| John Moy, OSPF Version 2, Internet Draft: draft-ietf-ospf-version2-11.txt, April 1997. * |
....is very feasible from an evil insider. It has been identified in [12] that link state routing protocols are more robust against simple failures or even some simple insider attacks. Therefore, in this paper, we examine the security of the standardized Open Shortest Path First version 2 (OSPF) 1][2] routing protocol. OSPF is intended to become the preferred TCP IP interior routing protocol used in the Internet. At the time of writing, OSPF was in the standards track, in the area director review stage of progression to full standard. In this paper, we limit our discussion to the security ....
....This scheme has a minimal performance impact, but unfortunately is easily compromised since the secret password itself is transmitted in the clear, and is thus vulnerable to eavesdropping by an intruder. An Experimental Study of Insider Attacks for the OSPF Routing Protocol 8 Fortunately, [2] defines a much stronger cryptographic authentication type, in which OSPF routers on a common network subnet share a secret key which is used to generate a cryptographic (e.g. keyed MD5) message digest for each protocol packet. In addition, a monotonically increasing sequence numbering scheme is ....
John Moy, OSPF Version 2, Internet Draft: draft-ietf-ospf-version2-11.txt, April 1997. *
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