U.S. National Security Agency, 'Secure Data Network System: Message Security Protocol (MSP) , SDN.701, revision 4.0 (January 1996) 148  Home/Search   Document Not in Database   Summary   Related Articles   Check

....at PKS 96 in Ziirich on 1st October 1996 [14] The final, government approved, version of the protocol fixes some minor problems and adds some new features. The document [4] is not complete in itself, as the protocol is presented as a series of extensions to the NSA s Message Security Protocol [18]. In the next section we will attempt for the first time to present the whole system in a complete and concise way, suitable for analysis by the cryptologic and computer security communities. We will then discuss some of its more obvious faults. The GCHQ architecture assumes administrative ....

U.S. National Security Agency, 'Secure Data Network System: Message Security Protocol (MSP) , SDN.701, revision 4.0 (January 1996) 148

....particularly convincing as various government agencies recommend the use of Di#e Hellman cryptosystems rather than RSA. See for example CESG s recommendations as reported by Zergo Ltd. 38] In addition, many standard cryptographic protocols such as the U.S. government s Message Security Protocol [21] are designed around cryptographic algorithms of the Di#e Hellman type. The user of this form of plausible deniability can convincingly argue that they are only seeking confidentiality, and were merely following government recommendations of good practice when they adopted a system of the ....

National Security Agency. Secure Data Network System : Message Security Protocol (MSP), January 1996.

....convincing as various government agencies recommend the use of Diffie Hellman cryptosystems rather than RSA. See for example CESG s recommendations as reported by Zergo Ltd. 38] In addition, many standard cryptographic protocols such as the U.S. government s Message Security Protocol [21] are designed around cryptographic algorithms of the Diffie Hellman type. The user of this form of plausible deniability can convincingly argue that they are only seeking confidentiality, and were merely following government recommendations of good practice when they adopted a system of the ....

National Security Agency. Secure Data Network System : Message Security Protocol (MSP), January 1996.

....version of PKCS #7, version 2.0, building on the experience just described. A variety of improvements are expected to be covered in the revision, representing experience gained with version 1. 5, a proposed alignment with the next version of the Secure Data Network System Message Security Protocol [6], and general improvements in cryptography and key management over the last several years. The development of version 2.0, like that of version 1.5 and its precursors, will be done through workshops and other forms of public review; development is expected to continue through the rest of the ....

National Security Agency (NSA) MISSI Program Office. SDN. 701: Secure Data Network System Message Security Protocol 4.0.February 1996.

....version of PKCS #7, version 2.0, building on the experience just described. A variety of improvements are expected to be covered in the revision, representing experience gained with version 1. 5, a proposed alignment with the next version of the Secure Data Network System Message Security Protocol [6], and general improvements in cryptography and key management over the last several years. The development of version 2.0, like that of version 1.5 and its precursors, will be done through workshops and other forms of public review; development is expected to continue through the rest of the ....

National Security Agency (NSA) MISSI Program Office. SDN. 701: Secure Data Network System Message Security Protocol 4.0. February 1996.

....and at PKS 96 in Zurich on 1st October 1996 [14] The final, government approved, version of the protocol fixes some minor problems and adds some new features. The document [4] is not complete in itself, as the protocol is presented as a series of extensions to the NSA s Message Security Protocol [18]. In the next section we will attempt for the first time to present the whole system in a complete and concise way, suitable for analysis by the cryptologic and computer security communities. We will then discuss some of its more obvious faults. The GCHQ architecture assumes administrative domains ....

U.S. National Security Agency, `Secure Data Network System : Message Security Protocol (MSP)', SDN.701, revision 4.0 (January 1996)

....at PKS 96 in Zurich on 1st October 1996 [13] The final GCHQ version of the protocol fixes some minor problems and adds some new features. The document [3] is not complete in itself, as the protocol is presented as a series of extensions to the US Department of Defense s Message Security Protocol [16]. In the next section we will attempt for the first time to present the whole system in a complete and concise way, suitable for analysis by the cryptologic and computer security communities. We will then discuss some of its more obvious faults. We will leave a description of the additional faults ....

U.S. National Security Agency, `Secure Data Network System : Message Security Protocol (MSP)', SDN.701, revision 4.0 (January 1996)

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National Security Agency. Secure Data Network System : Message Security Protocol (MSP), January 1996.

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