Cr epeau, C. and L. Salvail, "Quantum Oblivious Mutual Identification", In Advances in Cryptology: Proceedings of Eurorypt '95, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Springer-Verlag, 1995, pp. 133 -- 146.  Home/Search   Document Not in Database   Summary   Related Articles   Check

....that neither fish nor waves cause significant disturbance in the channel. In addition to prototypes for quantum key distribution, Jaroslav Hrub y is working in Prague at implementing a quantum smart card for identification purposes [44] following the protocol of Claude Cr epeau and Louis Salvail [30]. 3 Alternative Proposals Most working prototypes that we are aware of implement the original 1984 quantum key distribution protocol [4] henceforth called BB84, sometimes with the possibility of implementing also Bennett s simplified protocol based on only two nonorthogonal states [2] ....

.... referred to as BCJL, that was robust even in the presence of transmission errors on the quantum channel, and was claimed to be provably secure [24] The future of quantum cryptography was very bright indeed, with new applications such as the identification protocol of Cr epeau and Salvail [30] coming up regularly. The sky fell in October 1995 when Mayers found a subtle flaw in the BCJL proof of security [57] The irony is that the successful attack was identical in spirit although technically more difficult to the technique published in 1984 to break the original coinflipping ....

Cr' epeau, C. and L. Salvail, "Quantum oblivious mutual identification", Advances in Cryptology --- Proceedings of Eurocrypt '95, May 1995, Springer -- Verlag, pp. 133 -- 146.

....y) #] c. Fig. 1. word seen by an honest facing an honest Alice. In order to fulfill these conditions they take C to be a code over F4 . C1 C4 C6 First we analyze the situation from the point of view of an honest facing a malicious # . The following theorem from [11] tells us a condition on C to sustain the ignorance of a dishonest # . hides # to # if d] code such that #)n, for 0 # , except with exponentially small probability with respect to n. The intuition behind this theorem is that # will be roughly capable of ....

....bits will be random. If d] code such that 2 #)n for 0 # 2 , the bits seen from c will also be completely random as long as c was chosen at random. # thus receives truly random words unless he uses a string # very close to # . A formal proof of this theorem may be found in [11]. Fig. 2. word seen by a dishonest # facing an honest Alice. Suppose a malicious # tries to impersonate the real Alice. The following theorem from [11] specifies code parameters that allow to reject # with probability exponentially close to one. makes reject # if ....

[Article contains additional citation context not shown here]

Cr epeau, C. and L. Salvail, "Quantum Oblivious Mutual Identification", In Advances in Cryptology: Proceedings of Eurorypt '95, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Springer-Verlag, 1995, pp. 133 -- 146.

....secure [5] which would also have allowed secure quantum oblivious transfer [2] another fundamental primitive in classical cryptography. Because of this, the future of quantum cryptography looked very bright indeed, with new applications such as the identification protocol of Crepeau and Salvail [8], coming up regularly. Trouble began in October 1995 when Mayers found a subtle flaw in the BCJL protocol. The proof that Bob cannot cheat BCJL and learn information on the committed bit was correct, and so was the proof that it is not possible for Alice to simultaneously know how to open the ....

Cr epeau, Claude and Louis Salvail, "Quantum oblivious mutual identification", Advances in Cryptology: Proceedings of Eurocrypt '95, May 1995, pp. 133 -- 146.

....secure [5] which would also have allowed secure quantum oblivious transfer [2] another fundamental primitive in classical cryptography. Because of this, the future of quantum cryptography looked very bright indeed, with new applications such as the identification protocol of Cr epeau and Salvail [8], coming up regularly. Trouble began in October 1995 when Mayers found a subtle flaw in the BCJL protocol. The proof that Bob cannot cheat BCJL and learn information on the committed bit was correct, and so was the proof that it is not possible for Alice to simultaneously know how to open the ....

Cr' epeau, Claude and Louis Salvail, "Quantum oblivious mutual identification", Advances in Cryptology: Proceedings of Eurocrypt '95, May 1995, pp. 133 -- 146.

....x; s Phi y) OE] Phi (r; s) OE] Phi (x; y) OE] c: Figure 1. Word seen by an honest Bob facing an honest Alice. 5.2. CS(OE A ; OE B ) with a dishonest Bob First we analyze the situation from the point of view of an honest Alice facing a malicious Bob . The following theorem from [11] tells us a condition on C to sustain the ignorance of a dishonest Bob . Theorem 1 ( 11] Protocol CS(OE A ; OE B ) hides OE A to Bob if b C is an [n; n Gamma k; b d] code such that b d ( 1 2 fl)n, for 0 fl 1 2 , except with exponentially small probability with respect to ....

....Bob facing an honest Alice. 5.2. CS(OE A ; OE B ) with a dishonest Bob First we analyze the situation from the point of view of an honest Alice facing a malicious Bob . The following theorem from [11] tells us a condition on C to sustain the ignorance of a dishonest Bob . Theorem 1 ([11]) Protocol CS(OE A ; OE B ) hides OE A to Bob if b C is an [n; n Gamma k; b d] code such that b d ( 1 2 fl)n, for 0 fl 1 2 , except with exponentially small probability with respect to n. The intuition behind this theorem is that Bob will be roughly capable of guessing ....

[Article contains additional citation context not shown here]

C. Cr' epeau and L. Salvail (1995) Quantum Oblivious Mutual Identification, In Advances in Cryptology: Proceedings of Eurorypt '95, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Springer-Verlag, 1995, pp. 133 -- 146.

....they take C to be a code over F4 . C1 C4 C6 for the 10th anniversary of the CWI Crypto course. 9 5.2 CS(# A , # B ) with a dishonest Bob # First we analyze the situation from the point of view of an honest Alice facing a malicious Bob # . The following theorem from [11] tells us a condition on C to sustain the ignorance of a dishonest Bob # . Theorem 1 [11] Protocol CS(# A , # B ) hides # A to Bob # if b C is an [n, n k, b d] code such that b d # ( 1 2 #)n, for 0 # 1 2 , except with exponentially small probability with respect to n. ....

....of the CWI Crypto course. 9 5.2 CS(# A , # B ) with a dishonest Bob # First we analyze the situation from the point of view of an honest Alice facing a malicious Bob # . The following theorem from [11] tells us a condition on C to sustain the ignorance of a dishonest Bob # . Theorem 1 [11]. Protocol CS(# A , # B ) hides # A to Bob # if b C is an [n, n k, b d] code such that b d # ( 1 2 #)n, for 0 # 1 2 , except with exponentially small probability with respect to n. The intuition behind this theorem is that Bob # will be roughly capable of guessing half ....

[Article contains additional citation context not shown here]

Cr epeau, C. and L. Salvail, "Quantum Oblivious Mutual Identification", In Advances in Cryptology: Proceedings of Eurorypt '95, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Springer-Verlag, 1995, pp. 133 -- 146.

....power. In 1993 a protocol for quantum bit commitment, henceforth referred to as BCJL, was thought to be provably secure [15] Because of quantum bit commitment, the future of quantum cryptography was very bright, with new applications such as the identification protocol of Cr epeau and Salvail [17] coming up regularly. The trouble began in October 1995 when Mayers found a subtle flaw in the BCJL protocol. Though Mayers explained his discovery to many researchers interested in quantum bit commitment [18] his result was not made entirely public until after Lo and Chau discovered ....

Cr' epeau, C. and L. Salvail, "Quantum oblivious mutual identification", Advances in Cryptology --- Proceedings of Eurocrypt '95, May 1995, Springer -- Verlag, pp. 133 -- 146.

....to as BCJL, was claimed to be provably secure [11] that is, the resulting commitments were thought to be unconditionally secure. Because of quantum bit commitment, the future of quantum cryptography was very bright, with new applications such as the identification protocol of Cr epeau and Salvail [13] coming up regularly. The trouble began in October 1995 when Mayers found a subtle flaw in the BCJL protocol. Though Mayers explained his discovery to many researchers interested in quantum bit commitment [14] his result was not made entirely public until after Lo and Chau discovered ....

Cr' epeau, C. and L. Salvail, "Quantum oblivious mutual identification", Advances in Cryptology --- Proceedings of Eurocrypt '95, May 1995, Springer -- Verlag, pp. 133 -- 146.

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