J. Green and J. Laffont. Incentives in public decision making. In Studies in Public Economics. Volume 1, North Holland, Amsterdam, pages 65--78, 1979.  Home/Search   Document Not in Database   Summary   Related Articles   Check

....distributed algorithmic mechanism design approach, which augments a gametheoretic perspective with distributed computational concerns. In this paper, we extend the results of [5] by considering a more general computational model and approximate solutions. We also extend a classic impossibility [8] result by showing that no strategyproof mechanism can be both approximately e#cient and approximately budget balanced. 1.1 Multicast Cost Sharing Model We use the multicast transmission model of [5] There is a user population P residing at a set of network nodes N , which are connected by ....

....could expect a cost sharing mechanism to possess. A costsharing mechanism is said to be e#cient if it maximizes the overall welfare, and it is said to be budget balanced if the revenue raised from the receivers covers the cost of the transmission exactly. It is a classical result in game theory [8] that a strategyproof cost sharing mechanism that satisfies NPT, VP, and CS cannot be both budget balanced and e#cient. Moulin and Shenker [14] have shown that there is only one strategyproof, e#cient mechanism, called marginal cost (MC) that satisfies NPT, VP, and CS. They have also shown that, ....

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Green, J. and La#ont, J-J. (1979). Incentives in Public Decision Making, North Holland, Amsterdam.

....as well. However, there is a trade o# between the strength of the solution concept and the range 16 of social choice functions that can be implemented. Classic impossibility results show that certain social choice functions cannot be implemented by strategyproof mechanisms [Arr63, Gib71, Sat75, GL79] If the context of the particular mechanism justifies a weaker solution concept (such as Nash equilibrium) these SCFs may be implemented. In this dissertation, we follow most of the algorithmic mechanism design literature in choosing strategyproofness and group strategyproofness as our ....

....to give us all that we need strategyproofness and optimal e#ciency. However, one drawback of VCG mechanisms is that they are usually not budgetbalanced; the construction relies on having the freedom to run a surplus or a deficit. This 19 is one ramification of a result due to Green and La#ont [GL79] which shows that there is in general no strategyproof mechanism that is both budget balanced and e#cient. VCG mechanisms are also not group strategyproof; typically, a colluding group of agents can easily improve all their individual welfares. 2.2 Algorithmic Mechanism Design In Section 2.1, ....

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J. Green and J. La#ont. Incentives in public decision making. In Studies in Public Economics, volume 1, pages 65--78. North Holland, Amsterdam, 1979.

....algorithmic mechanism design approach, which augments a game theoretic perspective with distributed computational concerns. In this paper, we extend the results of [FPS01] by considering a more general computational model and approximate solutions. We also extend a classic impossibility [GL79] result by showing that no strategyproof mechanism can be both approximately e#cient and approximately budget balanced. Before providing a detailed technical statement of our results, we introduce distributed algorithmic mechanism design and our model of multicast cost sharing. 1.1 Distributed ....

....could expect a cost sharing mechanism to possess. A cost sharing mechanism is said to be e#cient if it maximizes the overall welfare, and it is said to be budget balanced if the revenue raised from the receivers covers the cost of the transmission exactly. It is a classical result in game theory [GL79] that a strategyproof cost sharing mechanism that satisfies NPT, VP, and CS cannot be both budgetbalanced and e#cient. Moulin and Shenker [MS01] have shown that there is only one strategyproof, e#cient mechanism, called marginal cost (MC) defined in Section 4 below, that satisfies NPT, VP, and ....

[Article contains additional citation context not shown here]

Green, J. and La#ont, J-J. (1979). Incentives in Public Decision Making, North Holland, Amsterdam.

....distributed algorithmic mechanism design approach, which augments a gametheoretic perspective with distributed computational concerns. In this paper, we extend the results of [5] by considering a more general computational model and approximate solutions. We also extend a classic impossibility [8] result by showing that no strategyproof mechanism can be both approximately ecient and approximately budget balanced. 1.1 Multicast Cost Sharing Model We use the multicast transmission model of [5] There is a user population P residing at a set of network nodes N , which are connected by ....

....one could expect a cost sharing mechanism to possess. A costsharing mechanism is said to be ecient if it maximizes the overall welfare, and it is said to be budget balanced if the revenue raised from the receivers covers the cost of the transmission exactly. It is a classical result in game theory [8] that a strategyproof cost sharing mechanism that satis es NPT, VP, and CS cannot be both budget balanced and ecient. Moulin and Shenker [14] have shown that there is only one strategyproof, ecient mechanism, called marginal cost (MC) that satis es NPT, VP, and CS. They have also shown that, ....

[Article contains additional citation context not shown here]

Green, J. and Laont, J-J. (1979). Incentives in Public Decision Making, North Holland, Amsterdam.

....by a node for this cost vector: uk (c) ck T ij Ik (c; i, j) We can rewrite our objective function as Ik (c; i, j)ck = uk (c) Note that the routing function (c; i, j) k#N minimizes this quantity. The characterization of VCG mechanisms, a result due to Green and La#ont [7], states that the payments for any strategyproof pricing mechanism minimizing a function of the form V (c) k#N uk (c) must be expressible as = uk (c) V (c) hk (c k ) where hk ( is an arbitrary function of c k . When ck = #, we have Ik (c i, j) 0, for all i, j (because the ....

J. Green and J. La#ont. Incentives in public decision making. In Studies in Public Economics. Volume 1, North Holland, Amsterdam, pages 65--78, 1979.

....constraints. An extensive literature deals indeed with conditions for transfer schemes to exist that achieve both incentive compatibility and first best e#ciency; see in particular, Arrow[4] d Aspremont and Gerard Varet [5, 6] d Aspremont et al. 7, 8] Cremer and McLean [10] Green and La#ont [14], Groves [15] Groves and Loeb [16] Johnson et al. 21] This is the motivation for studying the ex ante core in a quasi linear setup. In section 4 we provide our main positive result, that generically (in endowments) the ex ante core is non empty. We also show how other results from the ....

....the previous proof, we constructed money transfers making first best allocations incentive compatible. This kind of construction is standard in the mechanism design literature (e.g. Arrow[4] d Aspremont and Gerard Varet [5, 6] d Aspremont et al. 7, 8] Cremer and McLean [10] Green and La#ont [14], Groves [15] Groves and Loeb [16] Johnson et al. 21] In the rest of the section, we shall use these results to establish some cases where the ex ante core is not empty. Recall that the sum of the monetary transfers appears in the coalitions objective function (see (1) and (3) Large ....

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Green, J. and J.-J La#ont (1979), Incentives in Public Decision Making,Am- sterdam: North Holland.

....in Sprumont (1991) and further in Ching (1992, 1994) and Barber a, Jackson and Neme (1997) The Groves mechanisms described in section 3. 5 are due to Groves (1973) and the converse of the characterization theorem is from Green and Laffont (1977) The mechanisms are discussed in some detail in Green and Laffont (1979). The pivotal mechanism in section 3.6 was first described by Clarke (1971) and Groves (1973) while the Vickrey auctions were first analyzed by Vickrey (1961) The mentioned Moulin characterization of the pivotal mechanism as providing the highest minimum utility level appears in Related ....

.... the highest minimum utility level appears in Related auctions for multiple goods and interdependent valuations have recently been introduced and explored by Ausubel (1997) Dasgupta and Maskin (1997) and Perry and Reny (1999) Difficulties with balance of Groves schemes have been explored in Green and Laffont (1979) and Rob (1982) among others. These authors also explore the issues of large numbers and approximate efficiency. Laffont and Maskin (1980) explore domains where there exist balanced Groves schemes and Groves and Loeb (1975) exhibit a class of public goods problems where balance is achievable via ....

Green, J. and J.J. Laffont (1979), Incentives in Public Decision Making, North Holland: Amsterdam.

....7. 2 (Table 6) If the agents truthfully report their value functions, the auction mechanism finds an optimal agents have quasi linear preferences, the only efficient social choice functions that are implementable in dominant strategies are those that are implementable by Groves Clarke mechanisms [9]. 26 WELLMAN, WALSH, WURMAN, AND MACKIE MASON solution: f (1) 2, f (2) 3. It then calculates W Gamma1 = 4, W Gamma2 = 2, and W Gamma3 = 2. Agent 1 receives total value 0 [4 Gamma P 1 ] agent 2 receives 2 [2 Gamma P 2 ] and agent 3 receives 2 [2 Gamma P 3 ] Agents are willing ....

J. R. Green and J.-J. Laffont. Incentives in Public Decision Making. North-Holland, 1979.

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J. Green and J. Laffont. Incentives in public decision making. In Studies in Public Economics. Volume 1, North Holland, Amsterdam, pages 65--78, 1979.

No context found.

J. R. Green and J.-J. La#ont. Incentives in Public Decision Making. Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1979.

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Green, J. and J. J. La#ont (1979). Incentives in public decision making, in "Studies in Public Economics," pp. 65--78, North-Holland, Amsterdam, Vol. 1.

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J Green and J-J Laffont. Incentives in Public Decision Making. Amsterdam: NorthHolland, 1979.

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J R Green and J J Laffont. Incentives in Public Decision Making. Amsterdam: North Holland, 1979.

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J. Green and J. La#ont. Incentives in public decision making. In Studies in Public Economics, volume 1, pages 65--78. North Holland, Amsterdam, 1979.

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J. Green and J.J. Laffont, "Incentives in Public Decision Making," Studies in Public Economics, vol. 1, pp. 65--78, 1979.

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J. Green and J. Laont. Incentives in public decision making. In Studies in Public Economics. Volume 1, North Holland, Amsterdam, pages 65-78, 1979.

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J. Green and J. Laont. \Incentives in public decision making," in Studies in Public Economics, volume 1, North Holland, Amsterdam, pages 65-78, 1979.

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J. Green and J. Laffont. Incentives in public decision making. In Studies in Public Economics. Volume 1, North Holland, Amsterdam, pages 65--78, 1979.

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Green, J., and J.J. La#ont (1979a) Incentives in Public Decision Making, Amsterdam: North Holland.

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J. R. Green and J.-J. Laffont. Incentives in Public Decision-Making. North-Holland Publishing Company, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, 1979. (Cited on pages 17, 167 and 234.)

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J Green and J-J La#ont. Incentives in Public Decision Making. Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1979.

No context found.

J. Green and J. Laont. Incentives in public decision making. In Studies in Public Economics. Volume 1, North Holland, Amsterdam, pages 65-78, 1979.

No context found.

J. R. Green and J.-J. La#ont. Incentives in Public Decision Making. Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1979.

No context found.

J. R. Green and J.-J. Laont. Incentives in Public Decision Making. North-Holland, 1979.

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J. Green and J. J. Laffont, Incentives in public decision making, in "Studies in Public Economics," pp. 65--78, North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1979, Vol. 1.

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