Cohen, P. R., and Levesque, H. J. Speech acts and rationality. Proceedings of the 23rd Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics. 1986.  Home/Search   Document Details and Download   Summary   Related Articles   Check

....believes that each act in H plays a role in his plan. See discussion below. 4. G intends to execute each act in H. 5. G intends to execute H as a way of doing . 2Although this definition ignores some important issues of commitment over time, as discussed by Bratman [4] and Cohen and Levesque [7], it is sufficient to support the PI process needed for many question answering situations. This is because, in such situations, unexpected changes in the world that would force a reconslderation of the actor s intentions can usually be safely ignored. 6. G intends each act in lI to play a role ....

Philip R. Cohen and Hector J. Levesque. Speech acts and rationality. In Proceedings of the 3rd Conference of the Association for Computational Linguistics, pages 49-59, Stanford, Ca., 1985.

.... we represent utterances as surfacelevel speech acts in the manner first used by Petranit and Allen [1980] For example, if speaker m asks speaker r the question Do you know who s going to that meeting we would represent this as: s request(m, r, informif(r, m, knowref(r, w) Following Cohen and Levesque [1985], we limit the surface language to the acts s request, s lnform, sinformref, and s informif. Discourse level acts include inform, informif, informref, askref, asklf, request, pretell , testref, testif and warn, and are represented using a similar notation. 4.2 Expressed attitudes We distinguish ....

Philip It. Cohen and Hector J. Levesque. Speech acts and rationality. In 3th Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics, Proceedings of the Confer- ence, pages 49-60, 1985.

.... and to specify how agents model one another is a unique feature of CYNIC, although a recursive rule system for reasoning about belief was used by Ellman [46] Cohen and Levesque have gone on with a similar approach to modelling communication starting with a specification of rational agency [28, 27, 29, 30]. In their models they have stuck to representations of the passing of time which are more amenable to the generation of proofs than to planning. It seems that they are trying to capture the effects of agents reasoning about one another at different levels without actually modelling them as doing ....

.... doablefor [ true [ doris] does [open door] at [var [ fred] time 1] 28) 28 28 [27 doable] 28) 28 29 [ true [ doris] understands [ true [ doris] does [open door] at [var [ fred] time 1] 30) 3, 25, 28 30 [[26 27] imply [29] by [C0] 26, 27) 3, 25, 28 31 [ 7 24] imply [26] by [DR OBEDIENT] 7, 24) 3, 25 nogoods = 9 C.5 The spies example C.5.1 Domain specific rules The rule D1 states that if an agent has a meeting in one town, he wants the other to think he ....

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Philip R. Cohen and Hector J. Levesque. Speech acts and rationality. In Association for Computational Lingustics: Proceedings of the twenty-third annual meeting, pages 49--59, Chicago, Illinois, 1980.

....in terms of the communicative intent of the speaker and the beliefs of the interlocutors. Suitable terms for this purpose are provided by the formal theory of rational interaction being developed by, among others, Cohen, Levesque, and Perrault, such as the basic modal operators BEL and BMB from [Cohen Levesque 85] In the structurer s operationalized relations, then, each relation plan has two primary parts, a Nucleus and a Satellite, and recursively relates some unit(s) of the input, or another relation (cast as Nucleus) to other unit(s) of the input or another relation (cast as Satellite) A simple ....

Cohen, P.R. and Levesque, H.J. 1985. Speech Acts and Rationality. Proceedings of the 23rd ACL Conference, Chicago (49--59).

....see, for instance, Pustejovsky 1991] 85 In the literature on nonmonotonicity, this is called the ramification problem. See [Ginsberg 1988b] Section 8 Nonmonotonity in Linguistics 49 and on Perrault s nonmonotonic reformulation of this work. The central idea of the monotonic formulations in [Cohen Levesque 1985], Cohen Perrault 1987] and [Cohen Levesque 1987] is to axiomatize speech acts in such a way that theorems can be proved to support the efficacy of certain speech acts in achieving their conventional goals. In the case of assertion, for instance, this means that there will be a theorem to the ....

Philip Cohen and Hector Levesque. "Speech acts and rationality." 23rd Annual meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics: proceedings of the conference. Association for Computational Linguistics, 1985, pp. 49--59.

....Close Segment correlated with Attention In figure 7.1 Inferences are the combination of Entailments and Implicatures. The small number of Attention Repetitions in figure 7. 1 is due to the fact that speakers don t remember the verbatim form of a proposition and that form is determined by context (Prince, 1985). Thus a proposition re realized remotely is unlikely to be realized in the same form. The small number of Attention Inference IRUs is explained by the discourse inference constraint. There is no difference in the distribution of paraphrases and only Attention IRUs can be Unused by definition. ....

P.R. Cohen and H.J. Levesque. 1985. Speech acts and rationality. In Proceedings of the twenty-third Annual Meeting of the Association of Computational Linguistics, pages 49--60.

....is viewed as the characterization of the goal(s) that the operator achieves. In formalizing the RST relations to be used as plan operators, Hovy represents the constraints as communicative intent of the speaker in terms of the formal theory of rational interaction developed 62 by, among others, Cohen Levesque 85] For example, the PURPOSE relation shown in Figure 4 13 is formulated as the PURPOSE plan operator shown in Figure 4 14. The RST relation in Figure 4 13 is a descriptive relation, and it is used only to described a text. However, the RST based plan operator in 4 14 is an action generator, and ....

Cohen, P. R. and Levesque, H. J. Speech Acts and Rationality. In Proceedings of the 23rd Conference of the ACL, pages 49-59. Association for Computational Linguistics, Stanford, CA, 1985.

....so on and so forth until a state is reached where all preconditions are met with respect to the state the user is believed to be in. This algorithm is given in greater detail in [Allen 80, Allen 95] and a more indepth discussion about the logic and theory behind this kind of approach is given in [Cohen] Each precondition along the way that wasn t met is by [Allen 95] called a obstacle, and what the agent can do is help the user overcome all those obstacles that it believes the user will not be able to overcome by himself. However, finding the plan and goal is not always enough to really ....

....intent towards a request rather than what it was before. Hinkel 89] gives a good and more indepth account for how you would do this. 4. 2 What others have done Plan based and more syntactically semantically oriented approaches are what I saw the most of, where [Allen 80, Perrault 80, Allen 95, Cohen] fall into the former category and [Hinkel 89] falls into the latter category. 4.2.1 Plan based approaches [Allen 80, Perrault 80, Allen 95, Cohen] all make use of this approach in much the same way. Allen 95] bases his approach on his previous work, and therefore what I will discuss here is ....

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Cohen, P. R., and Levesque H. J. "Speech Acts and Rationality".

....Each system generates utterances, one at a time, each selecting its next response to be coherent according to its private model of the context up to that point. For simplicity, utterances are represented in the manner first used by Perrault and Allen [19] Following Cohen and Levesque [6], we limit the surface language to the acts request and inform, the operators believe, know, and intend, and constants to represent discourse agents and objects. Below are the forms that are exchanged during a re enactment of the when is dinner example. Directions for future work include ....

Philip R. Cohen and Hector J. Levesque. Speech acts and rationality. In 23th Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics, Proceedings of the Conference, pages 49--60, 1985.

....about what one agent believes the second believes the third believes, and to require some kind of default reasoning (again, an active AI research area) such as that Y believes that X believes what Y does provided that it does not contradict anything which Y believes X already believes. 8 Cohen and Levesque (1987) present a theory of communication derived from a formal theory of rational interaction. Informal principles, such as Grice s, are no longer primitive but follow (or not, as the case may be) from the formal theory just as we have suggested that informal principles of tutoring may, eventually, ....

Cohen, P.R. and Levesque, H.J. (1987). Speech acts and rationality. Proceedings of the International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, Milan.

.... we represent utterances as surfacelevel speech acts in the manner first used by Perrault and Allen [ 1980 ] For example, if speaker m asks speaker r the question Do you know who s going to that meeting we would represent this as: srequest (m, r, informif(r, m, knowref(r, w) Following Cohen and Levesque [ 1985 ] we limit the surface language to the acts s request, s inform, sinformref, and s informif. Discourse level acts include inform, informif, informref, askref, askif, request, pretell 5 , testref, testif and warn, and are represented using a similar notation. 4.2 Expressed attitudes We ....

Philip R. Cohen and Hector J. Levesque. Speech acts and rationality. In 23th Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics, Proceedings of the Conference, pages 49--60, 1985.

....knowledge of the referent and thus mutual knowledge of it established Recall that the effects of the primitive actions of a referring plan are to establish the mutual belief of the referent s properties. If we assume that the hearer believes the speaker is rational, that is, sincere and competent (Cohen and Levesque, 1985; Appelt and Kronfeld, 1987) then the hearer can infer her own belief about a property of the referent if she believes that the speaker believes the property (and she believes this as a result of evaluating the plan) Then, mutual belief of the property is established once she accepts the ....

Cohen, P. R. and Levesque, H. (1985). Speech acts and rationality. In Proceedings of the 23th Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics, pages 49--59.

....problem of revision of mutual belief. 5 Speech Act Semantics Speech acts [ Austin, 1962 ] are linguistic actions such as assertions, requests and promises, having an explicit propositional content. One strand in the theory of speech acts, Allen and Perrault, 1980; Cohen and Perrault, 1979; Cohen and Levesque, 1985; Cohen and Levesque, 1990; Perrault, 1990 ] seeks to characterize the semantics of a speech act by describing the effect it has on the mental states of the participants of the conversation. In this section we apply our theory of mutual belief revision to give a semantic reconstruction of one ....

P. R. Cohen and H. J. Levesque. Speech acts and rationality. In Proc. 23rd Annual Meeting of the ACL, pages 49--59, Chicago, IL, 1985. Association for Computational Linguistics.

....it. Thus, a statement counts only as an attempt to make the hearer adopt these beliefs and is successful exactly when the hearer recognizes it as an attempt. 2.1. 2 Inferential approaches The so called inferential approaches to speech act theory, such as those of Bach and Harnish (1979) Cohen and Levesque (1985a; 1990b) Perrault (1987; 1990) and Shelley (1992) can be seen as a bridge between the purely intention based account suggested by Grice and the more convention based one described by Searle. These approaches reject Searle s notion of felicity conditions as primitive, and instead derive their ....

....effects from Gricean intention, some general principles of communicative interaction, and a representation of participants mental states. According to this view, conversants plan and recognize speech acts by calculating how their actions affect each other s beliefs and intentions. For example, Cohen and Levesque (1985a, 1990b) attempt to formalize the nature of communicative intentions. Their account treats speech act types as types of committed attempts by a speaker to bring about a state of affairs where it is mutually believed by the dialogue participants that the speaker wants some goal. For example, they ....

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Cohen, Philip R. and Levesque, Hector J. (1985). Speech acts and rationality. In 23th Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics, Proceedings of the Conference. pages 49--60.

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Cohen, P. R., and Levesque, H. J. Speech acts and rationality. Proceedings of the 23rd Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics. 1986.

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Philip R. Cohen and Hector J. Levesque. Speech acts and rationality. In ACL-85 [19], pages 49-- 60.

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