "What awareness isn't: a sentential view of implicit and explicit belief", Proceedings of the First Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning about Knowledge, TARK-86, pp. 241-250, 1986.

....consisting of the conjunction of standard KD45 belief formulae and awareness formulae. The semantic counterpart of that syntactic operator is a set of arbitrary propositions. Both versions overcome to some extent the problems mentioned above. However, this kind of approach has been criticized [Kon86] based on the argument that it is nothing more than a complicated version of sentential approaches which lacks the elegance of possible world semantics and doesn t represent any improvement on purely syntactic formalisms [Kon80] Probably the most influential representative of approach (ii) is ....

Kurt Konolige. What awareness isn't: A sentential view of implicit and explicit belief. In Joseph Y. Halpern, editor, Proceedings of the 1986 Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning about Knowledge, pages 241--250, Los Altos, 1986. Morgan Kaufmann.

....may be used. In the remainder of this section, we discuss these formalisms in more detail. Intentional Logics There is a well established tradition in AI philosophy of devising logics of the mentalistic, intentional notions: belief, knowledge, intention, and so on (Hintikka, 1962; Moore, 1985; Konolige, 1986a; Cohen and Levesque, 1990) Such logics identify an agent with an intentional system: intentional systems . are] entities whose behaviour can be predicted by the method of attributing beliefs, desires, and rational acumen . Dennett, 1987, p49) The prevalent method for defining the ....

.... semantics in some way; Levesque suggested one way of doing this, Levesque, 1984) by borrowing some ideas from situation semantics (Barwise and Perry, 1983) Another scheme is described in (Fagin and Halpern, 1985) However, these methods have been criticised for their essentially ad hoc nature (Konolige, 1986b) Also, they suffer from one of the key problems of standard possible worlds approaches: they are not grounded. Some researchers have rejected possible worlds altogether, and looked instead to the possibility of developing an alternative semantics. The best known example of this work is the ....

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Konolige, K. (1986b). What awareness isn't: A sentential view of implicit and explicit belief (position paper). In Halpern, J. Y., editor, Proceedings of the 1986 Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning About Knowledge, pages 241--250. Morgan Kaufmann Publishers, Inc.

....to an agent a plan that contains the actions that the agent has been observed performing. This task is similar to diagnosing the agent s plan, except that the recognizer might need to first identify the agent s goals in performing the actions and then infer a plan from the goals. Helft and Konolige (1990) propose an abductive model of plan recognition. In their model, the goal G of a planning agent is an event that an agent wishes to bring about, such as OCCURS(TravelToSpain,t) 27 . A plan is a sequence of actions whose combined effect is to bring about G. The agent s theory T a includes an ....

Konolige, Kurt (1986b). What awareness isn't: A sentential view of implicit and explicit belief. In Halpern, Joseph Y., editor, Proceedings of the First Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning about Knowledge, Monterey, CA. pages 241--250.

No context found.

K. Konolige. What awareness isn't: A sentential view of implicit and explicit belief,. In J.Y. Halpern, editor, Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning about Knowledge, pages 241--250, 1986.

No context found.

Konolige, K., "What awareness isn't: a sentential view of implicit and explicit belief", Proceedings of the First Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning about Knowledge, TARK-86, pp. 241-250, 1986.

No context found.

K. Konolige. What awareness isn't: A sentential view of implicit and explicit belief (position paper). In J. Y. Halpern, editor, Proceedings of the 1986 Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Reasoning About Knowledge, pages 241--250. Morgan Kaufmann Publishers: San Mateo, CA, 1986.

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