G. Zlotkin and J. Rosenschein, "Negotiation and task sharing among autonomous agents in cooperative domains," in Proceedings of the Eleventh International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 1989, pp. 912--917.  Home/Search   Document Details and Download   Summary   Related Articles   Check

....in distributed artificial intelligence aims at models for communication and cooperation among intelligent automated systems. An overview is given in [8] The mechanism presented in this paper exploits research results from game theory. Research on game theoretic approaches to agent negotiation [13, 21] has focused on the definition of cooperation protocols that give no benefit to agents that misrepresent or hide information. In [17] disclosure of information is acceptable, because it will help an agent to find an optimal solution for itself. This also holds for the solution presented here. It ....

G. Zlotkin and J. S. Rosenschein. Negotiation and task sharing among autonomous agents in cooperative domains. In Proc. of the 11th Int. Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, pages 912--917, Detroit, Michigan, USA, August 1989.

.... other s intention, but the outcome would not have differed had they shared information, although they might have disagreed over who would be accosted Agents will act in order to achieve their goals and will not knowingly communicate false information which may harm other agents or can they [ZR89, ZR91] Deceit has long been recognised as a viable option, for example, within the context of the Prisoner s Dilemma [Axe84] Deals between agents [RG85, ZR90] are joint plans, methods sharing information, compromising over the work and even goal satisfaction. There must be a strictly defined ....

....able to generate arguments in order to classify and introduce a genuine level of competition into the goal modification process. Negotiation has long been seen as necessary as a vehicle for mutually beneficial co operation, but there is also a place for lying amongst otherwise friendly entities [ZR89, ZR91] Both papers introduce lying as a means to deal with incomplete information, also raising it within the context of the Prisoner s Dilemma [Axe84] A deal is a joint plan, they also mention multi plan deals [ZR90] deals are about sharing information, compromising over the work and even ....

Gilad Zlotkin and Jeffrey Rosenschein. Negotiation and task sharing among autonomous agents in cooperative domains. In 11th IJCAI, pages 912--917, 1989.

.... ) Our study also has practical importance for designing autonomous agents that can function in adversarial situations, such as competitive markets and battlefields. The issue of lies in communication has recently been addressed in the Distributed AI literature by Zlotkin and Rosenschein [8, 7, 9]. In their work, Zlotkin and Rosenschein analyze the use of lies in negotiation and conflict resolution in various domains. They study how pre established negotiation protocols, for particular domains, can ensure that agents will not lie. We, on the other hand, do not assume a pre arranged ....

Gilad Zlotkin and Jeffrey S. Rosenschein. Negotiation and task sharing among autonomous agents in cooperative domains. In Proceedings of the Eleventh International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, pages 912--917, August 1989.

....to communicate their true interests in the deal, and thus, privacy of interest is a major concern of each negotiation strategy. Game theorists have investigated negotiations schemes assuming public information, i.e. the utilities of both parties are published before the negotiation starts [ZR89]. In environments where published interests cannot be verified, the protocols allow for lies. Fairness for bilateral negotiations has been discussed in [RZ94,Rai82] Extensions of negotiation protocols for bounded rationality and incomplete information environments are proposed in [SL95b] 2.3 ....

G. Zlotkin and J. S. Rosenschein. Negotiation and task sharing among autonomous agents in cooperative domains. In Proc. of the 11th Int. Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, pages 912--917, Detroit, Michigan, USA, August 1989.

.... cooperation in such settings is to have reliable means for choosing a transaction from a number of alternatives in such a way that it compromises the conflicting interests of the participating agents [TA98] Existing cooperation mechanisms can be classified into bilateral multi step negotiations [ZR89, RZ94] and auctioning [Var95] Bilateral negotiations consider symmetric situations where two agents try to agree on a common plan. Many of the approaches to negotiation stem from research in game theory [NM47, FT91] which traditionally assumes public information among multiple agents [ZR89] ....

....[ZR89, RZ94] and auctioning [Var95] Bilateral negotiations consider symmetric situations where two agents try to agree on a common plan. Many of the approaches to negotiation stem from research in game theory [NM47, FT91] which traditionally assumes public information among multiple agents [ZR89] This does not apply to agents acting in competitive and hostile environments [ZS96] The negotiation approach presented in [SFJ97, NJFM96, JFN 96] for the domain of business process management considers privacy of information. However, it requires agents to reason about the interests and ....

G. Zlotkin and J. S. Rosenschein. Negotiation and task sharing among autonomous agents in cooperative domains. In Proc. of the 11th Int. Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, pages 912--917, Detroit, Michigan, USA, August 1989.

....based on sequential decision making in which the agent utilizes a preference model of the user. The user preference model is built by assessing the utility function that incorporates the user s risk attitude. Dealing with risk attitudes is an important feature of decision making. A few researchers [16] have taken into account risk attitudes for negotiation, but their work has mainly utilized the Zeuthen s Principle [3] in a game theoretic situation to determine who is the person more willing to make concessions. We utilize the risk attitudes in a different way, as discussed in section 3. In ....

Zlotkin, G., and Rosenschein, J. Negotiation and Task Sharing among Autonomous Agents in Cooperative Domains. In Proceedings of Eleventh International Joint Conference in Artificial Intelligence. (1989). 912-917.

....interactions are superadditive in game theory terms (Kahan Rapoport 1984) Generally speaking, superadditive domains are those in which agents always benefit by coordinating their activities. Most task re distribution domains such as the postman problem proposed by Zlotkin and Rosenschein (Zlotkin Rosenschein 1989) belong to this class, and here the postman problem was chosen as our domain problem. Briefly, in the postman problem, every agent (i.e. postman) in the post office is given a set of letters and they are required to deliver these letters to the addresses marked on the envelops. Agents first find ....

Zlotkin, G., and Rosenschein, J. 1989. Negotiation and task sharing among autonomous agents in cooperative domains. In Proceedings of the Eleventh International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 912--917.

....to fully uncover the effect of the role of crossovers in spreading information spatially. 4. Discussion 6 4 Discussion The proposed model here belong to a class of models aiming at emergent computation. Related models spans from researches in such areas as distributed artificial intelligence [5, 6] and artificial neural networks, to network computation models [7, 8] The major challenge in such models are how one can design a local rules or strategies without a global or central evaluation function or unit for the effective collective information behavior to emerge. Our model here is an ....

G. Zlotkin and J. Rosenschein, "Negotiation and Task Sharing Among Autonomous Agents in Cooperative Domains," Proceedings of IJCAI-89, pp.912-917, 1989.

....resources. 1 1. Introduction 2 1 Introduction One of the major goals of distributed artificial intelligence is to obtain, through interactions between agents, effective and useful emergent decisions or computations fromm relatively simple actions by each agent in a given environment (e.g. [5, 13, 14, 15, 26]) Research toward this goal faces the difficult challenge of designing each agent s actions and interactions with others in an ever changing environment to obtain a desired macroscopic computation or action. These issues and challenges in distributed artificial intelligence are becoming ....

Zlotkin, G. and Rosenschein, J. S.: Negotiation and Task Sharing Among Autonomous Agents in Cooperative Domains. In the Proceedings of IJCAI-89, pp.912-917, 1989.

....a master agent has also been examined specifically[7] On the other hand, agents developing plans for consensus must negotiate to reach an agreement by which all goals are satisfied. The contract net protocol and its extensions offer agents this capability [8] Additional negotiation mechanisms [9][10] provide additional support for agent interactions at the consensus level of autonomy. Locally autonomous agents, which plan independently but act as part of a larger system, exhibit the most diverse behavior. They may be fully cooperative and act under a functionally accurate, cooperative ....

Zlotkin, G., and Rosenschein, J. S. Negotiation and Task Sharing Among Autonomous Agents in Cooperative Domains. In Proceedings of the Eleventh International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, pp. 912-917. 1989.

....should be executed in a situation at hand. Other work in AI include efforts on semantics of KQML [29, 41] which is closely related to earlier work of Cohen and Levesque, but it does not include the notion of value central to our approach. While work on communication in negotiation is reported in [28, 48, 49]. Recently, Tambe [42] suggested decision theoretic communication selectivity to establish mutual belief among agents in a team. This approach is similar to ours in that the focus is on whether or not an agent should transmit a given message (fact) to others. Tambe uses a decision tree containing ....

Gilad Zlotkin and Jeffrey S. Rosenschein. Negotiation and task sharing among autonomous agents in cooperative domains. In Proceedings of the Eleventh International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, pages 912--917, August 1989.

....c t , and a threshold value of undeniability, u t , such that propositions having credibility and respectively undeniability higher than the threshold value can be retracted only after negotiation. Figure 11 also shows the regions defined by these thresholds in the c u space. In [21] and [25] examples of work exploring negotiation as a means to mediate among conflicting agents can be found. FIGURE 11. Negotiation regions in the c u space. undeniability u=u t c=c t c c t c c t u u t u u t Negotiate with consumers No negotiation Negotiate with producer Negotiate with producer and ....

Zlotkin, G., Rosenschein, J.S. Negotiation and task sharing among autonomous agents in cooperative domains, Proceedings of IJCAI-89, pp. 912-917, Detroit, MI, aug. 1989

....and Rosenschein [1992] On the other hand, agents developing plans for consensus must negotiate to reach an agreement by which all goals are satisfied. The contract net protocol developed by Smith [1980] offers agents this capability. The negotiation mechanisms presented by von Martial [1992] and Zlotkin and Rosenschein [1989] provide additional support for agent interactions at the consensus level of autonomy. Locally autonomous agents, which plan independently but act as part of a larger system, exhibit the most diverse behavior. They may be fully cooperative and act under a functionally accurate, cooperative ....

Zlotkin, G., and Rosenschein, J. S. 1989. Negotiation and Task Sharing Among Autonomous Agents in Cooperative Domains. In Proceedings of the Eleventh International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 912-917.

....often cannot resolve conflicts, since both agents are likely to perform symmetrical actions at the same time, and since, in case a conflict solution is negotiated, there are no arguments one agent can put forward which could not be used by the other agent with the same right. Game theory [ZR89] proposes to toss a coin in these cases which exactly corresponds to applying the principle of randomness. Forklift agents can use potential field methods or weighted randomness in order to reach their destination and in order to avoid collisions. We consider these mechanisms to be basically ....

....occuring in the processes of executing plans in parallel branches. Seminal work in describing architectures and protocols for exchanging and processing distributed knowledge, goals, and plans has been done by [DS83, Ros85, CL88, CML88, DL89, DM91] Purely cooperative agents have been modeled by [ZR89, Jen92]. Actually, all of the research mentioned before describes rational, plan based interaction. So far, hardly any attention has been paid to the scope and the mechanisms which are available for behaviour based agent interaction. Havingmade explicit both behaviour based and planbased concepts in ....

[Article contains additional citation context not shown here]

G. Zlotkin and J. S. Rosenschein. Negotiation and task sharing among autonomous agents in cooperative domains. In Proc. of the Eleventh IJCAI, pages 912--917. Detroit, Michigan, August 1989.

....An agent based approach might view these entities as agents competing for tasks or cooperating to fulfill a set of tasks. Thus, as tasks are placed on the activity worklists, agents may competitively bid for work (Lesser Corkill 1983) or may negotiate in a cooperative manner to distribute work (Zlotkin Rosenschein 1989). There has been quite a lot of work on distributed or agent based agenda ordering and task allocation (Lui Sycara 1998; Gasser Huhns 1989) AI scheduling combines a rich representation of constraints and powerful constraint reasoning mechanisms with intelligent search techniques. In workflow ....

Zlotkin, G., and Rosenschein, J. 1989. Negotiation and task sharing among autonomous agents in cooperative domains.

....[59] Communications require time and effort on the part of the agents. We also assume that resources can be transferred between agents. This ability may help the agents form more beneficial coalitions. Agreement on cooperation may be reached even if the last assumption is not valid (e.g. [1,2,29,62]) However, the possibility of goods transferability (or alternatively, side payments) may help the agents form more beneficial coalitions. To emphasize the non super additivity property of the environment with which we deal, we assume that the addition of agents to a coalition is costly, and ....

G. Zlotkin and J. Rosenschein. Negotiation and task sharing among autonomous agents in cooperative domain. In Proc. of the 11th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, pages 912--917, Detroit, MI, 1989.

No context found.

Gilad Zlotkin and Jeffrey S. Rosenschein. Negotiation and task sharing among autonomous agents in cooperative domains. In Proceedings of the Eleventh International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, pages 912--917, Detroit, Michigan, August 1989. 27

No context found.

Gilad Zlotkin and Jeffrey S. Rosenschein. Negotiation and task sharing among autonomous agents in cooperative domains. In Proceedings of the Eleventh International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, pages 912--917, Detroit, Michigan, August 1989.

....payments. The only assumptions that we made is on the negotiation protocol, which is a protocol of alternating offers which we describe in details in Section 3. However, we don t make any assumptions about the offers the agents make during the negotiation as is the case in some other work (e.g. [63]) In particular, the agents are not bounded to any previous offers that have been made. Nevertheless, the negotiation ends with no delay. 1.5 Related Work in Economics and Game Theory There are two main approaches to the development of theorems relating to the negotiation process. The first is ....

G. Zlotkin and J. S. Rosenschein. Negotiation and task sharing among autonomous agents in cooperative domains. In Proceedings of IJCAI-89, pages 912--917, Detroit, Michigan, August 1989.

....to have full information, to be rational, and to commit themselves to the agreements they have reached. The set of all possible agreements is assumed to exist and to include all the pairs of work sharing that will satisfy a goal. Another approach to handling negotiation in MAS has been explored in [192, 194, 193, 196, 195, 197]. Within this framework, agents converge to a single choice in a so called negotiation set. This negotiation set is the group of all agreements that exhibit the properties of positive utility for all agents, and Pareto Optimality. The disadvantage of these classic approaches to negotiation, ....

G. Zlotkin and J. S. Rosenschein. Negotiation and task sharing among autonomous agents in cooperative domains. In Proceedings of the Eleventh International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, pages 912--917, Detroit, Michigan, August 1989.

No context found.

G. Zlotkin and J. Rosenschein, "Negotiation and task sharing among autonomous agents in cooperative domains," in Proceedings of the Eleventh International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 1989, pp. 912--917.

No context found.

G. Zlotkin and J. Rosenschein, "Negotiation and task sharing among autonomous agents in cooperative domains," in Proceedings of the Eleventh International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 1989, pp. 912--917.

No context found.

G. Zlotkin and J. S. Rosenschein. Negotiation and task sharing among autonomous agents in cooperative domains. In Proc. of the 11th Int. Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, pages 912--917, Detroit, Michigan, USA, August 1989.

No context found.

Zlotkin, G., Rosenschein, J.S. (1989) Negotiation and task sharing among autonomous agents in cooperative domains, Proceedings of IJACI-89, pp. 912-917, Detroit, MI, aug. 1989

No context found.

Zlotkin, G. and J.S. Rosenschein. 1989. Negotiation and Task Sharing Among Autonomous Agents in Cooperative Domains. In Proc. IJCAI-89, 912-917, Detroit.

First 50 documents

Online articles have much greater impact   More about CiteSeer.IST   Add search form to your site   Submit documents   Feedback  

CiteSeer.IST - Copyright Penn State and NEC