Dorothy E. Denning. Cryptography and Data Security. Addison-Wesley, 1982.  Home/Search   Document Not in Database   Summary   Related Articles   Check

....Observe that for # = 0, L q [0, c] is a polynomial in ln q, while for # = 1, L q [1, c] is a polynomial in q, and thus fully exponential in ln q. 2. 6 Definition An algorithm whose running time is given by O(k h(n) for constant k 1 and polynomial h(n) is called an exponential time algorithm [Den82] The term superpolynomial is often exchangeable with subexponential when describing the complexity class that is asymptotically faster than exponential while asymptotically slower than polynomial. In this thesis, we stick to the term superpolynomial . Informally speaking, problems that ....

Dorothy Elizabeth Robling Denning. Cryptography and data security. Addison-Wesley, Reading, MA, USA, 1982.

....it can also be kept secret. Alternatively, a public key may be a key which happens to be public, that is, not secret. We try to use public key only with the latter meaning, and prefer encryption key for the former. The type system. The type system is based on old ideas on secrecy levels [10] and on the newer trend of representing these levels in types (e.g. 1, 9, 13 15, 22, 23, 26, 28] For example, Public and Secret are the types of public data and secret data, respectively. In addition, the type system gives information on the intended usage and structure of data, like standard ....

Dorothy E. Denning. Cryptography and Data Security. Addison-Wesley, Reading, Mass., 1982.

....this does not include the work factor to check whether the plaintext M obtained by solving equation is correct (i.e. meaningful) or not. It is assumed that the plaintexts are from a source such as natural language or a programming language which contains an enor mous amount of redundancy [Denning 82] Redundancy in M helps to determine the validity of the plaintext derived. 1.2. Private key Algebraic coded Cryptosystems (PP,C) To increase information rate and to reduce computational (encryption and decryption) overhead of MPBC, Private key Algebraic coded Cryptssystems (PRAC) were ....

Dorothy E. Denning, Cryptography and Data Security, Addison Wesley, 1982. ,in '83] Shu Lin, Daniel J. Costello, Jr., Error Control Coding: Fundamentals and Applications, Prentice-Hall, 1983.

....lack of physical security, and an untrusted initialization process. One way of addressing this problem is to ensure the integrity of a computer system. A system is said to possess integrity if no unauthorized modification has been made to it. Denning de fines integrity similarly for communication [7]. AEGIS assures integrity of a personal computer at boot time, through a process called chaining layered integrity checks, which uses induction and digital certificates. AEGIS works as follows: 1. A system administrator, or other authorized party generates a hash, H, of a bootstrap component, ....

Dorothy Denning. Cryptography and Data Security. Addison-Wesley, 1983.

....a subject may only read objects with classi cation level no higher than its clearance, but may only write to objects with classi cation level no lower than its clearance. Information is always unidirectionally owing from low classi cation source to high classi cation destination. Denning [18, 16, 17] rst applied this idea to the control of information ow in high level programming languages through static analysis. Subsequent developments have been constantly reported [50] among which the work of Volpano and Smith [68, 64, 63, 55, 65, 56, 66, 67, 62, 53, 54] has recently attracted ....

Dorothy E. Denning. Cryptography and Data Security. Addison-Wesley, 1982.

....it can also be kept secret. Alternatively, a public key may be a key which happens to be public, that is, not secret. We try to use public key only with the latter meaning, and prefer encryption key for the former. The type system. The type system is based on old ideas on secrecy levels [15] and on the newer trend of representing these levels in types (e.g. 1, 11, 19 21, 29, 30, 33, 35] For example, Public and Secret are the types of public data and secret data, respectively. In addition, the type system gives information on the intended usage and structure of data, like standard ....

Dorothy E. Denning. Cryptography and Data Security. Addison-Wesley, Reading, Mass., 1982. 29

....significant impact on performance. Such a process forces an attacker to decrypt small blocks of data at a time, dramatically increasing the difficulty of retrieving the clear text for the entire message. Further detail on cryptographic techniques is available in Cryptography and Data Security [Den82] 2.2 Integrity Checksums A checksum is a series of bits of fixed length, whose value is derived from a given block of data. Checksums are often appended to a block of data prior to transmission, so that the receiver can verify that the data was received in the exact condition in which it was ....

Dorothy Denning. Cryptography and Data Security. Addison-Wesley, 1982.

....access of principals to computing resources according to a prescribed policy. Its services are critical in ensuring the confidentiality, integrity, and accountability of shared data in a computing environment. It is useful to separate authorization into two subcategories, policy and mechanism [4] as depicted in Figure 1. An access control policy specifies the authorized accesses of a principal whereas an access control mechanism implements or enforces the policy. The advantages of this separation are: 1) It allows researchers to address each sub category independently. 2) A security ....

Dorothy E. Denning. 1982. Cryptography and Data Security. Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 191-259.

....is private and kept secret by the sender, the other one is publicly known. Data encrypted with a sender s private key can be decrypted using his public key, and vice versa. These keys are usually large integer numbers, several hundred decimal digits long with special, mathematical properties. ex. [Den82]) RSA is an example of a public key encryption algorithm ( RSA78] The following procedure and Figure 4.2 outline howwewould use the public key cryptoalgorithm to ensure originator authentication. The procedure could work as follows: ffl The sending name server creates the digital signature ....

Dorothy E. Denning. Cryptography and Data Security. Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, Inc., 1982.

....still paths in the function such that untrustworthy information may leak through if the function is called with untrustworthy arguments. A trust analysis can warn about the existence of such unchecked paths. Trust analysis has much in common with security flow analysis in the sense of Denning [Den82] Security flow analysis tracks data dependences ensuring that secret data can never directly or indirectly be put in insecure places. The main difference between trust analysis and security analysis is the introduction of the trust construct in trust analysis that explic 4 CHAPTER 1. ....

....of computer science, the early work on data security dates back to the beginning of the seventies. The basic model for security in computer systems goes back to the work by Bell and LaPadula at MITRE [BL73, BL76] Later the seminal work by Denning and Denning in the mid seventies [Den76, DD77, Den82] initiated the idea of applying program analysis to the computer security problem. The analyses of Denning are basically applications of abstract interpretation [CC77] to the problem of security flow analysis of Pascal like programs, that is, a first order imperative programming language with ....

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Dorothy Elisabeth Robling Denning. Cryptography and Data Security. AddisonWesley, 1982.

....4. Minimal degradation of system throughput: Data gathering by any data source must impose minimal overhead on the running system. If enabling the data source substantially degrades performance, or otherwise impairs normal user behavior, then it is unlikely that users will enable the system [10, 41]. 5. Atomicity: A record from a data stream must stand alone and be semantically and syntactically correct. For instance, if state information about a file is stored separately from the file name, both are records are needed to correctly process the data stream. The loss of one record renders the ....

Dorothy Elizabeth Robling Denning. Cryptography and Data Security. Addison-Wesley, Reading, Massachusetts, 1982.

....rules are No read up and No write down which state that a low level subject is not allowed to read high level objects, and high level objects can only be written by lowlevel subjects. These two rules result in an information flow from low to high . For more comprehensive information see [9, 12]. As mentioned earlier, MLS assigns security levels (also called labels) to subjects and objects. The security level of a subject is also called clearance. The different levels form a lattice which is a partially ordered set (poset) with specific properties: Definition 1 (Poset) The tuple ....

....prove helpful in the design of distributed MLS WfMS and the analysis of the corresponding business processes not only in military environments but also in other areas that rely on MLS. 5. 1 Discussion of related work Since the 1970s there has been a lot of work about MLS and information flow [4, 6, 9, 13]. Applications to other areas range from knowledge based systems [5] over object orientation [14] to multilevel relational data models [8, 28] Regarding processes (especially business processes) the following contributions are of interest: b Kang et al. 16] present a strategy for building a ....

Dorothy Elisabeth Robling Denning. Cryptography and Data Security. AddisonWesley, 1982.

....not describe an algorithm; we will address this issue in section 8. Throughout the paper, every occurrence of stands for a distinct anonymous meta variable of appropriate kind. 5.1 Types Let (L; be a lattice whose elements, denoted by and pc, represent security levels. Following Denning [4], we typically use the meta variable pc, rather than , when considering information obtained by observing the value of the program counter . Types, rows and alternatives are de ned as follows: t : unit j int j (t pc [r] t) j t ref j r exn r : f 7 ag 2E a : Abs ....

....is merely the disjoint union fAbsg [ L, causing the explicit injection Pre to disappear, because security levels become a subset of alternatives. In this presentation, subtyping is atomic [18] alternatives form a set of atoms. The use of subtyping in information ow control is ubiquitous [3, 4, 21, 8] and appears essential, because it allows building a directed view of the program s information ow graph, yielding better precision than a uni cation based analysis. 5.3 Additional notation A polytype s is a nonempty, upward closed set of types. A polytype environment is a partial mapping from ....

Dorothy E. Denning. Cryptography and Data Security. Addison-Wesley, Reading, Massachusetts, 1982.

....lack of physical security, and an untrusted initialization process. One way of addressing this problem is to ensure the integrity of a computer system. A system is said to possess integrity if no unauthorized modi cation has been made to it. Denning de nes integrity similarly for communication [7]. AEGIS assures integrity of a personal computer at boot time, through a process called chaining layered integrity checks, which uses induction and digital certi cates. AEGIS works as follows: 1. A system administrator, or other authorized party generates a hash, H, of a bootstrap component, and ....

Dorothy Denning. Cryptography and Data Security. Addison-Wesley, 1983.

....it can also be kept secret. Alternatively, a public key may be a key which happens to be public, that is, not secret. We try to use public key only with the latter meaning, and prefer encryption key for the former. The type system. The type system is based on old ideas on secrecy levels [10] and on the newer trend of representing these levels in types (e.g. 1, 9, 13 15, 22, 23, 26, 28] For example, Public and Secret are the types of public data and secret data, respectively. In addition, the type system gives information on the intended usage and structure of data, like standard ....

Dorothy E. Denning. Cryptography and Data Security. Addison-Wesley, Reading, Mass., 1982.

....under assumptions , P is well typed and will a ect only observers of security clearance pc or higher. It may also be read: under assumptions , assuming P gains information of level pc by being executed, P is well typed. This formulation explains why this meta variable is historically named pc [5]: it is the security level which P attains simply by virtue of being executed, i.e. the security level associated with its program counter . Even though the security lattice L is arbitrary, it is desirable to establish a simple dichotomy between low and high security levels. Such a ....

Dorothy E. Denning. Cryptography and Data Security. Addison-Wesley, Reading, Massachusetts, 1982.

....under assumptions , P is well typed and will a ect only observers of security clearance pc or higher. It may also be read: under assumptions , assuming P gains information of level pc by being executed, P is well typed. This formulation explains why this meta variable is historically named pc [5]: it is the security level which P attains simply by virtue of being executed, i.e. the security level associated with its program counter . Even though the security lattice L is arbitrary, it is desirable to establish a simple dichotomy between low and high security levels. Such a ....

Dorothy E. Denning. Cryptography and Data Security. Addison-Wesley, Reading, Massachusetts, 1982.

....compromise A s cipher is to factor p and q given the public modulus n. Deducing p and q will allow us to calculate d since we know e and that ed mod (p 1) q 1) 1. Given the current mathematical means, the complexity of factoring the public modulus n of length k is T = exp(sqrt(ln(k)ln(ln(k) [Dennings82] which grows exponentially in complexity and is also NP complete. Unless mathematicians nd a revolutionary way of solving NP complete problems (including factoring large numbers) in polynomial time ; the above ways of attacking the RSA algorithm are non polynomial and considered intractable. ....

....the left half of the data block of this round ie R i 1 = L i . 3 The actual values of the S boxes, P box, Key compression, etc matrices are not listed here, as we are only interested in getting the feel of how DES works. For a complete detailed treatment on the mechanics of DES, consult [Dennings82] 29 Figure 4: Round i of DES 4.3 The CBC encryption mode The CBC (Cipher Block Chaining) mode of encryption applies a feedback to a symmetric block cipher (such as DES) such that the encryption of the ith data block relies on the previous encrypted block. This is used to deal with security ....

Dorothy Denning, Cryptography and Data Security, AddisionWesley, 1982.

....are discussed in the next section) in November of 1996, a fourth center came into public existence. When computer security courses are taught, relatively few textbooks on computer security are in use, and several of the most commonly used ones are principally devoted to cryptography (e.g. Den83] or are outdated. Research in academia is being done by a limited number of faculty at scattered locations working with a few students. What research is being done, in academia or commercially, has traditionally been oriented towards limited military requirements because until recently that is ....

Dorothy E. R. Denning. Cryptography and Data Security. Addison-Wesley, Reading, MA, 1983.

....it can also be kept secret. Alternatively, a public key may be a key which happens to be public, that is, not secret. We try to use public key only with the latter meaning, and prefer encryption key for the former. The type system. The type system is based on old ideas on secrecy levels [10] and on the newer trend of representing these levels in types (e.g. 1, 9, 13 15, 22, 23, 26, 28] For example, Public and Secret are the types of public data and secret data, respectively. In addition, the type system gives information on the intended usage and structure of data, like standard ....

Dorothy E. Denning. Cryptography and Data Security. Addison-Wesley, Reading, Mass., 1982.

....transitive closure of the communication structure must also be antisymmetric, and hence an acyclic communication structure is necessary in general. Although a restriction to acyclic communication structures might seem too strong to be useful, there are applications, such as multilevel security [BL76, Den82] and hierarchical databases [HC86] that mandate such restrictions on information flow. For example, in a multilevel security environment, suppose that site A encapsulates a database at the Secret level and site B encapsulates a database at the Unclassified level. Communication from A 2 to B ....

....A general acyclic structure is a partial order, but it is known that partial orders by themselves do not lead to global consistent orderings, as is reviewed by example later in the paper (c.f. fig. 1) In the multilevel security domain, a restriction on partial orders to lattices is common [BL76, Den82]. A lattice is a partial order in which each pair of sites has a unique least upper bound and and a unique greatest lower bound. Unfortunately, lattices by themselves also do not lead to consistent orderings. In [AJ93b] it was shown that for a variety of concurrency control algorithms for ....

[Article contains additional citation context not shown here]

Dorothy E. Denning. Cryptography and Data Security. AddisonWesley, Reading, MA, 1982.

....the reader an intuitive feel for the meaning of expressions in the language. Precise meanings will be given in x4. Also, the second of these examples will motivate our choice to model adversaries as strategies. Example 3. 1 The first example is a simple encryption box that uses a one time pad [9]. It has two channels, high and low . At each tick of the system clock, it inputs a 0 or 1 on the high channel and outputs a 0 or 1 on the low channel. The low output is computed by taking the exclusive or (denoted Phi) of the high input and a randomly generated bit. It is well known that this ....

Dorothy E. Denning. Cryptography and Data Security. Addison-Wesley, Reading, Massachusetts, 1982.

....use of an overly expressive formalism. 4.2.2 Verification for Confidentiality Program analytic approaches to the enforcement of confidentiality have received a lot of attention, and are relatively well understood. Building on Bell and La Padula s security model [9] the work of Dorothy Denning [31, 33, 32] has laid the foundation for the study of secure information flow analysis. Developments have been constantly reported [6, 71, 70, 72, 8, 1, 53] In particular, the work of Volpano et al. [120, 118, 117, 106, 119] on using a type system to capture information flow has recently attracted ....

Dorothy E. Denning. Cryptography and Data Security. Addison-Wesley, 1982.

....between a smartcard and a user s host is the Internet, which is generally an insecure medium. Consequently, our security goals require establishment of a secure channel between a host and a remote smartcard. A secure channel has the following three properties: authenticity, secrecy, and integrity [4]. Our system achieves the rst two properties by employing SPEKE, a secure key exchange protocol [13] SPEKE establishes a session key for channel encryption while at the same time authenticating both parties with a shared secret. We did not implement cryptographically secure integrity checking, ....

Dorothy Denning. Cryptography and Data Security. Addison-Wesley, 1983.

....minimal generalization of a given table. Finally, we discuss some experimental results derived from the application of our approach to a medical database containing information on 265 patients. The problem we consider differs from the traditional access control [3] and from statistical database [1, 4, 8, 9, 12, 22] problems. Access control systems address the problem of controlling specific access to data with respect to rules stating whether a piece of data can or cannot be released. In our work it is not the disclosure of the specific piece of data to be protected (i.e. on which an access decision can be ....

Dorothy E. Denning. Cryptography and Data Security. Addison-Wesley, 1982.

....the reader an intuitive feel for the meaning of expressions in the language. Precise meanings will be given in x4. Also, the second of these examples will motivate our choice to model adversaries as strategies. Example 3. 1 The first example is a simple encryption box that uses a one time pad [10]. It has two channels, high and low . At each tick of the system clock, it inputs a 0 or 1 on the high channel and outputs a 0 or 1 on the low channel. The low output is computed by taking the exclusive or (XOR) denoted Phi) of the high input and a randomly generated bit. Note that we are ....

Dorothy E. Denning. Cryptography and Data Security. Addison-Wesley, Reading, Massachusetts, 1982.

....another. Finally, we still have only a limited understanding of how to specify and prove that a translation preserves particular security properties. This question deserves further attention. It may be worthwhile to address it first in special cases, for example for information flow properties [Den82] as captured in type systems [VIS96, Aba97, ML97, HR98] The judicious use of abstractions can contribute to simplicity, and thus to security. On the other hand, abstractions and their translations can give rise to complications, subtleties, and ultimately to security flaws. As Lampson wrote ....

Dorothy E. Denning. Cryptography and Data Security. Addison-Wesley, Reading, Mass., 1982.

....this style. Other specifications are precise mathematical statements, sometimes expressed in formal calculi. These specifications have played a particularly significant role in cryptography and cryptographic protocols, but also appear in other areas, for example in information flow analysis (e.g. [24, 34, 51, 56]) Many of these specifications serve as the basis for reasoning, with various degrees of rigor and e#ectiveness, during system design, implementation, and analysis. In recent years, there has been much progress in the development of techniques for stating and proving properties about small but ....

....the environment can detect when x is n by comparing two ciphertexts. case x of y K in c#m#, which sends a message on a channel c only if x is of a certain form ( y K ) does not preserve the secrecy of x, because it leaks some information about x. This leak is an implicit information flow [24]. In a typical example, P (x) describes a protocol for establishing a session key K and for sending x encrypted under K. Proving that P (x) preserves the secrecy of x may require lemmas about the auxiliary key K. The final result, though, concerns x rather than K. 6.2 Secrecy and inductive ....

Dorothy E. Denning. Cryptography and Data Security. Addison-Wesley, Reading, Mass., 1982.

....and authentication are preserved. 1 Introduction This report describes a formal development of the Needham Schroeder key distribution protocol using the Cogito formal development methodology and tool kit (see [3] 6] 8] A description of the Needham Schroeder protocol can be found in [5]. The formal development parallels that undertaken by Abrial in the language B (see [1] The goal of the work reported here was to test that the Cogito methodology and tool set was adequate for the formal development of security protocols, to investigate the kind of proofs arising in such ....

Dorothy Denning. Cryptography and Data Security. Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1983.

....this style. Other specifications are precise mathematical statements, sometimes expressed in formal calculi. These specifications have played a particularly significant role in cryptography and cryptographic protocols, but also appear in other areas, for example in information flow analysis (e.g. [28, 22, 43, 48]) Many of these specifications serve as the basis for reasoning, with various degrees of rigor and e#ectiveness, during system design, implementation, and analysis. In recent years, there has been much progress in the development of techniques for stating and proving properties about small but ....

....of secrecy implies the other: the first one concerns a process with a free variable x, while the second one concerns a process plus a set of terms with no free variables. There are also deeper di#erences between them: in particular, the first definition rules out implicit information flows [22], while the second one does not. We leave for further work explaining when one definition is appropriate and when the other, and finding useful relations between them. Both of these definitions of secrecy rely on a simple, abstract representation of cryptographic functions. More detailed accounts ....

Dorothy E. Denning. Cryptography and Data Security. Addison-Wesley, Reading, Mass., 1982.

....one of the most significant barriers to collaborative computing [HSRM96] Software engineers have attempted to apply traditional security approaches to their specific collaborative computing paradigm. Encryption, firewalls, and passwords are used for secure transmission and storage of information [Den83]. User access rights are used in file systems to protect directories and files from unauthorized accesses [GgS91] These systems rely on domain access control for the security of their data and focus on protecting systems from adversaries. However, they do not properly address the security issues ....

Dorothy E. R. Denning. Cryptography and Data Security. AddisonWesley, Reading, MA, 1983.

....to choose to release information based on a more sophisticated analysis. All practical information flow control systems provide the ability to declassify data because strict information flow control is too restrictive to write real applications. More complex mechanisms such as inference controls [Den82] often are used to decide when declassification is appropriate. In previous systems, declassification is performed by a trusted subject: code having the authority of a highly trusted principal. One key advantage of the new label structure is that it is decentralized: it does not require that all ....

Dorothy E. Denning. Cryptography and Data Security. Addison-Wesley, Reading, Massachusetts, 1982.

....such as social security numbers and medical histories of many This project has been carried out in the IBM T. J. Watson Research Center, P.O. Box 704, Yorktown Heights, New York 10598, in the summer of 1999. 1 System integrity is intact when no unauthorized modi cation has been made. [11] donors at a university hospital. Considering the private nature of the stolen information, the damage the incident caused was extremely serious [19] The time is right to begin addressing the awed assumption that physical attack is unlikely and that system integrity is intact [30] One ....

Dorothy Denning. Cryptography and Data Security. Addison-Wesley, 1983.

....is private and kept secret by the sender, the other one is publicly known. Data encrypted with a sender s private key can be decrypted using his public key, and vice versa. These keys are usually large integer numbers, several hundred decimal digits long with special, mathematical properties. ex. [Den82]) RSA is an example of a public key encryption algorithm ( RSA78] 76 Sender: data before signature) hash algorithm hash value asymmetric cryptoalgorithm digital signature Receiver: received data) hash algorithm hash value hash value = asymmetric cryptoalgorithm received digital ....

Dorothy E. Denning. Cryptography and Data Security. Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, Inc., 1982.

....in the United States; 6 in November of 1996, a fourth center came into public existence 7 . When computer security courses are taught, relatively few textbooks on computer security are in use, and several of the most commonly used ones are principally devoted to cryptography (e.g. [4]) or are outdated. Research in academia is being done by a limited number of faculty at scattered locations working with a few students. What research is being done, in academia or commercially, has traditionally been oriented towards limited military requirements because until recently that is ....

Dorothy E. R. Denning. Cryptography and Data Security. Addison-Wesley, Reading, MA, 1983.

....Schneier s book, Applied Cryptography [38] as the primary text, which was supplemented by a course pack of selected publications. In addition, materials were used from the following books: Doug Stinson s, Cryptography: Theory and Practice [41] Dorothy Denning s Cryptography and Data Security [13], Garfinkel and Spafford s Practical Unix Security [16] Kaufman, Perlman and Speciner s Network Security [24] and William Stalling s Network and Internetwork Security Principles and Practice [39] The cryptography and computer security course was offered in the Courant Institute of Mathematical ....

Dorothy Denning. Cryptography and Data Security. Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1983.

....we will describe in section 4.2.4. 4.2.2 Verification for Confidentiality Program analytic approaches to the enforcement of confidentiality have received a lot of attention, and are relatively well understood. Building on Bell and La Padula s security model [10] the work of Dorothy Denning [33, 35, 34] has laid the foundation for the study of secure information flow analysis. Developments have been constantly reported [7, 74, 73, 75, 9, 1, 56] In particular, the work of Volpano et al. [119, 117, 116, 103, 118] on using a type system to capture information flow has recently attracted ....

Dorothy E. Denning. Cryptography and Data Security. Addison-Wesley, 1982.

....Declassification in this model provides a safe escape hatch from the rigid restrictions of strict information flow checking. Deciding when declassification is appropriate is outside the scope of this model; work in inference controls and statistical databases has developed some applicable methods [Den82] The decentralized label model has a number of important properties that are discussed further in Chapter 2: It allows individual principals to attach flow policies to pieces of data. The flow policies of all principals are reflected in the label of the data, and the system guarantees that ....

....the use of data propagate with the data and apply to any data derived from it. Privacy restrictions prevent data from being seen by untrusted users; integrity restrictions prevent untrusted data from affecting storage locations. A good overview of information flow control is presented by Denning [Den82] The original model of information flow for secrecy comes from the early work of Bell and LaPadula [BL75] In this work, objects in the system are assigned to security classes from a small ordered set (e.g. unclassified, classified, secret) Information can flow between the partitions only by ....

[Article contains additional citation context not shown here]

Dorothy E. Denning. Cryptography and Data Security. Addison-Wesley, Reading, Massachusetts, 1982.

....the reader an intuitive feel for the meaning of expressions in the language. Precise meanings will be given in x4. Also, the second of these examples will motivate our choice of modeling adversaries as strategies. Example 3. 1 The first example is a simple encryption box that uses a one time pad [Den82]. It has two channels, high and low . At each tick of the system clock, it inputs a 0 or 1 on the high channel and outputs a 0 or 1 on the low channel. The low output is computed by taking the exclusive or (denoted Phi) of the high input and a randomly generated bit. It is well known that this ....

Dorothy E. Denning. Cryptography and Data Security. Addison-Wesley, Reading, Massachusetts, 1982.

....the relatively new Journal of Computer Security. Few universities or colleges offer in depth education in computer security. When courses are taught, relatively few textbooks on computer security are in use, and several of the most commonly used ones are principally devoted to cryptography (e.g. [11]) Research in academia is being done by a limited number of faculty at scattered locations working with a few students. What research is being done, in academia or commercially, is primarily oriented to military requirements. This lack of visibility, training, and coordinated research efforts has ....

Dorothy E. R. Denning. Cryptography and Data Security. Addison-Wesley, Reading, MA, 1983.

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Dorothy E. Denning. Cryptography and Data Security. Addison-Wesley, 1982.

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Dorothy E. Denning. Cryptography and Data Security. Addison-Wesley, 1982.

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Dorothy E. R. Denning. Cryptography and Data Security. AddisonWesley, Reading, MA, 1983.

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Dorothy E. Denning. Cryptography and Data Security. Addison-Wesley, Reading, Massachusetts, 1982.

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Dorothy Denning. Cryptography and Data Security. Addison-Wesley, 1982.

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Dorothy E. R. Denning. Cryptography and Data Security. AddisonWesley, Reading, MA, 1983.

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Dorothy Denning. Cryptography and Data Security. Addison-Wesley, 1982.

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Dorothy Elizabeth Robling Denning. Cryptography and data security. Addison-Wesley, Reading, MA, USA, 1982.

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Dorothy E. Denning. Cryptography and Data Security. AddisonWesley, Reading, MA, 1983.

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Dorothy Denning, Cryptography and Data Security , Addison-Wesley (1982)

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