| THOMAS Slezak, P. (1999). Situated cognition: Empirical issue, "paradigm shift" or conceptual confusion? In J. Wiles & T. Dartnall (Eds.), Perspectives on cognitive science II: Theories, experiments and foundations (pp. |
....While this position was a welcome critique of in vacuo AI, it could go too far and throw out the baby with the bath water . It is one thing to reject the notion of observerascribed and hand coded meaningful representations and another to reject representational theory per se (see also Slezak [51] and Ziemke [55] In a later paper Brooks [9] states that, I make it clear in the paper [8] that I reject traditional AI representation schemes [and] explicit representations of goals within the machine. There can, however, be representations which are partial models of the world . page ....
P. Slezak. Situated cognition: Empirical issue, `paradigm shift' or conceptual confusion. In Proceeding of the sixteenth annual meeting of the cognitive science society, pages 806--811, Hillsdale, NJ, 1994. Lawrence Erlbaum.
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THOMAS Slezak, P. (1999). Situated cognition: Empirical issue, "paradigm shift" or conceptual confusion? In J. Wiles & T. Dartnall (Eds.), Perspectives on cognitive science II: Theories, experiments and foundations (pp.
No context found.
Szelak, P. (1994). Situated cognition: Empirical issue, `paradigm shift' or conceptual confusion?. In ** (eds.), Proceedings of the 1994 cognitive science conference, Atlanta, GA, **.
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