S. Garfinkel, G. Spa#ord, and A. Schwartz. Practical Unix & Internet Security. O'Reilly & Associates, Inc., third edition, 2003.  Home/Search   Document Not in Database   Summary   Related Articles   Check

.... normally gets aggravated the lower the layer gets on which access control is implemented because less information about the application logic is available: operating systems (e.g. Unix) reside on a low layer and base their access control on user rights to access processes, files, and resources [49], and not on any information related to the application logic. Access via the network can also be controlled using standard mechanisms (e.g. SSL TLS [32] or more elaborate approaches. For example, a multi level secure system has been designed in which labels correspond to network nodes and ....

S. Garfinkel and G. Spa#ord. Practical Unix &Internet Security, 2nd edition. O'Reilly & Associates, Inc., Sebastopol, 1996.

....the possibilities given through the underlying active networking infrastructure. Our approach bases on a scenario tailored runtime supervision [7] of the services whereas the supervision entities decide corresponding to access control policies whether to fulfill specific requests. According to [3] a policy makes clear, what is being protected and why. It states the responsibility for that protection and it provides a ground on which to interpret and resolve any later conflict. In this report we do not precisely define how to express a policy but we recommend to follow the Principle of ....

S. Garfinkel G. Spafford. Practical UNIX & Internet Security. O'Reilly, 1996.

....the possibilities given through the underlying active networking infrastructure. Our approach bases on a scenariotailored runtime supervision [7, 8] of the services whereas the supervision entities decide corresponding to access control policies whether to fulfill specific requests. According to [3] a policy occupies the following roles: it makes clear, what is being protected and why it states the responsibility for that protection it provides a ground on which to interpret and resolve any later conflict II In this report we do not precisely define how to express a policy but ....

S. Garfinkel G. Spafford. Practical UNIX & Internet Security. O'Reilly, 1996.

....na mely fault injection. This approach has drawn upon years of research and experience in vulnerability analysis [1, 3, 6, 16, 20] Our approach relies on an empirically supported belief that the environment plays a significant role in triggering security flaws that lead to security violations [9, 16]. The problem For the purpose of our discussion, we assume that a system is composed of an application and its environment. Thus, potentially, all code that is not considered as belonging to the application belongs to the environment. However, we can reduce the size of the environment, ....

....can crash [23] Different patterns of input could possibly cause more applications to fail. Inputs made under different environmental circumstances could also lead to abnormal behavior. Other testing methods could expose these problems where random testing, by its very nature, might not [9]. Rather than rely on random inputs, our approach exploits those input patterns that could possibly cause security violations. Bishop and Dilger studied one class of the time ofcheck to time of use (TOCTTOU) flaws [4] A TOCTTOU flaw occurs when an application checks for a particular ....

S. Garfinkel and G. Spafford. Practical UNIX & Internet Security. O'Reilly & Associates, Inc., 1996.

....namely fault injection. This approach has drawn upon years of research and experience in vulnerability analysis [1, 3, 6, 17, 21] Our approach relies on an em pirically supported belief that the environment plays a significant role in triggering security flaws that lead to security violations [10, 17]. The problem For the purpose of our discussion, we assume that a system is composed of an application and its environment. Thus, potentially, all codes that are not considered as belonging to the application belong to the environment. However, we can reduce the size of the environment, ....

S. Garfinkel and G. Spafiord. Practical UNIX Internet Security. O'Reilly &; Associates, Inc., 1996.

.... against eavesdropping, ensure the integrity of information and software content, and validate the origin and content of orders and other critical transactions (digital signatures) Firewalls enforce Detailed technological descriptions are readily available from other sources see for example [2, 7, 8]. 8 manageable perimeters around distributed information systems, limit modes protocols for access. Finally, rights management software, such as the IBM Cryptolope system, offer interesting future possibilities for securely delivering information. Content is segmented and encrypted, the software ....

S. Garfinkel and E. Spafford, Practical UNIX & Internet Security, OReilly & Associates, Inc., 1996.

....confidential information, including users passwords, in the clear over the network. This situation was aggravated through broadcast based networks that were commonly used (e.g. Ethernet) which allowed a malicious user to eavesdrop on the network and to collect all communicated information [CB94, GS96] Fortunately, many users and system administrators have become aware of this issue and have taken countermeasures. To curb eavesdroppers, security researchers designed the Secure Shell (SSH) which offers an encrypted channel between the two hosts and strong authentication of both the remote ....

Simson Garfinkel and Gene Spafford. Practical UNIX & Internet Security. O'Reilly & Associates, 1996.

....verified the requestor s group membership. As mentioned in Section 3. 2, the fileserver may remap user IDs or group IDs in order to enforce certain security policies or interoperate between different security domains (although this depends on the data provided by the client) Many sites use NIS [Garfinkle96] or a similar product to maintain a consistent set of user IDs and group IDs across an entire site. With NIS, the client is still providing the user and group IDs to the server; a corrupted client can provide bogus data but well behaving clients will share a consistent set of IDs. In this respect, ....

Garfinkle, S., and Spafford, G., Practical UNIX & Internet Security, O'Reilly & Associates, Inc., 1996.

.... an isolated test equipment may be available, and there is time and interest in the task) The analysis of artifacts and the associated software environment may unveil known vulnerabilities in specific software (in a specific environment) The victim can then be helped with appropriate advice [Garfinkel 96] and in cases of widespread exploitation, a heads up can be sent to constituents and other CSIRTs. On the other hand, the analysis may unveil as yet unknown (or at least unpatched) vulnerabilities. This problem should then be transferred to a vulnerability handling service. That service might ....

Garfinkel, Simson & Spafford, Eugene. Practical UNIX & Internet Security, 2 nd ed. Sebastopol, CA: O'Reilly & Associates, 1996.

....de tapping , intercepci on de l ineas de comunicaci on) los aspectos de evaluaci on de riesgos, aspectos regulatorios, legales y eticos, estandarizaci on, patentes, administraci on y sistemas particulares (unix, windows) etc etera. Se puede leer al respecto de algunos de estos puntos en [4, 12], por ejemplo. Pero es necesario enfatizar que la funcionalidad y la seguridad de un sistema depende de todos y cada uno de sus componentes, por lo que no es posible menospreciar ning un aspecto. Para dar s olo una idea de lo que involucra el area de seguridad, consid erese el concepto de una ....

Simson Garfinkel, Gene Spafford, Practical Unix & Internet Security, O'Reilly & Assoc., 2nd ed., 1996.

....which we have source code shows that there appears to be a common careless programming idiom: receiving a Win32 message and unsafely using a pointer or handle contained in the message. The results of our study are significant for several reasons. First, reliability is the foundation of security[4]; our results offer an informal measure of the reliability of commonly used software. Second, we expose several bugs that could be examined with other more rigorous testing and debugging techniques, potentially enhancing software producers ability to ship bug free software. Third, they expose the ....

S. Garfinkel and G. Spafford, Practical UNIX & Internet Security, O'Reilly & Associates, 1996.

....paper does not discuss how to configure a system (or network) to be secure in a given environment. This is clearly necessary for secure use of a given program, but a great many other documents discuss secure configurations. An excellent general book on configuring Unix like systems to be secure is Garfinkel [1996]. Other books for securing Unix like systems include Anonymous [1998] You can also find information on configuring Unix like systems at web sites such as http: www.unixtools.com security.html. Information on configuring a Linux system to be secure is available in a wide variety of documents ....

....the topic, and in fact he has a web page dedicated to the topic at http: olympus.cs.ucdavis.edu bishop secprog.html. AUSCERT has released a programming checklist [AUSCERT 1996] based in part on chapter 23 of Garfinkel and Spafford s book discussing how to write secure SUID and network programs [Garfinkel 1996]. Galvin [1998a] described a simple process and checklist for developing secure programs; he later updated the checklist in Galvin [1998b] Sitaker [1999] presents a list of issues for the Linux security audit team to search for. Shostack [1999] defines another checklist for reviewing ....

Garfinkel, Simson and Gene Spafford. April 1996. Practical UNIX & Internet Security, 2nd Edition. ISBN 1-56592-148-8. Sebastopol, CA: O'Reilly & Associates, Inc. http://www.oreilly.com/catalog/puis

....a kernel role at the server side. It is responsible for managing the user data, access rights to the DBs, and for encrypting the data to the transport to the clients. The security controller is built upon the security mechanisms provided by both the operating system, namely UNIX at the server side [29], and Java [30] Furthermore, it exploits the DB access controls and the corresponding fine granularity access rights granting mechanisms supported by the DBMS. These mechanisms provide the basis for the security management in MEntAs. 3 The Functionality of the Graphic User Interface 3.1 The ....

Garfinkel, S., Spafford, G.: Practical Unix & Internet Security. O'Reilly & Associates Inc., USA, 1996.

....Unfortunately, xterm is not the only Unix utility that violates both of the above principles; sendmail is another notorious example. This remedy action suggests xterm to be rewritten in a defensive, security conscious programming style, following best practice guidelines for privileged programs [3, 8]. In this case, not only the logging flaw would be eliminated, but also any similar security flaws in other parts of the code. This is a relatively expensive solution, however, and there is always a risk that new security flaws and other bugs are introduced when such a large piece of software is ....

S. Garfinkel and G. Spafford. Practical UNIX & Internet Security. O'Reilly & Associates, second edition, 1996.

....attempt to log in to default accounts such as sync or guest which may not require passwords. ISS also has the capability to exploit an old bug in Sun s Network Information System (NIS) to retrieve a password file remotely. ISS is reportedly used often by crackers in breaking into computer systems [7]. The Computer Oracle and Password System (COPS) 4] is a collection of about a dozen programs and shell scripts that each attempt to detect different problem areas in Unix security (e.g. system directories with loose permissions and poor password files, among others) A similar tool developed by ....

....this call and other related input functions are dangerous is that they do not limit or check the length of the input they read. In the case of the Internet worm, supplying the gets call with more than 512 bytes of data overruns the stack frame, thus enabling arbitrary input data to be executed [7]. This example emphasizes the dangers of using input functions and system calls that do not check or limit input lengths. The work by Miller et al. managed to crash several system utilities, including ftp and telnet, by testing the bounds on input functions. In Practical Unix Internet Security, ....

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S. Garfinkel and G. Spafford. Practical Unix & Internet Security. O'Reilly & Associates, Inc., 2nd edition, 1996.

....may have on the file. Access permissions (including, r, w and x access) may be set for: the owner of the file (user access) any user who is a member of the file s group3 id (group access) and any other user that is not the owner or in the file s group (other access) The reader is referred to [6] for further information on the Unix protection mechanisms. Example 2 A system has user ids smith and jones, and group ids sales and admin, where mbrs(sales) fsmith; jonesg, mbrs(admin) fsmithg. A file, comms, of sales commissions is created by jones and may be read by anyone in the sales ....

....Given initial E2 access = fg, the clerk may access invoices (consult(inv) or purchase orders (consult(po) but not both. 6 Discussion The effectiveness of the proposed technique relies heavily on the suid feature of Unix. Use of suid makes a system vulnerable to certain types of attack [6]. For example, a suid shell script owned by root cannot be made secure; there is always the potential that the invoking user will interrupt it and subsequently gain arbitrary root access. Sometimes suid programs have to be written, and for these situations, 6] suggests using tainted Perl [15] ....

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S. Garfinkel and G. Spafford. Practical Unix & Internet Security. O'Reilly & Associates, 1996.

....systems, the security of the system is only as strong as its weakest link. Many professionals in computer security believe that the security of Web servers is so questionable that all Web servers should be placed outside of firewalls, essentially as a sacrificial lamb for malicious predators [4]. Clearly, this solution is not viable for electronic commerce. Electronic commerce requires Web servers to serve more than just an advertisements for their products (although that is an important and ever growing component of commerce, too) For electronic commerce to become a commercial force, ....

S. Garfinkel and G. Spafford. Practical Unix & Internet Security. O'Reilly & Associates, Inc., 2nd edition, 1996.

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S. Garfinkel, G. Spa#ord, and A. Schwartz. Practical Unix & Internet Security. O'Reilly & Associates, Inc., third edition, 2003.

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Simson Garfinkel, Gene Spafford, Alan Schwartz (2003) Practical Unix & Internet Security, 3 rd Edition. O'Reilly and Associates, Sebastopol USA.

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S. Garfinkel, G. Spa#ord, and A. Schwartz. Practical UNIX & Internet Security. O'Reilly & Associates, 2003.

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Garfinkel, Simson & Spafford, Eugene. Practical UNIX & Internet Security, 2 ed. Sebastopol, Calif.: O'Reilly & Associates, 1996.

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Simson Garfinkel and Gene Spafford. Practical UNIX & Internet Security. O'Reilly, 1996.

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Simson Garfinkel and Gene Spafford. Practical UNIX & Internet Security. O'Reilly, 1996.

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Garfinkel / Spafford, Practical Unix & Internet Security, O'Reilly 1996

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S. Garfinkel and E. Spafford. Practical Unix & Internet Security. O'Reilly & Associates, Inc., 1996.

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