Vann McGee. How truthlike can a predicate be? A negative result. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 14(4):399--410, 1985. Home/Search Document Not in Database Summary Related Articles Check |
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A Type-Free Formalization of Mathematics Where Proofs Are Objects - Dowek (1996) (Correct)
....of arithmetic, then the proposition P ) 9x proof(x; P ) is false in the standard model. Thus the standard model is not a model of the necessitation axiom. In other words the necessitation axiom implies the existence of non standard numbers for proofs of true but unprovable propositions (McGee [20] shows that even very weak conditions on a truth predicate imply inconsitency and thus the loss of the standard model of arithmetic. Here, it only implies the existence of non standard functions, i.e. more functions that can be proved to exist with the usual axioms. Remark The use of dummy ....
V. McGee, How truthlike can a predicate be ? A negative result, Journal of Philosophical Logic 14 (1985) pp. 399-410.
Logical Theories for Agent Introspection - Bolander (2003) (Correct)
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Vann McGee. How truthlike can a predicate be? A negative result. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 14(4):399--410, 1985.
Possible-Worlds Semantics for Modal Notions Conceived as.. - Halbach, Leitgeb, Welch (2002) (Correct)
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Vann McGee, How truthlike can a predicate be? A negative result, Journal of Philosophical Logic, vol. 14 (1985), pp. 399-410.
Possible Worlds Semantics for Predicates - Halbach, Leitgeb, Welch (2002) (Correct)
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Vann McGee, How truthlike can a predicate be?, Journal of Philosophical Logic, vol. 14 (1985), pp. 399-410.
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