R. Deb, S. Weber, E. Winter, The Nakamura theorem for coalition structures of quota games, Internat. J. Game Theory 25 (2) (1996) 189--198.  Home/Search   Document Not in Database   Summary   Related Articles   Check

....Therefore, our methods could be used to choose the coalition structure, and the agents could get paid their marginal contribution to the coalition structure. Again, the joining order would be randomized. This would give each agent an expected payoff equal to its Shapley value. Recently Deb et al. [9] investigated games where all effective coalitions must contain at least q agents, where q is a constant, 1 # q # a. It is also assumed that there is a finite number of payoff configurations. They determine an upper bound on the size of the space of payoff configurations that guarantees existence ....

R. Deb, S. Weber, E. Winter, The Nakamura theorem for coalition structures of quota games, Internat. J. Game Theory 25 (2) (1996) 189--198.

....Therefore, our methods could be used to choose the coalition structure, and the agents could get paid their marginal contribution to the coalition structure. Again, the joining order would be randomized. This would give each agent an expected payoff equal to its Shapley value. Recently Deb et al. [9] investigated games where all effective coalitions must contain at least q agents, where q is a constant, 1 q a. It is also assumed that there is a finite number of payoff configurations. They determine an upper bound on the size of the space of payoff configurations that guarantees existence of ....

R. Deb, S. Weber, and E. Winter. The Nakamura theorem for coalition structures of quota games. International Journal of Game Theory, 25(2):189--198, 1996.

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