Selten, R. (1978) The Chain Store Paradox. Theory and Decision 9, 127--159. Home/Search Document Not in Database Summary Related Articles Check |
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Game Theory and Agents - Johansson (1999) (Correct)
....have any chance to revenge the defection. However, if the player suspect that the opponent will defect in the last round as itself plans to do, it would pay better to defect one iteration earlier. This is what we call backward inductive reasoning and is discussed by Selten (the Chain Store Paradox [85]) and in the context of IPDs by Schuessler [83] 1.2.5 Noisy Games When players interact, their conception of what their opponent did and their ability to perform the action that their strategies define might be distorted. This is what we call noise and we can recognize two kinds of such ....
R. Selten. The chain store paradox. Theory and Decision, 9:127--159, 1978.
Unity Is Strength: An Experimental Study of Decentralized and.. - Berninghaus (2001) (Correct)
....that they become more powerful when bargaining collectively. Unlike players in game theory, human decision makers do not base their decisions always on the very specific details of the situation that they actually encounter but rather on general routines guiding their behavior in many situations (Selten, 1978; Cyert and March, 1963) One such routine might be: Let us do it together since together we are strong . They actually become stronger that way. 16 ....
Selten, R., 1978, The chain-store paradox, Theory and Decision 9, 127-159.
The Ascending Auction Paradox - Ausubel, Schwartz (1999) (1 citation) (Correct)
....Federal Reserve System, 1992, page 15) We show in this paper that the auction format has potentially disastrous consequences. Bidders have the incentive to divvy the quantity at the opening price, to end the auction before profit margins are eroded. The paradox in our title is intended to evoke Selten s (1978) chain store paradox. Selten s paradox is that the unique backward induction solution to the chain store game is so at odds with intuition. Backward induction requires that in every period a different potential entrant opens a store, and then the chain store monopolist accommodates, rather than ....
Selten, Reinhard (1978), "The Chain Store Paradox," Theory and Decision, 9, 127-159.
I. Multi-Market Competition and Market Commitments - Ganslandt (Correct)
....incumbent is free to redistribute capacity between local markets the . rm is less aggressive. The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduce four versions of the multi market game. Section 3 is devoted to the . rst version of multi market game, which is similar to Selten s [9] chain store game. In this version a multinational . rm competes sequentially with n potential entrants in n markets. In the second version of the multi market game, in section 4, the incumbent competes with n . rms simultaneously after the capacity choice has been made. In the third version of ....
Selten (1978), The Chain Store Paradox, Theory and Decision 9:127-159
Reputation and Imperfectly Observable Commitment: The Chain .. - Adolph, Wolfstetter (1996) (Correct)
....reputation effects break down; hence, Selten s chain store paradox comes back in full force. Keywords: industrial organization, entry deterrence, game theory, incomplete information. JEL classifications: D 43, D 82, D 72. filename: chain p1.tex 1 1 Introduction In his famous chain store game Selten (1978) introduced a simple game of sequential entry, played between an incumbent monopolist and a sequence of potential entrants. That game has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium. There, no entrant is ever deterred, even if the incumbent monopolist has acquired a strong record of fighting entry in ....
Selten, R. (1978). The chain store paradox, Theory and Decision 9: 127--159.
Game Theory, Complexity And Simplicity II: Problems and.. - Shubik (1997) (Correct)
....one could see the influence of numbers on the solutions. The contrast between behavior among few agents and behavior in mass economies raises deep questions concerning the economist s rational actor approach and a highly different mass particle approach. This is considered further in Part III. Selten (1975,1978) raised several fundemental problems in the study of the concept of threat. Wilson (1992) provides a perceptive survey of much of the basic game theoretic literature developed in the 1980s on the oligopolistic aspects of entry, deterrence and struggle for market share stressing the problems of ....
Selten, R. 1978. "The chain store paradox". Theory and Decision:9 127-137.
Using Simulated Annealing to Calculate the Trembles of.. - McDonald, Wagner (Correct)
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Selten, R. (1978) The Chain Store Paradox. Theory and Decision 9, 127--159.
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