Y. Bartal, A. Mayer, K. Nissim, and A. Wool. Firmato: A novel firewall management toolkit. In IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, May 1999.  Home/Search   Document Details and Download   Summary   Related Articles   Check

....notification is used to revoke names when the issuing conditions are not satisfied, thus revoking access to services that depended on that name. Credentials are limited to verifying membership to a group or role, and OASIS uses delegation in a very limited way, limiting decentralization. Firmato s[1] network grouping language is locally customized to each managed firewall. The language is portable, but limited to packet filtering. It does not handle delegation or different, interacting application domains. Policy updates force complete reloads of the rulesets at the affected enforcement ....

Y. Bartal, A. Mayer, K. Nissim, and A. Wool. Firmato: a novel firewall management toolkit. In Proceedings of the 1999.

....notification is used to revoke names when the issuing conditions are not satisfied, thus revoking access to services that depended on that name. Credentials are limited to verifying membership to a group or role, and OASIS uses delegation in a very limited way, limiting decentralization. Firmato s[1] network grouping language is locally customized to each managed firewall. The language is portable, but limited to packet filtering. It does not handle delegation or different, interacting application domains. Policy updates force complete reloads of the rulesets at the affected enforcement ....

Y. Bartal, A. Mayer, K. Nissim, and A. Wool. Firmato: a novel firewall management toolkit. In Proceedings of the 1999.

....a firewall that permits access to the database port from D and a firewall rule on D that recognizes A s credentials, while enforcement of access restrictions to particular fields must be done in the database server itself. One attempt to solve this problem in a limited domain is the Firmato [3] firewall language. Firmato is a high level language for specifying firewall policies. The administrator specifies a policy and a network topology; the policy is then compiled into rule sets for the different firewalls (which may be from different vendors) and distributed to each firewall ....

Y. Bartal, A. Mayer, K. Nissim, and A. Wool. Firmato: A novel firewall management toolkit. In Proc. IEEE Computer Society Symposium on Security and Privacy, 1999.

....and its most privileged users must not be able to reconfigure or disable the NI s policies. Alerts about suspicious activity will be sent to administrative systems via the same secure channels. Prior work provides solid mechanisms for remote policy configuration of this sort, and recent research [4, 6, 14, 19] and practice [2, 22] clarifies their application to distributed firewall configuration. 2.3 Self securing NI features A self securing NI performs intrusion detection on a host s network traffic, impedes communication when compromise is detected (if so configured) and normalizes odd traffic. ....

....to the destination. The administrative interface for the current prototype consists of a directly connected terminal interface. Clearly, this is not appropriate for practical management of per host self securing NIs. We plan to adopt one of the well established cryptography based protocols [2, 4, 6, 14, 19, 22] for remotely distributing policy updates and receiving alerts. 3.3 Discussion Our prototype is still young, with the main goal of allowing us to experiment with NI embedded scanners. Although it is too early to draw definitive conclusions, we believe that its software architecture is valuable. ....

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Y. Bartal, A. Mayer, K. Nissim, and A. Wool. Firmato: a novel firewall management toolkit. IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pages 17--31, 1999.

.... 1,2,3,4 [Premise (P) 0 (1 0) 2 0) 3 4 2 0) 4 2 0) 1: 1 0) 2: 2 0) 1,4 3: 3 4 2 0) 1 (1 0) 2 1 0) 3 4 2 0) 4 2 0) 2: 2 0)##1 2: 2 1 0) 2 0] 2 (1 0) 2 1 0) 3 4 2 0) # #4 (#) #4 (4 2 1 0) Preference, 1] 3 (1 0) 2 1 0) 3 0) # 3: 3 4 2 0)##1 3: 3 0) [3 4 2 0] #3 (3 0) #2 (3 1 0) Preference,P,0] 3 4 2 0) Selection,2] 4 (1 0) 2 1 0) 3 0) 4 3 0) 4: 4 3 0) #4 (4 3 0) #4 (4 2 1 0) Preference,1,3] 5 (1 3 0) 2 1 0) 3 0) 4 3 0) 1: 1 0)##3 2: 1 3 0) 1 0] 6 (1 3 0) 2 0) 3 0) 4 3 0) 2: 2 1 0)##4 2: 2 0) 2 1 0] #2 (2 0) ....

....information about sub AS topology [3] as well as interAS relationships and the AS hierarchy [15, 36] which provided a motivation for information flow control. Work in firewall configuration has proposed a high level specification language that uses a high level abstraction based on formal logic [4]. Our work builds heavily on the many specific BGP anomalies noted by previous work in routing instability [38] delayed convergence [24, 27] route reflector configuration [12, 32] route flap dampening [30] accidental misconfiguration [29] and the difficulties in route prediction for traffic ....

BARTAL, Y., MAYER, A., NISSIM, K., AND WOOL, A. Firmato: A novel firewall management toolkit. In IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (Oakland, CA, May 1999), pp. 17--31.

....and enforcement of Ismene policy within the Antigone communication system. Policy has been used in different contexts as a vehicle for representing authorization and access control [31, 5, 9, 32, 29] peer session security [33] quality of service guarantees [7] and network configuration [3, 2]. These approaches define a policy language or schema appropriate for their target problem domain. This paper expands on this work by defining a general approach in which policy is used to both provision and to regulate access to communication services. The problem of reconciling policies in an ....

Y. Bartal, A. J. Mayer, K. Nissim, and A. Wool. Firmato: A novel firewall management toolkit. In IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pages 17--31, 1999.

....hierarchy, hence the conflicts are inevitable. Without a rigorous way to verify correctness of policy specifications, large scale VPN deployment is going to be troublesome due to possible unexpected security breaches. The research effort closest to ours is probably firewall management toolkit [13] and filtering postures [14] in the sense of defining higher level policies centrally and distributing the policies to enforce. While they only focus on access control policies, we focus on interacted IPSec policies, i.e. VPN tunnel policies as well as access policies. Currently most firewalls ....

Y. Bartal, A. Mayer, K. Nissim, A. Wool. "Firmato: A novel firewall management toolkit". In Proc. 20 IEEE Symp. On Security and Privacy, pp. 17-31, Oakland, CA, May 1999

....around. This approach also decouples the NI enforced policies from the host software; even the host OS and its mostprivileged users should not be able to reconfigure or disable the NI s policies. Prior work provides solid mechanisms for remote policy configuration of this sort, and recent research [5, 7, 17, 20] and practice [2, 24] clarifies their application to distributed firewall configuration. In addition to configuration over the network, alerts about suspicious activity will be sent to administrative systems via the network. The same secure channels used for configuration can be reused for this ....

....from use of the current prototype. The administrative interface for the current prototype consists of a directly connected terminal interface. Clearly, this is not appropriate for practical management of per host self securing NIs. Fortunately, well established cryptography based protocols [2, 5, 7, 17, 20, 24] exist for remotely distributing policy updates and receiving alerts. The current prototype also does not preclude scanners from excessive resource utilization, instead relying on the underlying FreeBSD kernel to timeshare. A real NI kernel implementation would need to explicitly prevent any ....

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Y. Bartal, A. Mayer, K. Nissim, and A. Wool. Firmato: a novel firewall management toolkit. IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pages 17--31, 1999.

....telnet may not be explicitly forbidden by the policy, but such a telnet might allow access to an application on that machine that is forbidden by the policy. Traditionally (e.g. 4] security policy has always referred to the settings of firewall rules. Firewall based layered approaches [2][10] try to map security devices to the layers in the architectural design of IP networks. One of the most comprehensive treatments of security policy in networks with many firewalls and distinct security policies for sub networks (and an excellent example of presentation) is the Firmato ....

....[2] 10] try to map security devices to the layers in the architectural design of IP networks. One of the most comprehensive treatments of security policy in networks with many firewalls and distinct security policies for sub networks (and an excellent example of presentation) is the Firmato ([2], 10] Firmato is a firewall management toolkit with: 1) an entityrelationship model containing, in a unified form, global knowledge of the security policy and topology, 2) a model definition language, which is used as an interface to define an instance of the entity relationship model, 3) a ....

Y. Bartal, A. Mayer, K. Nissim, and A. Wool. Firmato: A Novel Firewall Management Toolkit. IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 1999: 17-31.

....Can be spoofed from [ext] 10.10.11.64 26 OK 10.10. 11.128 25 OK 5 Related work Much of the research in firewalls has focused either on performance or the problem of expressing an organization s security policy in a language understood by a firewall, i.e. tools for creating access lists [2, 3, 11]. There are also some commercial products available, such as Cisco s Access Control List Manager [5] and Secure Policy Manager [16] Modern firewall products usually allow the specification of rules using a graphical user interface. The work most similar to ours has been done by Mayer, Wool, and ....

.... based on a security policy and verifying that a packet filter implements some security policy [11] Molitor describes a tool which prints a more human readable description of an access list [20] Bartal et al. have written a rule illustrator , a tool for drawing an access list in a graphical form [2]. The low level implementation of packet filters, called the packet classification problem has also received quite a lot 6 of attention. However, most of the work has focused on performance issues and hardware implementations; Feldman and Muthukrishnan [10] give a recent summary and a good ....

Yair Bartal, Alain Mayer, Kobbi Nissim, and Avishai Wool. Firmato: A novel firewall management toolkit. In Proceedings of the 1999 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pages 17--31, Oakland, California, May 1999.

....by the firewall. And incoming packets are accepted or rejected by each inside host, according to both the policy and the cryptographically verified identity of each sender. 2 Policies and Identifiers Many possible policy languages can be used, including file oriented schemes similar to Firmato [BMNW99], the GUIs that are found on most modern commercial fire2 walls, and general policy languages such as KeyNote [BFK99] The exact nature is not crucial, though clearly the language must be powerful enough to express the desired policy. A sample is shown in Figure 1. What is important is how the ....

Yair Bartal, Alain Mayer, Kobbi Nissim, and Avishai Wool. Firmato: A novel firewall management toolkit. In Proc. IEEE Computer Society Symposium on Security and Privacy, 1999. to appear.

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Y. Bartal, A. Mayer, K. Nissim, and A. Wool. Firmato: A novel firewall management toolkit. In IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, May 1999.

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Y. Bartal, A. Mayer, K. Nissim, and A. Wool. Firmato: a novel firewall management toolkit. IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pages 17--31, 1999.

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Y. Bartal, A. J. Mayer, K. Nissim, and A. Wool. Firmato: A novel firewall management toolkit. In IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pages 17--31, 1999.

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Yair Bartal, Alain J. Mayer, Kobbi Nissim, and Avishai Wool. Firmato: A novel firewall management toolkit. In IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pages 17--31, 1999.

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Y. Bartal, A. J. Mayer, K. Nissim, and A. Wool. Firmato: A novel firewall management toolkit. In IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pages 17--31, 1999.

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Y. Bartal, A. Mayer, K. Nissim, and A. Wool. Firmato: a novel firewall management toolkit. In Proceedings of the 1999 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pages 17--31, May 1999. 159

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Y. Bartal, A. Mayer, K. Nissim, and A. Wool. Firmato: a novel firewall management toolkit. In Proceedings of the 1999.

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Yair Bartal, Alain Mayer, Kobbi Nissim, and Avishai Wool. Firmato: A novel firewall management toolkit. In Proc. IEEE Computer Society Symposium on Security and Privacy, 1999.

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Y. Bartal, A. Mayer, K. Nissim, and A. Wool. Firmato: a novel firewall management toolkit. In Proceedings of the 1999.

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Y. Bartal, A. Mayer, K. Nissim, and A. Wool. Firmato: a novel firewall management toolkit. In Proceedings of the 1999.

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Y. Bartal, A. Mayer, K. Nissim, and A. Wool. Firmato: a novel firewall management toolkit. In Proceedings of the 1999.

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Y. Bartal, A. J. Mayer, K. Nissim, and A. Wool. Firmato: A novel firewall management toolkit. In IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pages 17--31, 1999.

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Y. Bartal, A. Mayer, K. Nissim, and A. Wool. Firmato: a novel firewall management toolkit. In Proceedings of the 1999.

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Yair Bartal, Alain Mayer, Kobbi Nissim, and Avishai Wool. Firmato: A novel firewall management toolkit. In Proceedings, IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy. IEEE CS Press, May 1999.

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Y. Bartal, A. Mayer, K. Nissim, and A. Wool. Firmato: a novel firewall management toolkit. In Proceedings of the 1999.

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