| D. Gabbay and J.M. Moravcsik. Sameness and individuation. The Journal of Philosophy, 70:513--526, 1973. |
....(at different times) we may count one person where we count three employees (possibly at the same time) we may count one lump of clay where we count different statues (at different times) etc. This relationship between classification and identification is well known in philosophical logic [17, 3 39, 38, 65, 76]. There are two views concerning the relationship between classification and identification: 1. For each class C there is an equals sign =C that says whether individuals are identical or not if they are viewed as instances of C. In this view, if p 1 and p 2 are PASSENGERs, we can have p 1 = PERSON ....
D. Gabbay and J.M. Moravcsik. Sameness and individuation. The Journal of Philosophy, 70:513--526, 1973.
....hindsight, this is not surprising, because object identification, classification, encapsulated) object state and state change are among the core concepts of object orientation. In addition, the relation between identity, class and class change is one of the most difficult problems of modal logic [8, 9, 14, 15, 25]. 2 Object identifiers, keys, and surrogates 2.1 Reasons for introducing object identifiers In order to implement an information system (IS) that represents real world objects, we need a representation of real world objects that can be stored in an IS. We call this representation a proper name ....
D. Gabbay and J.M. Moravcsik. Sameness and individuation. The Journal of Philosophy, 70:513--526, 1973.
....where we count four passengers (at different times) Similarly, we may count one building where we count three shops, we may count three employees (at the same time) where we may count one person, etc. This relationship between classification and identification is well known in philosophical logic [GM73, LZ87, Lee91, Str59, Wig80]. There are two views concerning the relationship between classification and identification: 1. For each class C there is an equals sign = C that says whether individuals are identical or not if they are viewed as instances of C. In this view, if p 1 is a person and p 2 is a person, we can have p ....
D. Gabbay and J.M. Moravcsik. Sameness and individuation. The Journal of Philosophy, 70:513-- 526, 1973.
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