M.A. Bezem, R.N. Bol, and J.F. Groote. Formalizing process algebraic verifications in the calculus of constructions. Formal Aspects of Computing, 9:1--48, 1997.  Home/Search   Document Details and Download   Summary   Related Articles   Check

....by a computer program, like the Coq [CCF 95] system, which is a verification tool based on the calculus of constructions [CH88] See [Sel93] or [Sel96] for more information on using type theory for protocol verification. Examples of using Coq for protocol verification can also be found in [BBG95, GvdP93, KS93, KS94] 2. The Specification Language CRL The syntax and semantics of CRL are described in the style of ACP, which stands for Algebra of Communicating Processes [BBK87] We give a brief overview of the most important features. 2.1. Specifications in CRL The specification language ....

.... such as implicit set theory and ff=fi calculus [BBK87] This means that the new proof can be checked by a verification tool (like Coq) in a straightforward way (see [CH88, Sel93] Coq is a proof tool, based on type theory, which has been used for checking a number of CRL proofs (see [BBG95, GvdP93, KS94] In CRL processes can be parameterized with data. Typically, this feature is used to build specifications where infinite data domains are involved or specifications where the data domain is arbitrary. For instance in the picture below we have actions r i (d) i = 1; 2; 3 that read ....

M.A. Bezem, R. Bol, and J.F. Groote. Formalizing process algebraic verifications in the calculus of constructions. Technical Report Computing Science Report 95-02, Eindhoven University of Technology, 1995.

....on the use of general purpose proof checkers. e.g. tool support for CCS and CSP has been obtained on the basis of HOL [6, 7, 15] This theorem prover has also been used to get mechanized support for reasoning with the # calculus [14] For CRL, an ACP like language with data structures, both Coq [5, 11] and PVS [10] have been investigated. In [5] pure algebraic reasoning is used, whereas [10, 11] combine algebraic and assertional reasoning. Most of the research mentioned above aims at concrete applications. The only support for the verification of theoretical issues concerns the soundness proof ....

....e.g. tool support for CCS and CSP has been obtained on the basis of HOL [6, 7, 15] This theorem prover has also been used to get mechanized support for reasoning with the # calculus [14] For CRL, an ACP like language with data structures, both Coq [5, 11] and PVS [10] have been investigated. In [5] pure algebraic reasoning is used, whereas [10, 11] combine algebraic and assertional reasoning. Most of the research mentioned above aims at concrete applications. The only support for the verification of theoretical issues concerns the soundness proof of algebraic axioms, based on a specific ....

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M.A. Bezem, R.N. Bol, and J.F. Groote. Formalizing process algebraic verifications in the calculus of constructions. Formal Aspects of Computing, 9(1):1--48, 1997.

....research on the use of general purpose proof checkers. e.g. tool support for CCS and CSP has been obtained using HOL [6, 7, 15] This theorem prover has also been used to get mechanized support for reasoning with the # calculus [14] For CRL, an ACP like language with data structures, both Coq [5, 11] and PVS [10] have been investigated. In [5] pure algebraic reasoning is used, whereas the work described in [10, 11] combines algebraic and assertional reasoning. Most of the research mentioned above aims at concrete applications. The only support for the verification of theoretical issues ....

....e.g. tool support for CCS and CSP has been obtained using HOL [6, 7, 15] This theorem prover has also been used to get mechanized support for reasoning with the # calculus [14] For CRL, an ACP like language with data structures, both Coq [5, 11] and PVS [10] have been investigated. In [5] pure algebraic reasoning is used, whereas the work described in [10, 11] combines algebraic and assertional reasoning. Most of the research mentioned above aims at concrete applications. The only support for the verification of theoretical issues concerns the soundness proof of algebraic axioms, ....

[Article contains additional citation context not shown here]

M.A. Bezem, R.N. Bol, and J.F. Groote. Formalizing process algebraic verifications in the calculus of constructions. Formal Aspects of Computing, 9(1):1--48, 1997.

....are formalised in Isabelle HOL which is a theorem prover based on higher order logic. ffl The CRL proof has not been proof checked. The main reason for this is that verifications of a similar complexity as the verification of the Bakery Protocol have already been proof checked in Coq (e.g. see [KS94, GvdP93, BBG95]) and therefore not much new can be learned. ffl The CRL specification and verification of the Bakery Protocol are rather compact. In [GK95] there was enough space for including almost the whole hand written proof. I O automata theory is not very suited for writing down detailed hand written ....

M.A. Bezem, R. Bol, and J.F. Groote. Formalizing process algebraic verifications in the calculus of constructions. Computing Science Report 95-02, Eindhoven University of Technology, 1995.

....discussed above in Coq. This is a a proof checker, c.q. theorem prover, based on the Calculus of Constructions (higher order type theory) 6] extended with inductive types [15] The new theory has been placed on top of the basic proof system of CRL that has already been implemented in Coq (see [16, 3]) Moreover, we have extended the theory of [10] with a symbolic representation format for LPOs. In this format, LPOs can be mechanised more efficiently. We have chosen Coq (version V5.10.14.a) as our proof development tool for the following reasons. First, we have some experience with the tool in ....

....can be mechanised more efficiently. We have chosen Coq (version V5.10.14.a) as our proof development tool for the following reasons. First, we have some experience with the tool in which we already implemented the proof system of CRL and carried out several computer checked verifications (see [12, 11, 3]) Second, the system is highly expressive, i.e. supports higher order reasoning. This is important because we need higher order constructs for defining the notion of LPO. In fact, although Coq is rather expressive, we had to ask the tool builders to extend the functionality of Coq in order to ....

M.A. Bezem, R. Bol, and J.F. Groote. Formalizing process algebraic verifications in the calculus of constructions. Computing Science Report 95-02, Eindhoven University of Technology, 1995.

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M.A. Bezem, R.N. Bol, and J.F. Groote. Formalizing process algebraic verifications in the calculus of constructions. Formal Aspects of Computing, 9:1--48, 1997.

....analysis. ffl the definition of CRL had to be sufficiently precise to allow for the independent construction of computer tools for CRL capable in assisting in the actual development of systems. We are confident to say that CRL has indeed met al..l these intended purposes (see for example [5, 7, 8, 9, 15, 16, 18, 19, 21, 24, 28, 29, 33]) However, the need was felt to be able to deal with a more explicit notion of time. Moreover, the datatypes needed to be adapted to overcome some shortcomings, which are independent of the extension with time. Timed CRL is the extension of CRL in both respects. This extension is carried out in ....

M.A. Bezem, R.N. Bol and J.F. Groote. Formalizing Process Algebraic Verifications in the Calculus of Constructions. Formal Aspects of Computing, 9:1-48, 1997.

....formally defined language based on process algebra that incorporates data [6] The next step was to define a proof theory that enabled to prove distributed systems correct [7] From this point on CRL was ready for its usability test. Several distributed systems have now been proved correct [2, 3, 5, 12]. These experiments have revealed several problems. The most important is that proofs contain very many trivial steps. For human beings it is hard to guarantee that all these steps are correct. Therefore, we think it necessary to check the correctness proofs with automated proof checkers [15, 16, ....

....3, 5, 12] These experiments have revealed several problems. The most important is that proofs contain very many trivial steps. For human beings it is hard to guarantee that all these steps are correct. Therefore, we think it necessary to check the correctness proofs with automated proof checkers [15, 16, 12, 2]. Verification of the BRP. The Bounded Retransmission Protocol of Philips is an example of a distributed system which relies heavily on data. It is a simplified variant of a telecommunication protocol that is used in one of Philips products. The protocol allows to transmit large blocks of data ....

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M. Bezem, R. Bol, and J.F. Groote. Formalizing process algebraic verifications in the calculus of constructions. Technical Report 95-02, Eindhoven University of Technology, January 1995. To appear in Formal Aspects of Computing.

....case, one must expect to invest a lot of time providing a logical underpinning. An example from process algebra is found on page 35 of [5] Here, the principle RSP (Recursive Specification Principle) is described rather sloppily by a guarded recursive specification has at most one solution . In [7] a formulation of this principle is given in Coq, which fills almost an entire page of various definitions. 3 THE SLIP PROTOCOL 3 S C R r 1 2 s Figure 1: Architecture of the SLIP protocol 3. Finally, to really get a proof checker to work, the theory must be made effective. This means ....

....ones. Nevertheless, this overview gives a good impression of the state of the art. In the context of process algebra [5] most such checks have been carried out using the language CRL [34] It has been encoded in the Coq system and applied to the verification of the alternating bit protocol [8, 7], Milner s scheduler [47] a bounded retransmission protocol [36] and parallel queues [48] CRL has also been encoded in PVS and a distributed summing protocol has been computer checked in [33] using the methodology presented in [35] Temporal logic has been mainly used for proving safety ....

M.A. Bezem, R. Bol and J.F. Groote. Formalizing process algebraic verifications in the calculus of constructions. Formal Aspects of Computing, 9(1):1-48, 1997.

No context found.

M.A. Bezem, R. Bol, and J.F. Groote. Formalizing process algebraic verifications in the calculus of constructions. Computing Science Report 95-02, Eindhoven University of Technology, 1995.

No context found.

M.A. Bezem, R. Bol, and J.F. Groote. Formalizing process algebraic verifications in the calculus of constructions. Computing Science Report 95-02, Eindhoven University of Technology, 1995.

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