Blackley G.R., Safeguarding cryptographic keys, Proc. of the 1979.  Home/Search   Document Not in Database   Summary   Related Articles   Check

....security of a given system, but getting the secret key, if possible, would be the most trivial way to completely demolish any security claim Previous Solutions. The most widely considered solutions to the problem of key exposure are distribution of keys across multiple servers via secret sharing [54, 38, 13] and protection using specialized hardware. Instantiations of the key distribution paradigm include threshold cryptosystems [22] and proactive cryptosystems [35] Distribution across many systems, however, is quite costly. Such an option may be available to large organizations, but is not ....

G. Blackley. Safeguarding Cryptographic Keys. In Proc. of AFIPS 1979.

....the adversary is able to learn almost all of the secret key. Our techniques also have several applications in other settings. Previous approaches and our goals. The most widely considered solutions to the problem of key exposure are distribution of keys across multiple servers via secret sharing [20, 3] and protection using specialized hardware. Distribution across many systems, however, is quite costly. Such an option may be available to large organizations, but is not realistic for the average user. Similarly, the use of specially protected hardware (such as smartcards) can also be costly, ....

G. Blackley. Safeguarding Cryptographic Keys. In Proc. of AFIPS 1979 National Computer Conference, 1979.

....the adversary is able to learn almost all of the secret key. Our techniques also have several applications in other settings. Previous approaches and our goals. The most widely considered solutions to the problem of key exposure are distribution of keys across multiple servers via secret sharing [19, 3], and protection using specialized hardware. Distribution across many systems, however, is quite costly. Such an option may be available to large organizations, but is not realistic for the average user. Similarly, the use of specially protected hardware (such as smartcards) can also be costly, ....

G. Blackley. Safeguarding Cryptographic Keys. In Proc. of AFIPS 1979 National Computer Conference, 1979.

....of a given system, but getting the secret key, if possible, would be the most trivial way to completely demolish any security claim 2 Previous Solutions. The most widely considered solutions to the problem of key exposure are distribution of keys across multiple servers via secret sharing [54, 38, 13] and protection using specialized hardware. Instantiations of the key distribution paradigm include threshold cryptosystems [22] and proactive cryptosystems [35] Distribution across many systems, however, is quite costly. Such an option may be available to large organizations, but is not ....

G. Blackley. Safeguarding Cryptographic Keys. In Proc. of AFIPS 1979 National Computer Conference, 1979.

....the adversary is able to learn almost all of the secret key. Our techniques also have several applications in other settings. Previous approaches and our goals. The most widely considered solutions to the problem of key exposure are distribution of keys across multiple servers via secret sharing [23, 4], and protection using specialized hardware. Instantiations of the key distribution paradigm include threshold cryptosystems [8] and proactive cryptosystems [14] Distribution across many systems, however, is quite costly. Such an option may be available to large organizations, but is not ....

G. Blackley. Safeguarding Cryptographic Keys. In Proc. of AFIPS 1979 National Computer Conference, 1979.

....to use a cryptosystem. Thus some secret information should be shared by a group so that the cryptosystem can be used only if it is permitted by a specified subset of the group. The study of how to keep a secure backup of a secret key and how to recover it securely has been first studied by Blakley [4] and Shamir [23] independently. Shamir proposed a polynomial threshold scheme. In a (t; n) threshold scheme, a secret value is shared by n participants such that any t of the participants can reconstruct the secret value by putting their shares together, but any t Gamma 1 participants cannot get ....

....at any time. We consider unconditional security in this paper, which means that the adversary cannot guess the secret with probability better than 1 q if the secret s 2 GF (q) 3 Verifiable secret sharing Since secret sharing schemes were proposed initially by Shamir [23] and Blakley [4], research on this topic has been extensive. In the classic secret sharing schemes, there are assumed to be no faults in the system. Tompa and Woll [26] and McEliece and Sarwate [17] first considered schemes with faulty participants and gave partial solutions for that problem. In their schemes, ....

G.R. Blackley, Safeguarding cryptographic keys. Proc. Nat. Computer Conf. AFIPS Conf. Proc., 1979, 313-317.

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Blackley G.R., Safeguarding cryptographic keys, Proc. of the 1979.

No context found.

B. Blackley. Safeguarding cryptographic keys. Proceedings of the National Computer Conference 1979.

No context found.

G. Blackley. Safeguarding Cryptographic Keys. In Proc. of AFIPS 1979 National Computer Conference, 1979.

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B. Blackley. Safeguarding cryptographic keys. Proceedings of the National Computer Conference 1979, volume 48 of American Federation of Information Processing Societies Proceedings, pages 313--317, 1979.

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Blackley, G.R. Safeguarding Cryptographic Keys. In Proceedings of the National Computer Conference. 48: 313-7, 1979.

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