N. NISAN, "Algorithms for selfish agents", Proceedings of the 16th Annual Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science, Trier, Germany, March 1999, p. 1--15.  Home/Search   Document Not in Database   Summary   Related Articles   Check

....misbehavior such as tampering with route discovery maintenance, dropping, delaying or misrouting packets, etc. The scheme we propose addresses selfish misbehavior at the MAC layer, and can complement network layer mechanisms. Game theoretic techniques have also been used to develop protocols [10, 11, 14, 15] which are resilient to misbehavior. Konorski [10, 11] proposes a modified backoff algorithm for the MAC protocol that can tolerate selfish misbehavior. Konorski s work assumes that all hosts can hear transmissions from all other hosts. This and some other assumptions by Konorski are not ....

N. Nisan. Algorithms for Selfish Agents. In Proceedings of the Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science, LNCS 1563,, pages 1--17, Berlin, March 1999. Springer.

....[5] and [6] are the results of the Terminodes project. General reviews of the Terminodes project, and of the related security problems, can be found in [14] 15] 16] C. Algorithmic mechanism design and game theory Our approach is motivated by algorithmic mechanism design (see e.g. 17] [18], 19] 20] 21] 22] 23] 24] which is an emerging active research area in the intersection of computer science and mathematical economics. In particular, Feigenbaum et al. have considered BGP based mechanism design for lowest cost unicast routing in the Internet [23] In [21] Feigenbaum ....

N. Nisan, "Algorithms for selfish agents," in 16th Annual Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science, 1999, pp. 1--15.

....also often referred to as secure circuit evaluation. It is easy to see that an efficient solution to the secure distributed computing problem would be an enabling technology for a large number of interesting distributed applications across the Internet. Some example applications are: auctions ( NIS 99] charging for the use of algorithms on the basis of a usage count ( SAN 98, SAN 98b] various kinds of weighted voting, protecting mobile code integrity and privacy ( SAN 98b, LOU 99] Secure distributed computing is trivial in the presence of a globally trusted third party(TTP) all ....

N. NISAN, "Algorithms for selfish agents", Proceedings of the 16th Annual Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science, Trier, Germany, March 1999, p. 1--15.

....is also often referred to as secure circuit evaluation. It is easy to see that an efficient solution to the secure distributed computing problem would be an enabling technology for a large number of interesting distributed applications across the Internet. Some example applications are: auctions ([12]) charging for the use of algorithms on the basis of a usage count ( 13, 14] various kinds of weighted voting, protecting mobile code integrity and privacy ( 14, 10] Secure distributed computing is trivial in the presence of a globally trusted third party(TTP) all participants send ....

....feasible with the approach of section 3.2, the application would clearly benefit from our approach. For more complex applications requiring multi party SDC protocols, the communication overhead will be larger. A second case study investigates the communication overhead in decentralized auctions ([12]) and is the subject of ongoing research. Let us examine the trust requirements for this approach. Every p i sends his own a i to a remote execution site E j . Hence, p i can trust its agent. Furthermore, p i needs to be convinced that the excecution base E j on which its agent a i runs, is ....

N. Nisan, "Algorithms for selfish agents", Proceedings of the 16th Annual Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science, Trier, Germany, March 1999, p. 1--15.

....as mechanism design start from a specification of the agents preferences and design the interaction process characteristic to the learning in games setup to attain a socially desirable equilibrium. Such mechanisms 6 have been recently studied from the standpoint of algorithmic efficiency [23] They assume, however, rather detailed knowledge (in the form of a utility function) of the agents preferences. Such information is often not available beforehand, yet we have to develop mechanisms that are robust enough to encompass the real world applications. We propose to extend the COLT ....

N. Nisan, Algorithms for Selfish Agents, in Proc. 16th Annual Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science, Trier, Germany, March 1999. Lecture Notes in Computer Science 1563, pp. 1--15, Springer Verlag.

....is also often referred to as secure circuit evaluation. It is easy to see that an efficient solution to the secure distributed computing problem would be an enabling technology for a large number of interesting distributed applications across the Internet. Some example applications are: auctions ([12]) charging for the use of algorithms on the basis of a usage count ( 13, 14] various kinds of weighted voting, protecting mobile code integrity and privacy ( 14, 10] etc: Secure distributed computing is trivial in the presence of a globally trusted third party(TTP) all participants send ....

N. Nisan, "Algorithms for selfish agents", Proceedings of the 16th Annual Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science, Trier, Germany, March 1999, p. 1--15.

....the game theoretic literature stresses incentives with (usually) little regard for network complexity, while the theoretical computer science literature (usually) focuses on complexity without much consideration of incentives. In one of the first works to merge these two concerns, Nisan and Ronen [23, 24, 25] pose noncooperative allocation problems such as routing and load balancing and analyze the computational complexity of the relevant strategyproof mechanisms. Our work is very much in the same spirit as theirs, except that they consider a centralized setting for the computation, and we address the ....

....issue quite elegantly for the case in which there are no costs. Their approach does not appear to generalize easily to the case in which users incur di#erent network costs. Third, one can try to develop a general theory of the network complexity of mechanism design problems, as Nisan and Ronen [23, 24, 25] have done for the centralized complexity of these problems. It would be useful to be able to prove that particular mechanisms are complete or hard for the relevant network complexity classes. This will require formal computational models, appropriate notions of reduction, and other basic ....

Nisan, N. (1999). Algorithms for selfish agents, in "Proceedings of the 16th Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science," pp. 1--17, Springer-Verlag, Berlin. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 1563.

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Noam Nisan. Algorithms for selfish agents. In STACS, 1999.

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Noam Nisan. Algorithms for selfish agents. In To appear in Proceedings of the 16th Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science, Trier, Germany, March 1999.

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Noam Nisan. Algorithms for selfish agents. In To appear in Proceedings of the 16th Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science, Trier, Germany, March 1999.

....about the fraction of obedient agents that are incompatible with the mechanismdesign framework, and they have unacceptable network complexity. However, they provide a logical starting point for the design of privacy friendly solutions. The agent privacy issue was raised in an early paper of Nisan [Nis99], as was the potential applicability of SMFE techniques. However, few specific DAMD problems have thus far been addressed from an agent privacy point of view. We believe that privacy friendly DAMD is an important research direction and that interdomain routing is a compelling example in which it ....

N. Nisan. "Algorithms for Selfish Agents," in Proceedings of the Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science, LNCS 1563, pages 1-17, Springer, Berlin, 1999.

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Noam Nisan. Algorithms for selfish agents. To appear in Proceedings of the 16th Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science, Trier, Germany, March 1999.

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N. NISAN, "Algorithms for selfish agents", Proceedings of the 16th Annual Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science, Trier, Germany, March 1999, p. 1--15.

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Nisan, N. (1999). Algorithms for selfish agents, in "Proceedings of the 16th Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science," pp. 1--17, Springer-Verlag, Berlin. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 1563.

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Noam Nisan. Algorithms for selfish agents. In Proc. 16th Int. Symp. on Theoret. Aspects of Comput. Sci. (STACS), volume 1563 of Lecture Notes in Comput. Sci., pages 1--15. Springer, 1999.

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Noam Nisan. Algorithms for selfish agents. In 16th Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science, 1999.

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Noam Nisan. Algorithms for selfish agents. In 16th Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science, 1999.

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N. Nisan, Algorithms for selfish agents, in "Proceedings of 16th Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science," pp. 1--17, Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 1999. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 1563.

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