J. Kelsey, B. Schneier, D. Wagner, and C. Hall. Side Channel Cryptanalysis of Product Ciphers. Journal of Computer Security, vol.8, pages 141-158, 2000. Home/Search Document Details and Download
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....coalesces identical files within a local file system. LBFS [28] identifies identical portions of different files to reduce network bandwidth rather than storage usage. Convergent encryption deliberately leaks information. Other research has studied unintentional leaks through side channels [22] such as computational timing[238 measured power consumption [24] or response to injected faults [5] Like convergent encryption, BEAR[3 derives an encryption key from a partial plaintext hash. Song et al. 35] developed techniques for searching encrypted data. SALAD has similarities to the ....
J. Kelsey, B. Schneier, D. Wagner, and C. Hall, "Side Channel Cryptanalysis of Product Ciphers", Journal of Computer Security 8(2-3), 2000, pp. 141-158.
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....Use of Cache Memory as a Cryptanalytic Side Channel D. Page Department of Computer Science, University of Bristol http: www.cs.bris.ac. uk Abstract We expand on the idea, proposed by Kelsey et al. [14], of cache memory being used as a side channel which leaks information during the run of a cryptographic algorithm. By using this side channel, an attacker may be able to reveal or narrow the possible values of secret information held on the target device. We describe an attack which encrypts ....
J. Kelsey, B. Schneier, D. Wagner, and C. Hall. Side Channel Cryptanalysis of Product Ciphers. In 5th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security, volume 1485, pages 97--110. Springer-Verlag, 1998.
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....SCIENCE Theoretical Use of Cache Memory as Cryptanalytic Side Channel Page Theoretical Use of Cache Memory as a Cryptanalytic Side Channel D. Page Department of Computer Science, University of Bristol, UK http: www.cs.bris.ac. uk Abstract We expand on the idea, proposed by Kelsey et al. [8], of cache memory being used as a side channel which leaks information during the run of a cryptographic algorithm. By using this side channel, an attacker may be able to reveal or narrow the possible values of secret information held on the target device. As well as describing a theoretical ....
....be altered or damaged in any way during the attack. Other side channel attacks which are progressively more intrusive include timing attacks [12] electro magnetic radiation analysis [7] and glitch and fault analysis based attacks [5] In their review of sidechannel cryptanalysis, Kelsey et al. [8] state: We believe attacks based on cache hit ratio in large S box ciphers like Blowfish, CAST and Khufu are possible. 8, Section 7] 1 We show precisely how cache profiles can aid the recovery of secret information, thereby confirming this prediction. Since cache memory represents a large ....
J. Kelsey, B. Schneier, D. Wagner, and C. Hall. Side Channel Cryptanalysis of Product Ciphers. In 5th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security, volume 1485, pages 97--110. Springer-Verlag, 1998.
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....of the encryption algorithms. These side channel analysis attacks are much more powerful compared to mathematical analysis based attacks. Kelsey, Schneier, Wagner, and Hall showed that even a small amount of side channel information is sufficient to break some of the common encryption algorithms [1]. Side channel attacks can be defeated by carefully designing the software hardware to either reduce the amount of side channel information that leaks or make the leakage irrelevant. Denying an attacker the ability to monitor the internal states can defeat processor flag based side channel attack ....
J. Kelsey, B. Schneier, D. Wagner, and C. Hall, "Side Channel Cryptanalysis of Product Ciphers", Proceedings of ESORICS '98, Springer-Verlag, September 1998, pp. 97-110.
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John Kelsey, Bruce Schneier, David Wagner, and Chris Hall. Side Channel Cryptanalysis of Product Ciphers. Journal of Computer Security, 8:141--158, 2000.
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John Kelsey, Bruce Schneier, David Wagner, and Chris Hall. Side Channel Cryptanalysis of Product Ciphers. Journal of Computer Security, 8:141--158, 2000.
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J. Kelsey, B. Schneier, D. Wagner, "Side Channel Cryptanalysis of Product Ciphers, " ESORICS'98, LNCS 1485, Springer-Verlag, 1998.
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John Kelsey, Bruce Schneier, David Wagner, and Chris Hall. Side Channel Cryptanalysis of Product Ciphers. Journal of Computer Security, 8:141--158, 2000.
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J. Kelsey, B. Schneier, D. Wagner, and C. Hall, \Side Channel Cryptanalysis of Product Ciphers," ESORICS '98 Proceedings, Springer-Verlag, 1998, pp. pp 97-110.
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....the computation [25, 26] and this has led to practical attacks on smartcards. Electromagnetic radiation [33, 16, 34] compromising emanations [36] crosstalk onto the power line [37, 35] return signals obtained by illuminating electronic equipment [3, 35] magnetic fields [32] cache hit ratios [24, 30], and even sounds given off by rotor machines [23] can similarly give the attacker a window of visibility on internal values calculated during the computation. Also of interest is the probing attack, where the attacker places a metal needle on a wire of interest and reads off the value carried ....
J. Kelsey, B. Schneier, D. Wagner, "Side Channel Cryptanalysis of Product Ciphers," ESORICS '98, LNCS 1485, Springer-Verlag, 1998.
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....is secure, then so is the generation mechanism. This was done because there are quite a number of apparently secure block ciphers available in the public domain. Side Channel Attacks Side channel attacks are attacks that use additional information about the inner workings of the implementation [KSWH98b]: timing attacks [Koc96] and power analysis [Koc98] are typical examples. Many PRNGs that are otherwise secure fall apart when any additional information about their internal operations are leaked. One example of this is the RSAREF 2.0 PRNG, which can be implemented in a way that is vulnerable to ....
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J. Kelsey and B. Schneier and D. Wagner and C. Hall. Side Channel Cryptanalysis of Product Ciphers. In Journal of Computer Security, 8 (2-3), 141-158, 2000.
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J. Kelsey, B. Schneier, D. Wagner, and C. Hall, "Side Channel Cryptanalysis of Product Ciphers", Journal of Computer Security 8(2-3), 2000, pp. 141-158.
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