Putnam, H. (1988). Representation and Reality. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.  Home/Search   Document Not in Database   Summary   Related Articles   Check

....see [6] For my present purpose, it is more important that the Lockean concept of covariance lead to an intuition regarding a possible alternative to the reconstructionist approach to representation. 4Cf. Putnam s dictum on the meaning of a representation being in the world, not in the head [21]. Early computational accounts of the hyperacuity phenomenon postulated that the visual input is reconstructed, with ubpixel precision, at a certain stage of cortical processing, making it then possible to determine the sense of an offset smaller than the ; pixel size [2, 5] The proponents of ....

H. Putnam. Representation and reality. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1988.

....if it was detached from the engine during a period of engine speed increase, would increase its own speed during the disconnection, at an appropriate rate. 3. 3 Universal realisation Another criticism of the computational approach is that its formality renders it universally realisable Putnam [11] and Searle [13] argue that any physical system can be interpreted as realising any formal automaton. This has the consequence that an account of cognition cannot be in terms of formal computation, since any particular formal structure, the realisation of which is claimed to be sufficient for ....

....as such explicitation does not count as conceptual change, then it is a refutation of a more direct sort the transparent approach is not required. 3. 4 Externalism Mental states are relationally individuated [10] computational states are not [4] therefore computation cannot explain mentality [11], 5] That s the externalist objection to computationalism, in a subtlety ravaging nutshell. The transparent approach is to question the second premise. Peacocke has done just this by arguing that even conventional computational explanations are essentially relation and world involving [7] 3.5 ....

H. Putnam. Representation and Reality. MIT Press, Cambridge, 1988.

....2n dimensional (the velocity in each spatial dimensions is also a state variable) and the trajectories are discontinuous in this phase space (the velocity goes through an abrupt change) Hence the equivalence between our PCD results and theirs is an optical illusion. Finally the philosopher Putnam [15], while attempting to prove the thesis every open physical system realizes every automaton, uses a notion of aimulation we find implausible. Consider, for example a deterministic automaton without input, generating the sequence (q 1 q 2 ) Then the dynamical system dx dt = 1 (or any other ....

H. Putnam. Representation and Reality, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1988.

....There are ways in which different hypotheses can be empirically tested, at least in principle, over time. Failure modes are one source of constraints, as are certain properties associated with learning. Different architectures make different types of learning easier or harder. Note, however, that Putnam [1988] has argued that even whether a piece of matter is a Turing machine is a just a stance. The issue is currently hotly debated. But as long as we are interested in aspects of the organism s behavior that have an informational flavor (such as decision making) then talk of information and its use is ....

Putnam, H. (1988). Representation and Reality. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press/Bradford Books.

....(the direction in each spatial dimensions is also a state variable) and the trajectories are discontinuous in this phase space (the direction or the velocity goes through an abrupt change) Hence the equivalence between our PCD results and theirs is an optical illusion. Finally Putnam [11], while attempting to prove the thesis every open physical system realizes every automaton, uses a notion of abstraction we find implausible. 14 Consider, for example a deterministic automaton without input, generating the sequence (q 1 q 2 ) Then the system dx dt = 1 (or any other ....

H. Putnam. Representation and Reality, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1988.

....semantics as a purely linguistic enterprise. Even worse, if semantic knowledge is not different from conceptual knowledge, how is it possible that speakers of the same language can communicate, given the tremendous variation in individual conceptual knowledge (a question raised most eloquently by Putnam, 1975, 1988) It is no surprise that the Quinean argument is commonly rejected by linguists, usually just by appealing to seemingly uncontentious examples like x fell asleep x slept or x is a cat x is an animal that ARE intuitively analytical. Under the hypothesis that semantic and logical representation ....

....a word s analytical entailments , is not part of semantic representation but of logical meaning postulates and pragmatic implicatures. As Dowty (1979: 387) observed from a philosophical point of view, semantic representations in a mentalist sense underdetermine truth conditional intensions. In Putnam s (1988: 25) words, r]eference is socially fixed and not determined by conditions or objects in individual brains minds. This explains why people can use words like gold in a perfectly grammatical and unsuspicious way but still disagree in what they would take to be the analytic entailments of gold, ....

Putnam, H., 1988. Representation and Reality. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

....of automata such that any implementation of an automaton in that class will have the mental property in question. In this way, it is hoped that computation will provide a powerful formalism for the replication and explanation of mentality. In an appendix to his book Representation and Reality (Putnam 1988, pp. 120 125) Hilary Putnam argues for a conclusion that would destroy these ambitions. Specifically, he claims that every ordinary open system realizes every abstract finite automaton. He puts this forward as a theorem, and offers a detailed proof. If this is right, a simple system such as a ....

Putnam, H. 1988. Representation and Reality. MIT Press.

.... upon formal semantic description rather than part of cognitive agent s interpretative competence: satisfaction within a model does not reflect our judgment as to whether or not a description associated with a sentence is true, but whether the description of that judgment is formally correct (cf. Putnam 1988). In the first place, semantic representations, or intensions, in the correspondence approach are not available to us in the sense of grasping the content of an expression: The model theoretic intension of a word has in principle nothing whatsoever to do with what goes on inside a person s head ....

....is static in the sense that the representation of an utterance is related to fixed and eternal structures, namely the objects and relations in the model. Accordingly, interpretation can be seen as validation: a representation is truthful if and only if it can be validated against the model (cf. Putnam 1988). There is no sense it which interpretation changes the model. With a dynamic information state, on the other hand, interpretation can result in a change to the information state. In the dialogue in (4.1) B s information state may not contain a structure corresponding to I think John s got his ....

Putnam, H. (1988). Representation and reality. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.

....would say, resonates) to the environment (while extracting task specific information) without reconstructing it internally. By merely mirroring proximally the similarity structure of a distal shape space, Chorus embodies the ideas of those philosophers who argued that meaning ain t in the head (Putnam, 1988) and that cognitive systems are largely in the world (Millikan, 1995) circumvents the severe difficulties encountered by the reconstructionist approaches in computer vision, and may explain the impressive performance of biological visual systems, which, in any case, appear to be too sloppy to ....

Putnam, H. (1988). Representation and reality. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.

....would say, resonates) to the environment (while extracting task specific information) without reconstructing it internally. By merely mirroring proximally the similarity structure of a distal shape space, Chorus embodies the ideas of those philosophers who argued that meaning ain t in the head (Putnam, 1988) and that cognitive systems are largely in the world (Millikan, 1995) circumvents the severe difficulties encountered by the reconstructionist approaches in computer vision, and may explain the impressive performance of biological visual systems, which, in any case, appear to be too sloppy to ....

Putnam, H. (1988). Representation and reality. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.

....such RFs (Weiss and Edelman, 1993) It remains to be seen whether the principle of amending the metrics can be applied to the understanding of other biological information processing subsystems. 11 This may be compared to the idea of representations being in the world, rather than in the head (Putnam, 1988). 5.3 Prospects The applicability of MDS to the understanding of biological information processing in areas other than vision appears to be worth exploring. Olfaction seems to be a promising candidate for modeling in terms of representation by similarity (see Granger and Lynch 1991, p.211; ....

Putnam, H. (1988). Representation and reality. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.

....Barto, 1998] pp. 31 33. ing problem (e.g. plain discretization, CMAC [ Albus, 1981 ] or because no crisp division of the state action space is used (e.g. neural networks) In cognitive science literature, many models for concepts are discussed, see e.g. Lakoff, 1987; van Orman Quine, 1975; Putnam, 1988 ] When viewed as a cognitive model for a specific type of concepts, situation concepts distinguish themselves from other models by the level of detail at which they are specified. Since this level allows direct implementation, their validity can be tested in computational experiments, as ....

Hilary Putnam. Representation and reality. The MIT Press (A Bradford Book), Cambridge, MA, 1988.

....identifying exactly what it is computing has emerged as the goal of the field. Computational complexity, often used to separate cognitive behaviors from other types of animal behavior, will be shown to be dependent upon the observation mechanism as well as the process under examination. While Putnam (1988) has proved that all open physical system can have post hoc interpretations as arbitrary abstract finite state machines and Searle (1990) claimed that WordStar must be running on the wall behind him (if only we could pick out the right bits) neither considered the effects of the observer on the ....

....the bottom of Figure 3. Since an odd number of divisions will induce state machines with a corresponding number of states, an infinite number of finite state automata can be induced from the Baker s shift dynamical system. Other scientists and philosophers have explored this route to complexity. Putnam (1988) has proved that an open system has sufficient state generative capacity to support arbitrary finite state interpretations. His core argument relies on post hoc labeling of state space to accommodate an l r l r l r l r r time time FIGURE 2. The state machines induced from periodic and chaotic ....

Putnam, H. (1988) Representation and Reality (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press).

....are used to govern the modification of these weights based upon experience of the external world. The question of how to represent knowledge using a computer is linked to the notion of representation in cognitive science and philosophy, particularly with the work of Fodor and Putnam (Fodor, 1986; Putnam, 1988). Essentially, the choice of which model to use is a philosophical commitment which influences the way the data are used and viewed. Such a choice scopes both the experiments and the observations made. It also introduces artefacts usually computational objects into the domain being modelled. ....

Putnam, H. (1988) Representation and Reality. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.

....Marr, in his book, makes a very similar argument a mere fourteen pages before he discusses the work of Warrington (Warrington and Taylor, 1973) which swayed him in favor of the reconstructive approach. 10 cf. Putnam s dictum on the meaning of a representation being in the world, not in the head (Putnam, 1988). of just the right things about the appearance of a 3D object that better be ignored. 11 ....

Putnam, H. (1988). Representation and reality. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.

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Putnam, H. (1988). Representation and Reality. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

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Putnam, H. 1988: Representation and Reality, MIT Press, Boston.

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Putnam, H. 1991. Representation and reality. Cambridge, MA: Bradford Books/MIT Press.

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Science, 256:1018--1021. Putnam, H. (1988). Representation and reality. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.

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