Cleeremans A. (1997) Principles for implicit learning. In D. Berry (Ed.), How implicit is implicit learning ?, Oxford University Press, 195-234.  Home/Search   Document Details and Download   Summary   Related Articles   Check

....a discussion on this last point) The question of the practical knowledge nature opens another discussion about tacitness versus explicitness. This discussion has been recently enlightened by Nonaka [26] who distinguishes explicit and implicit knowledge and the movements between them (see also [11, 13, 12]) Explicit knowledge is easily shared whereas implicit knowledge is highly personal. This last type of knowledge is the result of some internal processing [29] In decision making, this is reminiscent to Kleins Recognition Primed Decision [20] The discussion about tacit versus explicit knowledge ....

Cleeremans A. (1997) Principles for implicit learning. In D. Berry (Ed.), How implicit is implicit learning ?, Oxford University Press, 195-234.

....knowledge nature opens another discussion about tacitness versus explicitness. A first discussion refers to explicit vs. implicit beliefs [22] This discussion has been recently enlightened by Nonaka [23] who distinguishes explicit and implicit knowledge and the movements between them (see also [24, 25, 26]) Explicit knowledge is easily shared whereas implicit knowledge is highly personal. This last type of knowledge is not articulated and is mixed with emotion [27] it is the result of some internal processing [28] In decision making, this is reminiscent to Kleins Recognition Primed Decision ....

Cleeremans A. (1997) Principles for implicit learning. In D. Berry (Ed.), How implicit is implicit learning ?, Oxford University Press, 195-234.

....be used to represent procedural knowledge, but this would require an arti cial assumption that some symbolic representations are not accessible while other similar representations are accessible. Such an assumption seems arbitrary and is not intrinsic to the media of representations. See e.g. Cleeremans 1997 or Sun 1997 for more analyses. Procedural representation can be modular; that is, a number of small backpropagation networks can exist with each adapted to a speci c modality, task, or input stimulus type. This is consistent with the well known modularity claim (Fodor, 1983; Karmilo Smith, ....

A. Cleeremans, (1997). Principles for implicit learning. In D. Berry (Ed.), How implicit is implicit learning? , pp. 195-234. Oxford (England): Oxford University Press.

....highly relevant to the study of consciousness in general. Implicit learning: A graded, dynamic perspective 8 In addition to the well known difficult challenges involved in designing empirical paradigms suitable for the exploration of differences between conscious and unconscious processing (see Cleeremans, 1997 for an overview of these issues) the study of consciousness also notoriously involves a great deal of conceptual issues. In this respect, it is worth pointing out that current theories of consciousness indeed make sometimes very contrasted assumptions about its underlying mechanisms. For ....

....adaptive ways. From this perspective then, the central function of consciousness is to offer flexible, adaptive control over behavior. This complex, dynamical relationship between consciousness and learning has, however, often tended to be overlooked in classical models of cognition. As argued in Cleeremans (1997) and also in Jimnez and Cleeremans (1999) this is most likely due to the fact that classical models of cognition (the Computational Theory of Mind , see Fodor, 1975) take it as a starting point that cognition is symbol manipulation. As we will try to highlight in the next few paragraphs, we ....

[Article contains additional citation context not shown here]

Cleeremans, A. (1997). Principles for implicit learning. In D. C. Berry (Ed.), How implicit is implicit learning? (pp. 195-234). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

....efficacious and fully implicit. It does not produce any kind of conscious or unconscious attitude and hence cannot be accounted for based on the representational theory of mind. Clearly, such knowledge is better captured through dynamical approaches such as the connectionist framework (see Cleeremans, 1997; Cleeremans Jimnez, submitted; O Brien Opie, in press, Mathis Mozer , 1996) a perspective with which D P otherwise agree. A particularly important and difficult issue in this context is to chart the divide between processes and representations, but this is a matter for further debate. ....

Cleeremans, A. (1997). Principles for implicit learning. In: How implicit is implicit learning?, ed. D.C. Berry. Oxford University Press.

.... to allow for unconscious cognition consist (1) of assuming that all the relevant knowledge is permanently embedded in the functional architecture, or (2) of assuming the existence of a powerful unconscious system that is basically the same as the conscious one, only minus consciousness (see Cleeremans, 1997, for further analysis) O O successfully defend the claim that classical systems are therefore simply inadequate to conceptualize the implicit explicit distinction, and offer the connectionist framework as an alternative a perspective that we very much agree with for having defended it ....

.... analysis) O O successfully defend the claim that classical systems are therefore simply inadequate to conceptualize the implicit explicit distinction, and offer the connectionist framework as an alternative a perspective that we very much agree with for having defended it elsewhere (see Cleeremans, 1997, Cleeremans Jimnez, submitted) However, O O then strangely end up claiming (1) that most existing empirical evidence supporting implicit cognition is flawed based on an overly superficial review of the relevant literature, and (2) that we are phenomenologically aware of any stable activation ....

Cleeremans, A. (1997). Principles for implicit learning. In: How implicit is implicit learning?, ed. D.C. Berry. Oxford University Press.

.... feedforward backpropagation networks are used to analyze high level cognitive phenomena, such as speech production (e.g. Sejnowski Rosenberg, 1987) sentence parsing (Elman, 1990) or word recognition (e.g. Seidenberg McClelland, 1989) mid level phenomena such as implicit learning (e.g. Cleeremans, 1993); or even low level neural phenomena, such as dyslexia (e.g. Plaut Shallice, 1993; Plaut, 1995) All of these models have been very successful in accounting for empirical data, yet al..l of them are based on the completely unsupported notion that learning takes places through back propagation. In ....

.... Anderson, 1990; Laird, Rosenbloom, Newell, 1985; Rosenbloom, Newell, Laird, 1990) overlaps largely with the performance of the Simple Recurrent Network (Cleeremans McClelland, 1991) in accounting for artificial grammar learning tasks performance (see Berry and Dienes, 1993; Cleeremans, 1993 for discussions) Some authors even go as far as claiming that many of these models are not empirically differentiable (Barsalou, 1990; Goldstone Krushke, 1994) In contrast to these authors, we believe that it is possible to identify general methodological principles that can be used to ....

Cleeremans, A. (in press). Principles for implicit learning. In D. Berry (Ed.), What is implicit about implicit learning. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. Cleeremans, A. (1993). Mechanisms of implicit learning: Connectionist models of sequence processing. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

....(Berry and Dienes, 1993) In short, IL is the ability to learn without awareness (Cleeremans, Destrebecqz, and Boyer, 1998) as opposed to explicit learning, which is strategy and or hypothesisdriven, and of which one tends to be consciously aware. IL can produce implicit knowledge. According to Cleeremans (1997), at a given time, knowledge is implicit when it can influence processing without possessing in and of itself the properties that would enable it to be an object of representation, and implicit learning is the process by which we acquire such knowledge. p.199) As for the notion of ....

.... and Vinter talk about its function within a causal system ) Therefore, an entity that is an object of representation has to exist independently from the hardware of the system by which it is represented, making it available for information processing operations in a variety of contexts (Cleeremans, 1997) such as a rule that is applicable to different instances of a certain problem. Inherent to this issue is the question of whether the mechanisms through which implicit and explicit knowledge are acquired are best viewed as being subtended by separate processing systems. This is exactly what ....

Cleeremans, A. (1997). Principles for implicit learning. In D.C. Berry (Ed.), How implicit is implicit learning?, pp. 195--234. Oxford University Press.

No context found.

Cleeremans, A. (in press). Principles for implicit learning. In D. Berry (Ed.), What is implicit about implicit learning?, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. Cohen, A, Ivry, R.I., & Keele, S.W. (1990). Attention and structure in sequence learning.

Online articles have much greater impact   More about CiteSeer.IST   Add search form to your site   Submit documents   Feedback  

CiteSeer.IST - Copyright Penn State and NEC