Veltman, F.: 1996, `Defaults in Update Semantics'. Journal of Philosophical Logic 25, 221--261. Home/Search Document Not in Database Summary Related Articles Check |
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Presupposition Accommodation: A Plea for Common Sense - Beaver (Correct)
....the common ground. It will be helpful to adopt some of the formalism of recent dynamic semantics. I will build particularly on ideas of Stalnaker [Sta74] Karttunen [Kar74] and Heim [Hei83] and use formal techniques related to those discussed by Groenendijk and Stokhof, e.g. GS91] and Veltman [Vel91]. I will present what will here be called Presupposition Logic, a simple propositional system with a dynamic semantics and dynamic notion of semantic entailment. Further discussion and motivation can be found in [Bea92, Bea93b, Bea94, Bea95] Presupposition Logic provides a model of how a speaker ....
Veltman, F., 1991. "Defaults in Update Semantics", in dyana deliverable R2.5.C. (To appear in: Journal of Philosophical Logic).
Dynamic Semantics Meets Cognitive and Social Science - Ogata (Correct)
....programs or actions. Therefore, I will propose Dynamic Logic of Motions from Private Viewpoints, Dynamic Logic of Cogintion, and Dynamic Logic of Empathy, based on this idea. 2 A Short Introduction to Dynamic Semantics Dynamic Semantics is a framework of semantics of logical languages developed by [3, 39, 13, 35, 14, 15, 44, 43, 23, 50, 4, 51, 45, 30, 36] and others, exploiting Heim s [19] idea of File Change Semantics of English. Theories of Dynamic Semantics can be classified into at least following classes Literatures Langaguage Model Interpretation Dynamic Interpretations [3, 39, 14, 23] LQ (#) W = g g D [ Extensions of Dynamic ....
Frank C. Veltman. Defaults in update semantics. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 8:73--80, 1996.
What do you mean by "what do you mean"?: A formal representation.. - Ogata (Correct)
....update the common knowledge of the community by adding proposition what p means to the common knowledge , and what do you mean (by X) means a declaration of undefinedness of such presuppositions. 3 A Dynamic Semantics of Conversations More formally, exploiting the idea of update semantics [11], Discourse Representation Theory based dynamic semantics of dialogue [8] and dynamic epistemic semantics ( 4, 3, 2] dynamic semantics of each sequence of moves m is defined in the basis of conditional updates discussed in section 2. Definition 2. Given a Kripke model of an epistemic logic (W, ....
Frank C. Veltman. Defaults in update semantics. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 8:73--80, 1996.
A System of Dynamic Modal Logic - de Rijke (1998) (4 citations) (Correct)
....include conditional logic and other systems that somehow involve a notion of change. But, whereas the applications to Theory Change and conditionals do not require the states in DML models to have any particular structure, others do. For example, one version of Frank Veltman s Update Semantics [36] may be seen as a formalism for reasoning about models of the modal system S5 (where each S5 model represents a possible information state of a single agent) and certain transitions between such models. By imposing the 6 structure of S5 models on the individual states in a DML model, the latter ....
F. Veltman. Defaults in update semantics. ILLC, University of Amsterdam, Report LP-91-02, 1991. To appear in Journal of Philosophical Logic.
Tests as Epistemic Updates: Pursuit of Knowledge - van Linder, van der Hoek, Meyer (1994) (Correct)
....the knowledge and abilities of agents, and the results of the actions that the agents may perform. To deal with the test action in a general, natural, and intuitively acceptable way, we propose to extend the framework of [HLM93a, HLM93b] by incorporating some aspects of update semantics (cf. [Vel91, EV93]) In particular, the parts from update semantics take care of a fairly natural and intuitively acceptable formalization of tests. 3.1. Epistemic updates in KT models The models that we considered in [HLM93a, HLM93b] are tuples S; R;r; c , where S is a set of states, is a valuation on ....
F. Veltman. Defaults in update semantics. Technical Report LP-91-02, ILLC, University of Amsterdam, 1991. 32
Anaphora and Quantification in Categorial Grammar - Jäger (Correct)
....replace them by suitable complex types. Two options suggest themselves: both S and D should be identified either with I I or I I for some type I. 2 They both have a dynamic flavor: I I is akin to the view of Discourse Representation Theory, File Change Semantics or Update Semantics (cf. [11, 4, 23]) where a sentence defines a function from information states to information states. I I resembles DMG (Dynamic Montague Grammar, cf. 3] where a sentence meaning is a function from possible continuations to static sentence meanings. I ll adopt the latter, DMG style option here. The semantic ....
Veltman, F.: Defaults in Update Semantics. Journal of Philosophical Logic 25 (1996) 221--261
Changing Modalities - de Lavalette (2001) (Correct)
....and Stokhof in the previous sentence. They do not extend the language of predicate logic, but come up with a nonstandard semantics where formulae have change potential , in that they may change the reference of variables. Dynami cation of modal logic starts with Veltman s Update Logic (see [19]) applying the change potential of modal formulae in the analysis of default reasoning. Gerbrandy and Groeneveld develop DEL (Dynamic Epistemic Logic, see [9, 8] which contains epistemic update actions UB that update the common epistemic state of the group of actors B with action (e.g. ....
Frank Veltman. Defaults in update semantics. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 15:221 - 261, 1996. 15
Validity of Practical Inference - Berislav Zarni May (Correct)
....fact quali es it as a general proposition contrary to its singular phenomenology. Implicit generality makes propositional translation of a conditional implausible 5 . Assigning a speci c semantic for rule expressing conditionals seems to be the natural solution for propositional logic. Veltman [33] takes default rules to be representable 5 Je rey s example [24] p.78. can illustrate the point: I ll break my leg today. I know that s true because I know it s false that if I break my leg today, I ll ski tomorrow. 18 in propositional dynamic logic and gives speci c semantics for ....
....normally are not employed. John is a student. Therefore, presumably John is not employed. Veltman formalizes as (p :q) p; therefore, presumably :q , obviously presupposing that a rule may enter the language of modal propositional logic, as normally(If John is a student than he is unemployed ([33], p.250) 19 Proposition 23 9 2 ( Est ( 2 F [F iat ( 2 F) Proposition 24 8 2 ( Est ( 2 F [F iat ( 2 F) Proposition 25 8 2 ( F iat ( 2 F Est ( 2 F) Proposition 26 8 2 ( F iat ( 2 F [ Est ( 2 F) 3.6 A comparison Cross [10] gives the discrepancy model ....
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F. Veltman. Defaults in update semantics. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 25: 221-261, 1996.
Desires and Defaults: A Framework for Planning with Inferred Goals - Thomason (2000) (14 citations) (Correct)
....Example 2.1. Beliefs about the porch light. 1 A generalization of Reiter s de nition of extension, for systems with defaults for both beliefs and desires, is given in Section 2, below. 2 There are some similarities between this approach to belief and that of Veltman s Update Semantics. See [14]. i) I have a reason to believe the porch light is o , because I asked my daughter to turn it o . ii) I have a reason to believe the porch light is on, because the last time I saw it, it was on. iii) All things considered, I believe the porch light is o , because my daughter is pretty ....
Frank Veltman. Defaults in update semantics. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 26(3):221-261, 1996.
The Surprise Examination - Jelle Gerbrandy Jelle (Correct)
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Veltman, F.: 1996, `Defaults in Update Semantics'. Journal of Philosophical Logic 25, 221--261.
Dynamic Epistemic Logic - Gerbrandy (1997) (8 citations) (Correct)
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Frank Veltman (1996) Defaults in Update Semantics. Journal of Philosophical Logic 25:221--261.
The Dynamics of Default Reasoning - Van Linder Van (1995) (Correct)
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F. Veltman. Defaults in update semantics. Technical Report LP-91-02, ILLC, University of Amsterdam, 1991.
Playing Cards with Hintikka - An Introduction to.. - van Ditmarsch, van.. (2004) (Correct)
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F. Veltman. Defaults in update semantics. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 25:221--261, 1996. 27
Dynamic Normative Reasoning Under Uncertainty: How to.. - van der Torre (Correct)
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F. Veltman. Defaults in update semantics. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 25:221-261, 1996.
Remedial Interchange, Contrary-to-Duty Obligation and Commutation - Parent (2003) (Correct)
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VELTMAN F., "Defaults in Update Semantics", Journal of Philosophical Logic, vol. 25, 1996, p. 221--261.
The Dynamics of Information Exchange Dialogues - Cate (2001) (Correct)
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Veltman, F., Defaults in update semantics, Journal of Philosophical Logic 25 (1996), pp. 221-261. 12
When Variables Don't Vary Enough - Beaver (1994) (2 citations) (Correct)
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Veltman, F., 1991, Defaults in update semantics, in dyana deliverable R2.5.C
Presupposition - Beaver (1994) (4 citations) (Correct)
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Veltman, F., 1991. Defaults in Update Semantics, in deliverable R2.5.C. To appear in: Journal of Philosophical Logic.
A Modal Analysis of Modal Subordination - Robert Van Rooy (Correct)
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Veltman, F. (1996), "Defaults in Update semantics", Journal of Philosophical Logic 25: 221-261.
Exhaustification - van Rooy, Schulz (Correct)
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Veltman, F. (1996), `Defaults in Update Semantics', Journal of Philosophical Logic, 25: 221-261.
Presupposition: An (un)common attitude? - van Rooy (Correct)
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Veltman, F. (1996), "Defaults in Update semantics", Journal of Philosophical Logic 25: 221-261.
Presupposition Satisfaction - van Rooy (Correct)
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Veltman, F. (1996), "Defaults in Update Semantics", Journal of Philosophical Logic, 25, pp. 221-261.
Permission to Change - van Rooy (2000) (1 citation) (Correct)
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Veltman, Frank (1996), `Defaults in update semantics', Journal of Philosophical Logic 25: 221-261.
A Dynamic Solution for the Problem of Validity of Practical.. - Zarnic (1999) (Correct)
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F. Veltman. Defaults in update semantics. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 25: 221-261, 1996.
Comments Welcome - El Co Me (Correct)
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Frank Veltman, Defaults in update semantics, Journal of Philosophical Logic 25 (1996) 221-261. 37
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