| MasterCard International and VISA International, 1996 Secure Electronic Transaction Specification, Book3: Formal Protocol Definition, 1996 |
....primary care practices, and so on) each of which will certify the keys of its own staffs. In general, we would expect that even three octets would be inadequate for CAs. If each employer certifies its employees, and each merchant certifies keys supplied to or by its customers like the case of SET [19 21], then four octets will be required even with a completely compressed namespace. But there will likely be sound performance reasons for not waiting this space to be densely packed. So this field should be of variable length. Similarly, the use of a 32 bit sensitivity label and a 256 bit ....
MasterCard International and VISA International, 1996 Secure Electronic Transaction Specification, Book3: Formal Protocol Definition, 1996
....primary care practices, and so on) each of which will certify the keys of its own staffs. In general, we would expect that even three octets would be inadequate for CAs. If each employer certifies its employees, and each merchant certifies keys supplied to or by its customers like the case of SET [19 21], then four octets will be required even with a completely compressed namespace. But there will likely be sound performance reasons for not waiting this space to be densely packed. So this field should be of variable length. Similarly, the use of a 32 bit sensitivity label and a 256 bit ....
MasterCard International and VISA International, Secure Electronic Transaction Specification, Book1: Business Description, 1996
....the other hand left unchanged. The approach is currently being applied to the C SET and SET protocols, and has already lead to significant results. 1 Introduction Consumer demand for secure access to electronic shopping and other services is becoming very high. Many electronic commerce protocols ([12, 6, 2, 9, 14], etc. have been proposed recently to meet this demand. Such protocols mainly use encryption and decryption functions to achieve security requirements. But the design of a cryptographic protocol is a difficult and error prone task, and many popular and largely used cryptographic protocols have ....
....properties. Draft: to be presented at the 10th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop DRAFT Payment properties involve some standard authentication requirements. As an example of such standard requirement, let us consider the situation found in many payment protocols such as SET [12], C SET [6] Globe On line [14] iKP [2] etc. where the merchant will typically ask to a representative of a bank, the payment gateway, for a payment authorization. The merchant, at the time when he receives payment authorization, wants typically to be sure that he has really been talking to the ....
MasterCard and VISA. Secure electronic transactions specification (books 1, 2, 3). June 1996.
....transaction protocol, on the other hand, is used to exchange related secure messages between two processes with one or more of the secure transaction properties. The secure message properties defined above are well known, and are already provided in several existing security protocols, such as SET [13], PGP [10] and SSL [3] The relational properties of atomicity and isolation are also familiar from classical database theory [5] where they provide for computational separation of transactions. In secure transactions we seek a similar effect, so that transactions that involve exchanges of things ....
....and is implemented as a replacement for the sockets API to be used by applications requiring secure communications. S HTTP, on the other hand, is similar to PEM in terms of implementation its data are passed in named text fields in the HTTP header. SET The Secure Electronic Transaction (SET) [13] specification was introduced this year by several credit card and system software vendors. It is currently under design and there are no publicly available reference implementations. SET uses a session communications model like that of SSL and S HTTP. SET certificate management is based on X.509, ....
VISA and MasterCard and others. Secure Electronic Transaction Specification, Books 13, version 1.0 edition, May 1997.
....protocols have been invented in the seventies and later, and the development of electronic commerce on the Internet and intranets will undoubtedly foster the creation of more and more new protocols to cater for the needs of every financial or economical institution. Real life protocols, like SET [13] or C SET [7] are orders of magnitude more complex than typical protocols invented in the eighties. However, even the latter are for the most part buggy [4] In real world applications, we therefore need trusted protocols; a good way of trusting protocols is to prove them correct according to a ....
.... of the same protocol at the same time, and which will be described in a forthcoming paper) appears to be scalable to protocols that are at least two orders of magnitude bigger than the usual toy examples found in papers on cryptographic protocols, notably electronic commerce protocols [3] like SET [13] or C SET [7] There is no real opposition between approaches based on process algebra like the spi calculus and practical approaches like Clap, however, and it is probably a good idea to formalize the semantics of Clap by a translation to the spi calculus or any derived calculus. By the way, the ....
Mastercard and VISA. Secure Electronic Transactions specification. (Books 1, 2, 3), 1996.
No context found.
MasterCard International and VISA International, 1996 Secure Electronic Transaction Specification, Book2: Programmer's Guide, 1996
Online articles have much greater impact More about CiteSeer.IST Add search form to your site Submit documents Feedback
CiteSeer.IST - Copyright Penn State and NEC