U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology. Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, Jan 1994. FIPS PUB 140-2.  Home/Search   Document Not in Database   Summary   Related Articles   Check

....This idea is interesting because it does not require a permanent link to an external reference clock but only from time to time. The whole time stamper card should behave as an opaque module, strictly forbidding (and detecting) any access to its internal components. For instance, FIPS 140 2 [NIST01] classifies different levels of security requirements for cryptographic modules, and a few selected trusted governmental organizations accept to test and certify equipments according to FIPS 140 2 levels. Unconditional trust of TSA is then moved forward to unconditional trust of certifying ....

National Institute of Standards and Technologies, NIST FIPS PUB 140-2, Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, U.S. Department of Commerce, August 17, 2001.

....fashion, making the software tokens less secure and causing a weak link in the security chain. Hardware token devices often contain tamper detection mechanisms that software based devices lack, and will sometimes erase critical information from the device if physical tampering is detected [3] 4] [11]. This is not to say that dedicated hardware based devices are immune to attack and do not contain security design flaws [1] 14] However, the di#culty and required 8 cost to attack is increased. The availability of free and commercial decompilers for software token environments such as ....

National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules," FIPS 140-1, January 1994, http://www.itl.nist.gov/fipspubs/fip140-1.htm.

....cheaper than a full, secure computer . it could have biometrics . it could have more memory than a chip card and could thus hold larger applications . its clock could be faster than that of a chip card . it could have a very high level of intrusion detection with battery buffered key storage [17]. By taking the battery out one can delete keys if required. it could provide transparency of all kinds of stored information, such as receipts, or passphrases used elsewhere . it could comprehensively control one s privacy: encryption, decryption, and check whether ecash coins have really ....

National Institute of Standards and Technology. Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules (1994) Available at <http://csrc.nist.gov/fips/fips1401.htm>

.... Security Anonymity Effective Key Length Key Management AntiTamper TEMPEST TRANSEC Cover Deception SML1 40 bits symmetric key length, 80 exponent 512 modulus public key length SMI Cat X of [NSF98] 80 exponent 512 modulus public key length, 80 hash key length comparable to [5200.1 R] [FIPS140] level 1 or 2 comply with applicable EMI EMC FCC standards or portions of [NT1 92] low power unit TBD SML2 80 bits symmetric key length, 160 exponent 1024 modulus public key length SMI Cat Y of [NSF98] 160 exponent 1024 modulus public key length,160 hash key length comparable to [5200.1 R] ....

.... level 1 or 2 comply with applicable EMI EMC FCC standards or portions of [NT1 92] low power unit TBD SML2 80 bits symmetric key length, 160 exponent 1024 modulus public key length SMI Cat Y of [NSF98] 160 exponent 1024 modulus public key length,160 hash key length comparable to [5200.1 R] [FIPS140] level 3 or 4 [NT1 92] commercial spread spectrum signal techniques TBD Cryptographic Algorithm Physical Security Technical Security Anonymity Effective Key Length Key Management AntiTamper TEMPEST TRANSEC Cover Deception SML3 Due to the complicated nature of this level, please consult ....

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FIPS PUB 140-1, National Institute of Standards and Technology, Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, http://www.itl.nist.gov/div897/pubs/fip140-1.htm.

....room. If we go one step further and equip NetSCSI disks with a secure coprocessor that can securely store keys [Tygar95] data can be stored in encrypted form on the disk, allowing the disks to be used in a variety of physically open environments. There are now a variety of secure coprocessors [Cylink95, NIST94a, Weingart87, White87, Telequip95, National94 ]available, some of which provide cryptographic accelerators sufficient to support singledisk bandwidths [National96] Case 3: Network attached Secure Disks (NASD) With network attached secure disks, shown in Figure 4, we relax the goal of minimal change from the existing SCSI interface and ....

National Institute of Standards and Technology,"Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules" NIST FIPS 140-1

....go one step further and equip NetSCSI disks with secure coprocessors [Tygar95] then keys can be protected and all data can be encrypted when outside the secure coprocessor, allowing the disks to be used in a variety of physically open environments. There are now a variety of secure coprocessors [NIST94a, Weingart87, White87, National96] available, some of which promise cryptographic accelerators sufficient to support single disk bandwidths. 3.4 Case 3: Network attached Secure Disks (NASD) With network attached secure disks, we relax the constraint of minimal change from the existing SCSI interface and implementation. Instead ....

National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules", NIST FIPS 140-1.

.... for purposes of maintaining military secrets, see [29] For general discussion of security, confidentiality and information integrity issues, see [1, 24, 6, 18] Our own e#orts are more influenced by Role Based Access Control, access control based on the role of the user requesting the information [3, 33, 30]. 19 20 Sharing Location Conceptual Requirements In the context of this paper, location sharing is the sharing of information about locations of persons for the purpose of performing some task e#ectively, such as joining them for a meeting, delivering a package, predicting their near future ....

National Institute of Standards and Technology. Security requirements for cryptographic modules. Federal Information Processing Standard 140-1, 1992.

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U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology. Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, Jan 1994. FIPS PUB 140-2.

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National Institute of Standards and Technology. Security requirements for cryptographic modules. FIPS 140-2, NIST, Jun 2001. http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/.

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National Institute of Standards and Technologies, NIST FIPS PUB 140-2, Security Requirements for Cryptographic Modules, U.S. Department of Commerce, August 17, 2001.

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National Institute Of Standards and Technology. Security requirements for cryptographic modules. http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips140-1/fips1401.htm, Jan 1994. FIPS PUB 140-1.

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