S. Kraus. An overview of incentive contracting. Articial Intelligence, 83(2), 1996.  Home/Search   Document Details and Download   Summary   Related Articles   Check

....game theoretic issues but only algorithmic ones. In his seminal paper, Vickrey [25] argued for the importance of incentive compatibility and rst analyzed the incentive compatible second price auction. The main motivation is to free the bidders from strategic considerations. It has been argued [21, 6, 22, 23, 12] that this is especially important in computerized settings. Our rst result in this paper is a full characterization of incentive compatible on line auctions: An on line auction is called based on supply curves if before receiving the i th bid, b i (q) it xes some function (supply curve) p i ....

S. Kraus. An overview of incentive contracting. Articial Intelligence, 83(2), 1996.

....University of York York YO1 5DD, UK ea minster.york.ac. uk February 8, 1998 Abstract Negotiation has been a subject of central interest in DAI, proposed specially as a means for autonomous, self interested agents to communicate and compromise in Multiagent Systems (Conry et al. 1988; Kraus, 1996; Kraus et al. 1995; Rosenschein and Zlotkin, 1994; Smith, 1980) However, the main focus of DAI research from a logical perspective has been that of planning for multiple agents , which considers issues inherent in centrally directed multi agent execution (Georgeff, 1983; Georgeff, 1984; ....

Kraus, S. (1996). An Overview of Incentive Contracting. Artificial Intelligence, 83:297--346.

....significance of the results should be based on careful experimentation. Moreover, it is doubtful, whether these small artificial markets with a low number of participants and limited number of encounters could produce the effects we see on large size, real markets (for some positive results, see Kraus, 1996). It is hard to define where the borderlines of the model should lay: just as in the real world, production elements with monetary terms should have, within the model, counterparts in consumption. Money that can buy nothing is good for nothing. Consider a machine agent that, under present ....

....all collaborators commit themselves to carrying out the actions they agreed upon previously. Since the outside world pays only for completed orders, success of the whole depends on the success of the members. Collaborative acting and planning involve the intentions of multiple agents (Grosz and Kraus, 1996). Since the presence of other agents is always a source of uncertainty (beyond other possible sources) collaborative planning requires an integrated treatment of the beliefs and intentions of the agents who may take part in a collaborative act. There is a rich body of theories on agents for ....

Kraus, S. (1996), An overview of incentive contracting. Artificial Intelligence, 83, 297-346.

....agent can have overwhelming power, then, according to the everyday experience, repeated encounters lead to adaptive behavior with prices proportional to the costs. The market enables also the integration of an incentive mechanism that drives the system as a whole toward some preferred states [13]. In our case, such states are those that satisfy the system wide scheduling constraints and result in the long run as much pro t as possible. This can be accomplished, even if the agents do not know about system wide constraints and global performance criteria. 3.2 The negotiation and ....

S. Kraus. An overview of incentive contracting. Articial Intelligence, 83:297-346, 1996. 18

....that help us to avoid such dilemmas Different disciplines, like economics, sociology or organizational theory give their own answers to questions like above. Here we discuss those that are given by distributed artificial intelligence research. These proposals can be ordered between two extremes [8,11,18]: Cooperative distributed systems: Agents in such systems have clearly defined common goals which can be attained only if the agents cooperate. The system is centrally designed so that these goals be achieved in an efficient and reliable way. This applies to the design of both the local ....

Kraus, S. (1996), An overview of incentive contracting. Artificial Intelligence 83, 297346.

....game theoretic issues but only algorithmic ones. In his seminal paper, Vickrey [25] rst argued for the importance of incentive compatibility and suggested his incentive compatible second price auction. The main motivation is to free the bidders from strategic considerations. It has been argued [21, 6, 22, 23, 12] that this is especially important in computerized settings. Our rst result in this paper is a full characterization of incentive compatible on line auctions: An on line auction is called based on supply curves if before receiving the i th bid, b i (q) it xes some function (supply curve) p i ....

S. Kraus. An overview of incentive contracting. Articial Intelligence, 83(2), 1996.

....has no knowledge about the preferences of the agents in the system, and is unable to perform a global optimization and prescribe strategies. The problem of mechanism design is how to establish rules of the game that promote truthful revelation of preferences and allows efficient coordination (Kraus 1996). The system designer is only able to indirectly influence the actions of the agents through an appropriate reward and penalty structure. We would like to design a game where the actions that emerge as the optimal strategies for self interested agents are also the actions that achieve the ....

Kraus, S. 1996. An overview of incentive contracting.

....[59] Communications require time and effort on the part of the agents. We also assume that resources can be transferred between agents. This ability may help the agents form more beneficial coalitions. Agreement on cooperation may be reached even if the last assumption is not valid (e.g. [1,2,29,62]) However, the possibility of goods transferability (or alternatively, side payments) may help the agents form more beneficial coalitions. To emphasize the non super additivity property of the environment with which we deal, we assume that the addition of agents to a coalition is costly, and ....

S. Kraus. An overview of incentive contracting. Artificial Intelligence, 83(2):297--346, 1996.

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