David Makinson. On the formal representation of rights relations. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 15:403--425, 1986.  Home/Search   Document Not in Database   Summary   Related Articles   Check

....during visits to Swedish Institute of Computer Science. 2. the permission to exercise that power; 3. the practical ability (opportunity, know how) to exercise that power. The distinction between permission and institutional power is illustrated in [JS96] by quoting the following example from [Mak86]. consider the case of a priest of a certain religion who does not have permission, according to instructions issued by the ecclesiastical authorities, to marry two people, only one of whom is of that religion, unless they both promise to bring up the children in that religion. He may ....

D. Makinson. On the formal representation of right relations. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 15:403--425, 1986.

....A social commitment can not imply a juridicial norm, but utmost a directed norm (which we will use) S Comm(i; j; O j i ( 4) The directed obligation O j i ( is read as agent i (the addressee) has an obligation towards j (the counterparty) that will be achieved. Several authors ([9, 12, 15]) analysed or described the types of rights relationships between the addressees (or bearers) and counterparties from the classic work by Hohfeld ( 11] The counterparty is an agent or a group of agents that has a right against the addressee, who has a duty (an obligation) Right and duty ....

Makinson, D., On the Formal Representation of Rights Relations, Journal of Philosophical Logic 15, pp. 403-425, 1986.

....expression EX p is read as group X brings it about that p or group X sees to it that p . The sentence O(EX p) is read as it is obligatory that X brings it about that p , just as OX (p) However, now we have four atomic types of obligations instead of two atomic types OX (p) and OX ( p) see [15]) 1. O(EX p) it is obligatory that X brings it about that p . 2. O(EX:p) it is obligatory that X brings it about that not p . 3. O( EX p) it is obligatory that X does not bring it about that p . 4. O( EX:p) it is obligatory that X does not bring it about that not p . The first two ....

.... then we can express the responsibility of all the agents to fulfill the collective obligation precisely: OX (p) C COMMX;fi ( ff 1 ; ff 2 ; ff 3 ) COMM(i 1 ; X; ff 1 ) COMM(i 2 ; X; ff 2 ) COMM(i 3 ; X; ff 3 ) O(i 1 : ff 1 ) ff 1 ]O(i 2 : ff 2 ) ff 1 ]O(i 3 : ff 3 ) Several authors ([8, 11, 12, 14, 15]) analysed or described the types of rights relationships between the addressees (or bearers) and counterparties from the classic work by Hohfeld ( 10] The counterparty is an agent or a group of agents that has a right against the addressee, who has a duty (an obligation) Right and duty ....

Makinson, D., On the Formal Representation of Rights Relations, Journal of Philosophical Logic 15, pp. 403-425, 1986.

....D a p expresses the (non deontic) agentive claim that agent a does p, i.e. brings it about that p, sees to it that p, or acts in a way that assures that p. Versions of this compositional strategy, as we may call it, have been considered by many authors, including Chisholm (1964) Kanger (1971) Makinson (1986), Horty (1996) and Sergot (1999) Garca (1986) discusses an early proposal by Meinong to the same e ect. Objections to various versions of the compositional strategy have also been put forward from time to time. The most sustained and detailed objections, presented in Krogh and Herrestad 1996, ....

Makinson, D. 1986. On the formal representation of rights relations. Journal of Philosophical Logic, vol. 15, pp. 403--425.

....some years before Brady, Stig Kanger and Helle Kanger started to investigate how their explications might be combined. This investigation resulted in what the Kangers called the atomic types of rights. By employing a few notational constructs, slightly modified by those proposed by Makinson in [27], Kanger s investigation of combinations of rights can be formulated quite easily. A choice set, X)fY g, is defined as the following lexicographic operation: 14 Definition 4.1 (X)fY g def = fUV : U 2 X V 2 Y g. A maxiconjunction is defined as follows: Definition 4.2 A maxiconjunction is a ....

David Makinson. On the formal representation of rights relations. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 15:403--425, 1986.

....(and permissions) could hold between the agents in a protocol would be useful. It does perhaps not come as a surprise the theory of normative positions is applicable here. 14 In order to represent normative positions, we will employ the conceptual vocabulary developed by David Makinson in [26] and subsequently modified by Jones and Sergot in [18] Furthermore, an operator V is introduced which takes two sets and returns a set consisting of all consistent conjunctions in which one of the conjuncts is taken from the first set and the other conjunct is taken from the second set. 15 ....

David Makinson. On the formal representation of rights relations. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 15:403--425, 1986.

.... it may be used to distinguish between declarations and assertions in normative reasoning, between creating an obligation or permission for another agent and evaluating whether such deontic states hold [vdTT99] and finally between the power and permission to create obligations and permissions [Mak86, FS99]. Dynamic reasoning about norms has been formalized in dynamic deontic logic [Dig99, Lia98] deontic update semantics [vdTT99] and deontic deep structure models [TT98] with applications in computer security (e.g. changing access rights) and electronic commerce (e.g. the transfer of obligations ....

D. Makinson. On the formal representation of right relations. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 15:403--425, 1986.

....is presented in section 3. Viewed as a formal theory of duties and rights, the Kanger Lindahl framework has important and well documented limitations, especially in regard to the feature Hohfeld called (legal) power , also known as legal capacity or competence (see e.g. the discussion in [ Makinson, 1986; Lindahl, 1992; Jones and Sergot, 1996 ] Nevertheless it provides a powerful and expressive framework that is capable of articulating many distinctions and nuances, and a way of exploring these distinctions in a systematic fashion. The aim of this present paper is to comment on the adequacy of ....

....is a more accurate reading of the expression OExF . 2 Classes of normative positions The core of Kanger s analysis of the Hohfeldian relations are what he called the atomic types of rights relations of two agents a and b with respect to some state of a airs F . They 5 can be characterised [ Makinson, 1986 ] as the expressions belonging to the set: r O Ea E b F z (2.1) The expression inside the brackets stands for the set of sixteen sentences of the form O Ea F or O E b F , where stands for the two possibilities of armation and negation. The brackets denote maxi conjunctions: ....

Makinson, D. (1986). On the formal representation of rights relations. Journal of Philosophical Logic 15:403-425.

....fashion the complete space of all logically possible (normative, control, in uence) relations between two agents with respect to some given act type. These are the (normative, control, in uence) positions . For further discussion of the theory and some of its features, see e.g. Talja, 1980, Makinson, 1986, Lindahl, 1992, Herrestad and Krogh, 1995, Herrestad, 1996, Krogh, 1997) Jones and Sergot (1992, 1993) present a modi ed version of the Kanger Lindahl theory and discuss how it may be applied to a problem in computer science concerning the speci cation of access control to databases of sensitive ....

....nor of the representational adequacy of the framework. There are well documented limitations of the KangerLindahl framework, in particular in regard to its treatment of the feature Hohfeld called (legal) power , also referred to sometimes as legal capacity or competence . See e.g. (Makinson, 1986, Lindahl, 1992) for a discussion of these points, and (Jones and Sergot, 1996) for a recent account of power . For wider applicability the methods presented in this paper will need to be augmented: with a treatment of power , with temporal constructs, and with a richer set of action concepts, ....

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Makinson, D. (1986). On the formal representation of rights relations. Journal of Philosophical Logic 15:403-425.

....an agent brings it about that, or sees to it that, such andsuch is the case. This approach to the logic of action is summarised in later sections. It might be supposed that, of these notions, it is permission to do which is closest to empowered to do . But, as is pointed out by Makinson [Makinson 86, p.408] jurisprudential theorists have long been aware that these two notions are not equivalent. Indeed, even if one were to enrich the logical language by adding a further modality, to express the idea of agent ability, or practical possibility to act, the notion of institutionalised power ....

D. Makinson. On the formal representation of rights relations. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 15:403--425, 1986.

....agents with respect to the end state result of a common state of affairs. This fails as an attempt to address the relationality problem, because the possible co existence of obligations and permissions of two agents does not guarantee any relation between the agents. Following Hansson (1970) and Makinson (1986), we suggested (Herrestad Krogh, 1993) to define a directed obligation operator i O j between two individuals i and j. However, we later became aware that our attempt at making the reductions i O j i O, and i O O, made us introduce an inadvertent ambiguity in the reading of O, where O may be ....

Makinson, David (1986), "On the Formal Representation of Right Relations", Journal of Philosophical Logic, Vol. 15, pp. 403-442.

....has a certain right, then moral and legal discourse might become less vague and confused. Furthermore, a formal theory of rights would be an important contribution to the construction of computer programs to aid in systems specification and legal drafting (Jones Sergot (1992) As noted by Makinson (1986) W.N. Hohfeld s theory of rights (1913) has offered a standing challenge to logicians because of its abstract and systematizing character . The best known proposal of a formalisation of Hohfeld s theory has been presented by Stig Kanger (1971,1972) and with Helle Kanger (1966) This attempt has ....

....a standing challenge to logicians because of its abstract and systematizing character . The best known proposal of a formalisation of Hohfeld s theory has been presented by Stig Kanger (1971,1972) and with Helle Kanger (1966) This attempt has been further developed by Lindahl (1977, 1991) and Makinson (1986), to which the present paper is a response. They hold that what may be termed the counterparty problem , and the expression of rights without a counterparty are two central problems for Kanger s proposal. In order to present these problems, we shall give a brief introduction to Kanger s ....

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Makinson, David (1986), "On the Formal Representation of Right Relations", Journal of Philosophical Logic, Vol 15, s. 403-442.

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David Makinson. On the formal representation of rights relations. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 15:403--425, 1986.

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D. Makinson. On the formal representation of rights relations. Journal of philosophical Logic, 15:403--425, 1986.

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David Makinson. On the formal representation of rights relations. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 15:403--425, 1986.

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Makinson, D., On the Formal Representation of Rights Relations, Journal of Philosophical Logic 15 (1986), 403-425.

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D. Makinson. On the formal representation of rights relations. Journal of philosophical Logic, 15:403--425, 1986.

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D. Makinson. On the formal representation of rights relations. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 15:403--25, 1986.

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D. Makinson. On the formal representation of right relations. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 15:403--445, 1986.

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