| Uriel Feige and Adi Shamir. Witness indistinguishable and witness hiding protocols. In proceedings of STOC '90, pages 416--426, 1990. |
....conversations, that are accepting for some given x, with c 6= c . Then given x and those two conversations, a witness w such that (x; w) 2 R can be computed efficiently. A simple but important fact (see [15] is that if a Sigma protocol is HVZK, the protocol is witness indistinguishable (WI) [25]. Although HVZK by itself is defined with respect to a very much restricted verifier, i.e. an honest one, this means that if for a given instance x there are at least two witnesses w, then even a malicious verifier cannot distinguish which witness the prover uses. In our results to follow, we ....
U. Feige and A. Shamir. Witness Indistinguishable and Witness Hiding Protocols. In 22nd ACM Symp. on Theory of Computing, pp. 416--426, 1990.
....Signature Scheme 3.1 Witness Indistinguishability In the following, we will focus on a speci c three pass witness indistinguishable identi cation scheme, and its transformation into a blind signature scheme. The notion of witness indistinguishability was de ned by Feige and Shamir in [12] for the purpose of identi cation. In such a scheme, many secret keys are associated to a same public key. Furthermore, the views of two identi cations using two distinct secret keys associated to a same public key are indistinguishable. For example, in the Fiat Shamir protocol [15] the veri ....
U. Feige and A. Shamir. Witness Indistinguishable and Witness Hiding Protocols. In Proc. of the 22nd STOC, pages 416-426. ACM Press, 1990.
....the attacker. As a consequence, the signer cannot be simulated without the secret key, otherwise the signature scheme would be universally forgeable. In order to overcome this problem, we use the concept of the witness indistinguishable proofs. This notion was de ned by Feige and Shamir in [18] for the purpose of identi cation. In such a proof system: Many secret keys are associated to a same public key. The views of two proofs using two distinct secret keys (witnesses) associated to a same public key are indistinguishable, even from the point of view of the veri er. The ....
U. Feige and A. Shamir. Witness Indistinguishable and Witness Hiding Protocols. In Proc. of the 22nd STOC, pages 416-426. ACM Press, New York, 1990.
....we can only prove the security of Schnorr identification against passive adversaries. A solution proposed by Okamoto [24] consists into using two basis g and g2 and to prove the knowledge of a representation (s, s2) such that I = Sl s g g2 modp. This protocol is witness indistinguishable [10] so, even if we cannot prove that it is zero knowledge, it is provably secure against active adversaries if the computation of the discrete logarithm of g in basis 92 modulo p is intractable. Brickell McCurley scheme [5] In the protocol proposed in [5] the computations are still done modulo a ....
U. Feige and A. Shamir. Witness Indistinguishable and Witness Hiding Protocols. In Proceedings of the 22nd $TOC, pages 416426. ACM Press, 1990.
.... strict polynomial time black box extractor) Our construction is based on the constant round zero knowledge arguments of knowledge of Feige and Shamir [13] see Appendix A for a detailed description) Actually the protocol need not be zero knowledge and it suces for it to be only witness hiding [14]; see Appendix A. In the rst phase of the Feige Shamir argument system, a subprotocol is performed where the veri er proves to the prover that it knows an NP witness for some hard problem (based on one way functions) that it had generated previously. This proof is executed using a ....
U. Feige and A. Shamir. Witness Indistinguishable and Witness Hiding Protocols. In 22 STOC, pages 416-426, 1990.
....a Digital Credential public key for which they know more than one secret key, which according to Property 1 is infeasible. The notions of so called witness indistinguishability and witnesshiding, and the general technique of using the first to prove the second, are due to Feige and Shamir [42]. At the same time, Alice cannot trick Bob into accepting her responses without her actually knowing a Digital Credential secret key, for the following reason. Suppose that Alice can come up with an initial witness a for which she can provide correct responses for two different challenges, c and ....
Uriel Feige and Adi Shamir. Witness indistinguishable and witness hiding protocols. In Proc. 22nd ACM Symp. on Theory of Computing, pages 416--426, May 1990.
....either a witness to the statement being proved or a witness to the above mentioned hard problem. This second proof is executed using a constant round witness indistinguishable proof of knowledge. Actually the protocol need not be zero knowledge and it suffices for it to be only witness hiding [13]; see Appendix A. Soundness of the Feige Shamir protocol is derived from the fact that a polynomial time bounded prover cannot solve the hard problem (even having seen the first proof) and therefore must use a witness to the statement being proved. On the other hand, zero knowledge is ....
U. Feige and A. Shamir. Witness Indistinguishable and Witness Hiding Protocols. In 22
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Uriel Feige and Adi Shamir. Witness indistinguishable and witness hiding protocols. In proceedings of STOC '90, pages 416--426, 1990.
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U. Feige and A. Shamir. Witness indistinguishable and witness hiding protocols. In Proc. 22nd Annual ACM Sympsoium on Theory of Computing, pages 416--426. ACM Press, 1990.
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U. Feige and A. Shamir. Witness indistinguishable and witness hiding protocols. In the 22nd Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, pp. 416--426, 1990.
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U. Feige and A. Shamir, Witness Indistinguishable and Witness Hiding Protocols. In Proc. of 23rd STOC, 1990.
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U. Feige and A. Shamir, "Witness Indistinguishable and Witness Hiding Protocols," Proceedings of 22nd STOC, pp.416-426, 1990.
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U. Feige, A. Shamir, Witness Indistinguishable and Witness Hiding Protocols, In 22nd ACM Symposium on the Theory of Computing, 416-426, 1990
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U. Feige, and A. Shamir. Witness indistinguishable and witness hiding protocols. In Proc. of the 22 Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC90), pages 416-426.
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Uri Feige and Adi Shamir. Witness indistinguishable and witness hiding protocols. In Proceedings of the 22nd Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, pages 416-426, 1990.
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U. Feige and A. Shamir. Witness indistinguishable and witness hiding protocols. In Baruch Awerbuch, editor, Proceedings of the 22nd Annual ACM Symposium on the Theory of Computing, pages 416-426, Baltimore, MY, May 1990. ACM Press.
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U. Feige and A. Shamir. Witness indistinguishable and witness hiding protocols. In Baruch Awerbuch, editor, Proceedings of the 22nd Annual ACM Symposium on the Theory of Computing, pages 416--426, Baltimore, MY, May 1990. ACM Press.
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U. Feige and A. Shamir. Witness indistinguishable and witness hiding protocols. In Proceedings of the 22nd Annual Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC), pages 416--426, Baltimore, MD, USA, May 1990. ACM Press.
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U. Feige and A. Shamir. Witness indistinguishable and witness hiding protocols. In Baruch Awerbuch, editor, Proceedings of the 22nd Annual ACM Symposium on the Theory of Computing, pages 416-426, Baltimore, MY, May 1990. ACM Press.
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U. Feige and A. Shamir. Witness indistinguishable and witness hiding protocols. In Baruch Awerbuch, editor, Proceedings of the 22nd Annual ACM Symposium on the Theory of Computing, pages 416--426, Baltimore, MY, May 1990. ACM Press.
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U. Feige and A. Shamir. Witness Indistinguishable and Witness Hiding Protocols. In 22nd ACM Symp. on Theory of Computing, pp. 416--426, 1990.
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U. Feige and A. Shamir, Witness Indistinguishable and Witness Hiding Protocols. In Proc. of 23rd STOC, 1990.
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U. Feige and A. Shamir, Witness indistinguishable and witness hiding protocols, Proc. 22nd ACM Symp. on Theory of Computing, 1990, pp. 416-426. 38
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Feige, U. and Shamir, A. (1990) Witness indistinguishable and witness hiding protocols. In Proc. 22nd Ann. ACM Symp. on the Theory of Computing, Baltimore, MD, May 14--16, pp. 416--426. ACM.
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U. Feige and A. Shamir. Witness indistinguishable and witness hiding protocols. In Baruch Awerbuch, editor, Proceedings of the 22nd Annual ACM Symposium on the Theory of Computing, pages 416-426, Baltimore, MY, May 1990. ACM Press.
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