Dasgupta, P., P. Hammond, and E. Maskin (1979). The implementation of social choice rules, Review of Economic Studies 46, 185--216. Home/Search Document Not in Database Summary Related Articles Check |
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Designing Cost Effective Demand Management Contracts Using.. - Fahrioglu, Alvarado (1999) (Correct)
....detail in, among other places, 8] and [13] Mechanism design is a powerful tool that helps a principal (in this case, the utility) with no private information about its customers, decide in an optimal way how much to buy from (or sell to) its customers and at what price. The revelation principle [9, 5, 14] is used to simplify the problem. The mechanism (or contract offer structure) can be designed in a way that customers wishing to maximize their own total benefit are forced to reveal their true valuation of power interruptions. The mechanism has two kinds of output: a decision vector (amounts to ....
P. Dasgupta, P. Hammond, and E. Maskin. The implementation of social choice rules. Review of Economic Studies, 46:185--216, 1979.
Sharing the Cost of Multicast Transmissions - Feigenbaum, Papadimitriou.. (2000) (82 citations) (Correct)
....Nash equilibria (or other notions of noncooperative behavior) rather than strategyproofness: That is, they assume that simultaneous selfish play leads to a self consistent equilibrium, called a Nash equilibrium, in which no agent can improve her lot by deviating. The Nash implementation approach [3, 19] involves designing resource allocation mechanisms with Nash equilibria that yield the socially desirable outcome (such as an e#cient and or budget balanced and or fair allocation) In contrast, strategyproofness ensures that no matter how other agents behave whether selfish, spiteful, or ....
Dasgupta, P., P. Hammond, and E. Maskin (1979). The implementation of social choice rules, Review of Economic Studies 46, 185--216.
Some Technical Results on Continuity, Strategy-proofness.. - Scott Shenker Palo (1993) (Correct)
....concepts introduced so far. In the next two sections we investigate the implications of monotonic closure of the domain, and of continuity of the social choice function. 3 Monotonic Closure We now consider the property of monotonic closure (MC) a concept originally called rich domain in Dasgupta Hammond Maskin (1979) and then rechristened in Maskin (1985) Definition 4 [Maskin] A domain of utility functions U is monotonically closed (MC) if, for all pairs U; V 2 U , and all pairs x; y 2 B such that (1) U(x) U(y) V (x) V (y) and (2) U(x) U(y) V (x) V (y) there exists some W 2 U such that for all ....
....can find another sequence U t of utility functions representing the same preferences such that lim t 1 U t (x) U(x) for all allocations x. The domains U c and U sc are monotonically closed, and in fact U sc is strictly monotonically closed. This can be seen by Example 3.1. 2 in Dasgupta Hammond Maskin (1979), where a similar result is established for continuous, strictly convex, strictly monotonic preferences. Note that our domains U c and U sc are also continuously closed. Lemma 2 U c and U sc are continuously closed. Proof: The following proof applies for both U = U c and U = U sc . ....
P. Dasgupta, P. Hammond, and E. Maskin (1979): "The Implementation of Social Choice Rules," Reviews of Economic Studies, 46, 153-170.
Negotiation as a Resource Allocation Process - Tohme (1996) (Correct)
.... 0 n ) This means that if all the agents change their types and no alternative becomes most preferred than the former social outcome, that outcome must continue to be the social outcome (now for the new assignation of types) Now we can state the main result for direct revelation mechanisms [Dasgupta et al..t.79] Theorem 4 (Gibbard Satterthwaite) If X is finite, with Card(X) 3 and for every i and every x; x 0 2 X, x 6= x 0 , u i (x) 6= u i (x 0 ) then the epiyective social choice function f is incentive compatible in dominant strategies if and only if it is dictatorial Proof 4 ) The argument ....
Dasgupta,P.- Hammond,P.- Maskin, E. The Implementation of Social Choice Rules, Review of Economic Studies 46 pp.185216, 1979.
Sharing the Cost of Multicast Transmissions - Feigenbaum, Papadimitriou.. (2000) (82 citations) (Correct)
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Dasgupta, P., P. Hammond, and E. Maskin (1979). The implementation of social choice rules, Review of Economic Studies 46, 185--216.
Learning and Implementation on the Internet - Friedman, Shenker (1998) (18 citations) (Correct)
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P. Dasgupta, P. Hammond, and E. Maskin. The implementation of social choice rules. Review of Economic Studies, 46:153--170, 1979.
Sharing the Cost of Multicast Transmissions - Feigenbaum, Papadimitriou.. (2001) (82 citations) (Correct)
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P. Dasgupta, P. Hammond, and E. Maskin, The implementation of social choice rules, Review of Economics Studies 46 (1979), 185--216.
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