| M. Bellare, A. Desai, D. Pointcheval and P. Rogaway: Relations among Notions of Security for Public-Key Encryption Schemes. Proc of Crypto'98, Springer LNCS Vol. 1462, 162--177 (1998) |
....contribution of this paper is to provide a rigorous proof that this intuition is indeed correct, under known cryptographic assumptions in the random oracle model for the underlying hash functions. More specifically, we define a strong security notion that is similar to the well known IND CCA2 [3] notion for standard public key encryption schemes, and prove the confidentiality of Zheng s original signcryption schemes in the security notion. Our notion for confidentiality is even stronger than the direct adaptation of IND CCA2 to the setting of signcryption, since we allow the attacker to ....
M. Bellare, A. Desai, D. Pointcheval and P. Rogaway: Relations Among Notions of Security for Public-Key Encryption Schemes, Advances in Cryptology - Proceedings of CRYPTO '98, Vol. 1462 of LNCS, Springer-Verlag 1998, pages 26--45.
....of length . The probability that distinguishes the two cases is negligible and we denote the bound by , i.e. outputs i outputs i Note that the above specification indicates that should withstand a chosen ciphertext attack in the preprocessing mode in the terminology of [19] or CCA I in [3]. Possible implementation of can be done via pseudo random permutations (which model block ciphers) See more details on the efficient implementation of and in Section 4.1. Key Assignment: Another critical cryptographic operation performed in the system is the key assignment method, i.e. how a ....
M. Bellare, A. Desai, D. Pointcheval, P. Rogaway: Relations Among Notions of Security for Public-Key Encryption Schemes, Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO'98, Lecture Notes in Computer Science 1462, Springer, 1998, pp. 26--45.
....two cases is negligible and we denote the bound by # 2 , i.e. Pr[B outputs i E L (x) Pr[B outputs i E L (R x ) # # 2 . Note that the above specification indicates that E should withstand a chosen ciphertext attack in the preprocessing mode in the terminology of [19] or CCA I in [3]. Possible implementation of EL can be done via pseudo random permutations (which model block ciphers) See more details on the efficient implementation of F and E in Section 4.1. Key Assignment: Another critical cryptographic operation performed in the system is the key assignment method, i.e. ....
M. Bellare, A. Desai, D. Pointcheval, P. Rogaway: Relations Among Notions of Security for Public-Key Encryption Schemes, Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO'98, Lecture Notes in Computer Science 1462, Springer, 1998, pp. 26--45.
.... the two cases is negligible and we denote the bound by 2 , i.e. jPr[B outputs i jE L (x) Pr[B outputs i jE L (R x ) j 2 : Note that the above specification indicates that E should withstand a chosen ciphertext attack in the preprocessing mode in the terminology of [19] or CCA I in [3]. Possible implementation of EL can be done via pseudo random permutations (which model block ciphers) See more details on the efficient implementation of F and E in Section 4.1. Key Assignment: Another critical cryptographic operation performed in the system is the key assignment method, i.e. ....
M. Bellare, A. Desai, D. Pointcheval, P. Rogaway: Relations Among Notions of Security for Public-Key Encryption Schemes, Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO'98, Lecture Notes in Computer Science 1462, Springer, 1998, pp. 26--45. 31
.... the two cases is negligible and we denote the bound by 2 , i.e. jPr[B outputs i jE L (x) Pr[B outputs i jE L (R x ) j 2 : Note that the above specification indicates that E should withstand a chosen ciphertext attack in the preprocessing mode in the terminology of [19] or CCA I in [3]. Possible implementation of EL can be done via pseudo random permutations (which model block ciphers) See more details on the efficient implementation of F and E in Section 4.1. Key Assignment: Another critical cryptographic operation performed in the system is the key assignment method, i.e. ....
M. Bellare, A. Desai, D. Pointcheval, P. Rogaway: Relations Among Notions of Security for Public-Key Encryption Schemes, Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO'98, Lecture Notes in Computer Science 1462, Springer, 1998, pp. 26--45.
....can distinguish both cases with probability 1= poly(n) which contradicts the pseudorandomness of f Gamma1 . Now, given that this simulation succeeds, we obtain the desired result by applying the same argument of the proof of Proposition 5. ut Recently, Dolev et al. DDN99] and Bellare et al. [BDPR98] showed that (semantic) security against chosen ciphertext and plaintext attacks implies nonmalleability. Hence, our scheme is non malleable as well. In fact, our construction gives an alternative to the non malleable private key scheme presented in [DDN99] The construction there is similar, but ....
M. Bellare, A.Desai, D.Pointcheval, P.Rogaway: Relations Among Notions of Security for Public-Key Encryption Schemes, Crypto '98, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 1462, Springer-Verlag, 1998.
No context found.
M. Bellare, A. Desai, D. Pointcheval and P. Rogaway: Relations among Notions of Security for Public-Key Encryption Schemes. Proc of Crypto'98, Springer LNCS Vol. 1462, 162--177 (1998)
No context found.
M. Bellare, A.Desai, D.Pointcheval, P.Rogaway: Relations Among Notions of Security for Public-Key Encryption Schemes, Crypto '98, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 1462, Springer-Verlag, 1998.
No context found.
M. Bellare, A. Desai, D. Pointcheval and P. Rogaway: Relations Among Notions of Security for Public-Key Encryption Schemes, Advances in Cryptology - Proceedings of CRYPTO '98, Vol. 1462 of LNCS, Springer-Verlag 1998, pages 26--45.
No context found.
M. Bellare, A. Desai, D. Pointcheval, P. Rogaway: \Relations among notions of security for public-key encryption scheme", Crypto '98, Springer LNCS 1462.
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