Doyle, J., 1980. A model for deliberation, action, and introspection, Cambridge: MIT Artificial Intelligence Laboratory, TR-581 (Ph.D. thesis).  Home/Search   Document Not in Database   Summary   Related Articles   Check

....last case the self referential ability is definitely disregarded. Therefore, we cannot consider the above equation (3) as a commonsense statement, although it has many advantages like, for example, providing an embedding for default reasoning in a wide class of modal logics (see (McDermott and Doyle, 1980; McDermott, 1982; Marek and Truszczynski, 1990; Marek and Truszczynski, 1993; Marek et al. 1993; Schwarz and Truszczynski, 1994; Schwarz, 1995) Let us reformulate the strict relation between definability and self reference. As we have argued, classical definability is too strong because it is ....

....to the uniqueness of C, that is, without relying on an implicit definition of C. This has been, in fact, the main effort of this work. The connection between nonmonotonic reasoning and a logic in which fixed points are characterizable, namely the modal logic G, has been early investigated by (Doyle, 1980). The modal logic G (Boolos, 1979; Solovay, 1976) is the logic in which the notion of provability in Peano Arithmetic is interpreted. For this reason the characterization of fixed points goes through implicit definability which, as we discussed above, means that there exists a unique solution to ....

[Article contains additional citation context not shown here]

Doyle, J. (1980). A model for Deliberation, Action, and Introspection. AI-TR 581, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Artificial Intelligence Laboratory, Cambridge,Massachusetts.

.... these effects Which rules are implied, which ingredients enable agents to make normative decisions In which way does a normative decision maker differ from an ordinary decision maker, if any 5 Goals serve a dual role in most planning systems, capturing aspects of both intentions and desires (Doyle, 1980). Besides expressing the desirability of a state, adopting a goal represents some commitment to pursuing that state. For example, accepting a proposition as an achievement task commits the agent to finding some way to accomplish this objective, even if this requires adopting some subtasks that may ....

Doyle, J. 1980. A model for deliberation, action and introspection. Technical Report AI-TR-581, MIT AI Laboratory.

....twovalued utility function u satisfying u(fl) u( fl) would suffice to represent this preference. However, this simple preferential interpretation of goals is inadequate for several reasons. First, goals serve a dual role in most planning systems, capturing aspects of both intentions and desires (Doyle, 1980). Besides expressing the desirability of a state, adopting a goal represents some commitment to pursuing that state. These two attitudes must be disentangled in any semantical treatment of goals. In our treatment, we concentrate exclusively on the role of expressing desirability, recognizing that ....

Doyle, Jon 1980. A model for deliberation, action, and introspection. AI-TR 581, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Artificial Intelligence Laboratory, 545 Technology Square, Cambridge, MA, 02139.

No context found.

Doyle, J., 1980. A model for deliberation, action, and introspection, Cambridge: MIT Artificial Intelligence Laboratory, TR-581 (Ph.D. thesis).

....best performance. Making control decisions rationally raises the problem of infinite regress, since trying to control the cost of making rational control decisions by means of additional rational control decisions creates a tower of deliberations, each one concerned with the level below (as in (Doyle, 1980)) 11 Thus striking a balance between control and reasoning computations means taking effort expended at all these levels into account. In practice, the deliberative information available at higher levels but unavailable at lower ones vanishes as one ascends the reflective tower, and most ....

Doyle, J. 1980. A Model for Deliberation, Action, and Introspection. AI-TR 581, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Artificial Intelligence Laboratory, Cambridge, MA.

....of a set S D, by QExts(S) fE 2 Exts(S) j E 2 d2E J (d; S)g: That is, E is a component admissible extension of S just in case each element of E approves (via J ) of the way it occurs in E relative to S. The admissible extensions AExts(S) are stipulated as a subset of 12 [Minsky 1965] [Doyle 1980], Weyhrauch 1980] Frisch and Allen 1982] Smith 1982] 8 the component admissible extensions, or formally, AExts(S) QExts(S) Exts(S) If E 2 AExts(S) we also write S Delta E. Putting all these definitions together, we say that each choice of (D; I; 6 S ; J ; Delta ) or ....

....is not decidable. 24.18) Theorem (Church) Consistency is not decidable. For some special cases, such as finite sentential and monadic sets, arguability and inevitability appear decidable. But rather than continue this topic here, we refer to the discussions in [Reiter 1980] McDermott and Doyle 1980], and [Davis 1980] 32 Attitudinal theories x25. In the previous theories of reasoned assumptions, there was no commitment to what state components signified, other than reasons. Elements of the domain were not in themselves any familiar psychological organization, but merely the components ....

[Article contains additional citation context not shown here]

Doyle, J., 1980. A model for deliberation, action, and introspection, Cambridge: MIT Artificial Intelligence Laboratory, TR-581.

....mold of Equation (1) at the outset, as they associate several possible distinct sets of constructive conclusions with each individual set of manifest beliefs. One such theory is that embodied in Doyle s (1979) reason maintenance system, which has received formal treatments including McDermott and Doyle s (1980, McDermott 1982) nonmonotonic logics, Reiter s (1980) logic of defaults, Moore s (1983) autoepistemic logic, and Doyle s (1983) theories of reasoned assumptions. The problem here is not that the agent s beliefs may have different models (or, as in circumscription, minimal models) in which ....

....making this allocation by means of another rational choice involving restricted sorts of preferences, such as those expressed in default rules, or those employed by Smith (1985) and Russell and Wefald (1988) If need be, this simplification may be employed more than once to reach a decision. See (Doyle 1980, 1988a) for treatments of patterns of successively reflective preferences about preferences and reasoning about reasoning as elements of a theory of rationally bounded rationality. Two related but in many ways simpler approaches towards mechanizing rational representation may be found in reason ....

Doyle, J., 1980. A model for deliberation, action, and introspection, Cambridge: MIT Artificial Intelligence Laboratory, TR-581.

....This paper celebrates the twentieth volume of Fundamenta Informaticae. The year of its writing (1993) also marks the twentieth anniversary of my involvement in the field of artificial intelligence; the fifteenth anniversary of the appearance of the original nonmonotonic logic (McDermott Doyle, 1980); and the tenth and fifth anniversaries (respectively) of the appearance of my mathematical monograph (Doyle, 1983c) and my foundational monograph (Doyle, 1988) from which the present paper derives and upon which it improves, and looking back from these anniversaries has led me to include some ....

....notions of nonmonotonic conclusions proved a perplexing task. I formulated perhaps the first rigorous solution to this problem in 1976 as the two fundamental principles of my original reason maintenance system or RMS (Doyle, 1976, 1979) renamed so from truth maintenance system or TMS in (Doyle, 1980)) which introduced the now familiar notion of nonmonotonic justification. Some may also consider McCarthy s (1977) probably contemporaneous early notion of circumscription a solution to this problem, or even credit the older logical theory of implicit definition (Doyle, 1985) The RMS ....

[Article contains additional citation context not shown here]

Doyle, J. (1980). A model for deliberation, action, and introspection. Ai-tr 581, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Artificial Intelligence Laboratory, 545 Technology Square, Cambridge, MA, 02139.

....formulation largely by choosing logical or LISP like languages for the contents of mental subagents. The mathematical framework is developed and otherwise applied in [Doyle 1982] and [Doyle 1983b] While I formulate the particular society here to generalize the organization suggested in my thesis ([Doyle 1980]) the ideas involved have an older, wider history, and I have worked to incorporate the insights of Johan de Kleer, Merrick Furst, Kurt Konolige, Marvin Minsky, Brian Smith, Richard Stallman, Guy Steele, Gerald Sussman, David Touretzky, and Richard Weyhrauch into this exposition. x2. Researchers ....

....functions, but we avoid formalizing those here. As another example, if we choose C to be the set of sentences in a first order logical language and adopt the modifiable reference definitions discussed earlier, the society bears close resemblance to the variant of Weyhrauch s FOL system used in [Doyle 1980]. In this case, subagents and perspectives correspond to theories and subtheories, and ) corresponds to semantic attachment. Weyhrauch s system also incorporates a simplifier, evaluator, and automatic reflection mechanism, but we avoid pursuing these here as well. x9. Our task is not yet ....

[Article contains additional citation context not shown here]

Doyle, J., 1980. A model for deliberation, action, and introspection, Cambridge: MIT Artificial Intelligence Laboratory, TR-581 (Ph.D. thesis).

....changes of assumptions play much larger, though often unacknowledged, roles. For example, McDermott views non monotonic logic and reason maintenance as logicist enterprises, but properly formulated they are better viewed as limited theories of rational and intentional selections of attitudes. As [Doyle 1980, 1983a, 1985, 1986] first suggest and then show, by separating the notions of belief revision and reasoned assumptions from each other and from the irrelevant (in this context) notion of logical consistency, it is readily seen that (A) defaults are preferences in favor of making specific ....

....connected with Pascal s wager and James will to believe. Other examples involving revisions of belief include rational selection of sources of inconsistencies, conserva Doyle tive accommodations to new information, and rational selection among alternative theories in learning. See especially [Doyle 1980, 1986] for details. If reasoning is an activity, knowledge is best thought of as the grounds of reasoning: not merely the agent s factual information (its beliefs and subjective probabilities, or content theory ) but its evaluative and procedural information (its preferences and plans, desires ....

Doyle, J., 1980. A model for deliberation, action, and introspection, Cambridge: MIT Artificial Intelligence Laboratory, TR-581.

Online articles have much greater impact   More about CiteSeer.IST   Add search form to your site   Submit documents   Feedback  

CiteSeer.IST - Copyright Penn State and NEC